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Abstract
Proper Names appear at the heart of several debates in philosophy and the cognitive sciences.
These include reference, intentionality, and the nature of belief as well as language acquisi-
tion, cognitive development, and memory. This dissertation follows a cognitive approach
to the philosophical problems posed by proper names. It puts an emphasis on adequately
describing the actual cognitive abilities that allow humans to understand and use proper
names. To achieve this goal I use the evidence obtained by cognitive and neuropsychology
as well as psycholinguistics. The result is an empirically informed and integrative theory of
reference, language use and intentionality, and some metaphysics and epistemology thereof.
Chapter 2 argues against descriptivism and partly develops a theory according to which
an understanding of reference is prelinguistic and requires no mediating descriptive inten-
sions. The theory, which is consistent with a referentialist semantics for names, is supported
by empirical data from lexical, cognitive and neuropsychological research on the acquisi-
tion, understanding and processing of proper names. If correct, this theory has important
consequences for the debate concerning the possibility of singular thought.
Chapter 3 describes the relation between proper name use and the structure of be-
lief by reflecting on the intimate connection between the puzzles of informativeness and
substitution-failure. Chapter 4 offers a psychological and linguistic resolution of the puzzles.
It offers an account of the psychological architecture involved in proper name processing
and shows how it interacts with a linguistic account of how proper names are used in tandem
with predicate meaning-transfer.
Chapter 5 offers a theory of empty names by using some cognitive-general, non-linguistic,
resources. A special kind of mental representational state (i.e., EDU-attitudes) and its content
(i.e., EDUs) is described and applied. By solving the problems posed by the ordinary use of
empty names, the theory helps illuminate issues in metaphysics, ontology, intentionality, and
fictional imaginings. Chapter 5 also offers a metalinguistic account of negative existential
assertions (e.g., utterances of the form ‘X doesn’t exist’). This account helps us avoid a
common dilemma between a controversial ontology and an unsatisfactory linguistic theory.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction: Why should we care about
proper names?
Why should a philosopher care about proper names? I see proper names as located at
two different thresholds: first, between the world of our thoughts, beliefs and desires and
the world of our actions, institutions, and practice; and second, between the linguistic
and the non-linguistic, between the world of meanings and truth-values and the world of
representations and imaginings. Thus, proper names turn out to be important for several
reasons.
On the one hand, a proper understanding of the ordinary use of proper names illuminates
several cognitive phenomena such as language acquisition and use, as well as the nature of
thought and belief (intentionality). On the other hand, there is no understanding of proper
names without a proper understanding of reference. Thus, proper names also teach us about
how our thoughts and assertions relate to the world, thereby teaching us about the latter by
telling us what the former are about.
We have thoughts about how the world is, but we also like to think about how it should
be. So, presumably, a proper understanding of reference and intentionality should help
us understand not only our claims to knowledge but also our value judgments. I think a
satisfactory account of proper names sheds some light over these issues as well (see Shatz
1994 and 2008).
To address the central issues I have decided to follow a more recent methodology: what
has come to be known as “cognitively oriented” philosophical theorizing (see Leslie 2007
and 2008). This means that I will be mostly worried about how it is that human beings
actually manage to acquire, understand, and use a given natural language and, in particular,
proper names. Thus, my main goal is not to offer a formal semantic model for proper names,
one that we may then associate with compositional rules in order to recursively assign
truth-conditions to all possible sentences involving proper names.
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Throughout, I am interested in finding a way to better understand the actual cognitive
abilities required for natural language speakers to do what they do when using proper names.
Since these abilities are responsible for our understanding of proper names, providing an
account of them should allow us to understand the contribution made by a proper name to the
content of a thought. I believe this approach is complementary to the more traditional one;
yet the methodologies are clearly distinct (for a recent contrasting approach, see Cumming
2008). A lot of work has been done on the logic of proper names. I think it is time to start
working on getting the psychology straight. With this dissertation I hope to contribute to
that part of the philosophical project.
1.1 Reference
Proper names are perhaps the most paradigmatic devices of reference. They are independent
of perceptual characteristics, universal across languages, and primitive for all of them (see
Hall, 1999). Furthermore, they are learned much before (4.5 - 6 months of age) any other
terms (some common nouns appear at 9-10 months and adjectives at 18), suggesting that
proper names are among the building blocks of language development.
There are two broad views about reference for proper names (see Reimer 2003). On
the one hand, there are those who think that reference is not mediated. On this view, the
contribution of a proper name to the content of a thought just is its referent. On the other
hand, there are those who think that reference is mediated. Those who like this latter view
have generally proposed what is known as “sense” theories of reference, where a sense is
supposed to play the mediating role between the referent and the thought. This view is
associated with description theories of reference since it is common to identify senses with
the content of definite descriptions.1
In chapter 2 we argue against the view according to which reference for proper names is
mediated by definite descriptions.2 We offer an empirical assessment of description theories
of names by looking at evidence on lexical and cognitive development, memory, and aphasia.
We show that description theories demand much more cognitive resources than what the
data suggest and so they lack empirical support.
In this chapter we also offer a preliminary developmental account of reference for proper
1Not all description theories of names count as description theories of reference. Russell 1905 argues that
names are not referential devices but disguised descriptions, which he analyzes in terms of quantifiers. On this
view, reference is not mediated by a description, but names do have a descriptive content as their semantic
value.
2Chapter 2 was coauthored with Marilyn Shatz. A version of it will appear in Mind & Language.
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names. On this view, an understanding of reference is the result of a prelinguistic prepared-
ness on the side of subjects to understand that a given object (e.g., the string of sounds ‘Jon’)
can be the sign of something else (e.g., Jon). We offer some evidence on behalf of this
account.
As a result, this chapter offers indirect support for the view that there is direct reference
and, thus, for the view that the objects to which we refer can constitute the content of our
thoughts. The issue of whether there are some such thoughts—also known as “singular
thoughts”— is still hotly debated among philosophers (see Recanati forthcoming). I believe
the arguments in chapter 2 can substantially illuminate this debate.
Mallon, Machery, Nichols, and Stich 2009 argue against drawing philosophically sig-
nificant conclusions out of theories of reference. This is so because, the authors claim,
“intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural
work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals
in a culture” [p.332]. The account of reference we present in chapter 2 is based on evi-
dence from lexical and cognitive development as well as on research from neurophysiology.
Intuitions do not play a central role in it. As such, it avoids Mallon and colleagues’ criticism.
A more fully developed version of this developmental account of reference promises
to be fruitful in different philosophical areas such as: the metaphysics of mind, philosophy
of science, and metaethics.3 Now, exactly how and to what extent this theory proves to be
useful in these areas is, of course, an open question.
1.2 Belief and Intentionality
Understanding the nature of thought and belief is necessary to understand how the mind
relates to the world and, ultimately, how it is that humans may be said to have knowledge of
their surroundings. Much is left to be done in order to achieve such an understanding of the
mind, but some progress may be achieved by solving some puzzles of intentionality—i.e.,
puzzles concerning mental states with content. Some of these longstanding puzzles, owed to
Frege 1892 and Kripke 1979, involve proper names.
The evidence presented in chapter 2 suggests a rather simple view of the content of
names. According to this view, all there is to the contribution of a name is its referent. Frege
1892 argues that such a view is unable to account for the fact that competent speakers may
fully understand the sentence pairs (1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b) and still take each sentence to
3For a more detailed account of how philosophers have drawn important philosophical conclusions from
the theory of reference, see Mallon and colleagues 2009.
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convey different information even though, unbeknownst to the speaker, (1b) is true.
(1a) Melville is Melville.
(1b) Melville is Bartleby.
(2a) Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(2b) Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
If the simple view is correct, then ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’ make exactly the same con-
tribution to the content of the sentences in which they are used. How, then, can a competent
speaker still take each member of the pair of sentences to convey different information?
How can she, for example, believe (1a) but not (1b) or (2a) but not (2b)? It seems obvious
that the sentences in question differ in informative value. How can there be such a difference
without a corresponding difference in the contribution made by the names?
The substitution of coreferential names fails to preserve informative value among simple
assertive utterances. The tradition has called this “the problem of informativeness”. This
problem has given place to further puzzles that are more explicitly concerned with the
attitudes. It seems that (3a) and (3b) may be true of the very same subject that ignores (1b)
(3a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(3b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
It seems then that the substitution of coreferential names may also fail to preserve truth
value. Kripke 1979 argues that these problems are more likely concerned with the nature of
belief, for a similar puzzle may arise for a competent speaker even when there is a single
name involved.
Peter may learn the name ‘Paderewski’ with an identification of the person
named as a famous pianist. Naturally, having learned this, Peter will assent to
“Paderewski has musical talent”, and we can infer — using ‘Paderewski’, as we
usually do, to name the Polish musician and statesman:
(3c) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent.
Later, in a different circle, Peter learns of someone called ‘Paderewski’ who
was a Polish nationalist leader and Prime Minister. Peter is skeptical of the
musical abilities of politicians. He concludes that probably two people . . . were
both named ‘Paderewski’. [. . . ] Peter assents to, “Paderewski had no musical
talent”. Should we infer . . . :
(3d) Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent.
[Kripke, 1979, p.265.]
I deal with these puzzles in Chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 3, I argue that informativeness
and substitution failure are not two independent phenomena demanding two distinct expla-
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nations. I show they are intimately related, in such a way that any context that gives place
to one of them will also give place to the other; and similarly, any solution to any of these
problems will also solve the other. I give an account of this intimate relation by looking
at research on the cognitive mechanisms involved in what psychologists have called the
“theory of mind mechanism” (see Leslie 1987). On this view, there is substitution failure
in both language and thought in virtue of it being a design feature of the human cognitive
apparatus, a feature that allows our mental states to distinguish between a representation
and its interpretation.
In chapter 4, I offer an integrative account of the puzzles. I do so by looking at some
evidence on the semantic assumptions that are in play when speakers learn new names and
integrating this with a linguistic account of predicate meaning transfer. On the psychological
side, I argue that a rational and competent speaker may fail to notice that two distinct
expressions are coreferential, even though she may know what both refer to, because she
has stored them in different files. I describe some of the criteria that speakers seem to follow
when distinguishing among referential expressions. I show how this view is empirically
substantiated by offering evidence on memory, information retrieval, and proper name
acquisition. An advantage of this view it that it does not make any extraordinary cognitive
demands on the side of speakers.
On the linguistic side, the account explains how speakers may use sentences like (2a)-
(2b) within belief reports in order to convey the information that the ascribee has failed to
notice that two expressions are coreferential. This results in belief reports that use different
coreferential names and have different truth-values, such as (3a)-(3b).
(3a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(3b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
To explain this I appeal to the mechanism of meaning transfer for predicates and to a
self-referential use of proper names. On this view, when engaged in the job of ascribing atti-
tudes with substitution failure speakers use the relevant names to convey themselves. They
do so in a way that hearers may identify that something like this is the right interpretation.
In chapter 4 I offer an account of the mechanism by means of which hearers may retrieve
such interpretation from the conventional meaning of the terms used.
Frege’s puzzles of informativeness and substitution failure have been widely applied.
Kalderon 2004, for example, argues that one of the central arguments in contemporary
metaethics, namely, Moore’s famous “open question argument,” is nothing more than a
variant of Frege’s puzzle. If so, then the integrated account presented in chapter 4 should
be of some relevance to metaethics. Others have used the problem of substitution failure
to argue against certain views of the metaphysics of mind (see Kim 2006, chapter 4). The
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integrated account should also be helpful here.
1.3 Imagination and the use of language
We normally use names to talk about the world of our experience, but we also use them to
imagine how that world could be and how we want it to be. We use them not only to engage
in acts of pretense (e.g., fictional names) but also in acts of serious science making (e.g.,
failed scientific hypothesis). Understanding the ordinary use of empty names seems central
to understand this rather important part of human cognition. How do speakers manage to
use names like ‘Santa’ and ‘Vulcan’ to convey truth-evaluable, non-trivial, information?
Children believe in the existence of fictional characters, and behave accordingly. Scien-
tists sometimes endorse failed hypothesis, and behave accordingly. In their relevant contexts,
utterances of ‘Santa wears red’ and ‘Vulcan is a planet’ may convey something true and
informative. How can all these claims be true? What is it that children believe when they
believe that Santa is coming? What did Le Verrier believe when he thought that Vulcan was
responsible for the changes in the orbit of Mercury?
To answer these questions we need to explain: (i) what is the contribution made by an
empty name to the content of a sentence; (ii) how this makes such content a truth-evaluable
one; (iii) how that content is efficacious at guiding behavior; (iv) how this fits in the overall
picture of language and cognitive development; (v) how this fits within a general fiction
/ non-fiction distinction; (vi) and how this fits within a more general semantic theory for
proper names. Chapter 5 presents a new account of empty names, the cognitive theory, that
is capable of addressing all these issues.
The cognitive theory of empty names comes in two parts. First, it assumes a referentialist
semantics for names, according to which the only semantic contribution of a proper name is
its referent. In doing so we can extend the same semantic treatment to all referential uses
of proper names, including empty names. This is a great advantage and, to my mind, an
important contribution of my theory to the debate on empty names. A consequence of this
homogenous treatment is that assertions, belief reports, and fictional games that make use of
empty names are not intelligible in virtue of their semantics alone. So we need the second
part of the theory to explain how such uses are intelligible.
Here I offer a psychological account of the mechanism involved in uses of empty names
in a way that is independent of the semantics of the expressions used. On this view, when us-
ing empty names speakers assert, believe, report, and desire the contents of their imaginings,
which are concerned with what I call “epistemically decoupled units” or EDUs for short.
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The theory contributes to the debate on empty names by arguing for two central theses:
Cognitivism: Referential uses of empty names are intelligible not merely in virtue of
semantics and / or pragmatics, but mainly in virtue of the cognitive-general resources
they recruit (i.e., something like Leslie’s 1987 “decoupling mechanism”).
Representationism: Two object-directed attitudes, the content of which is cognitively
determined (as above), may be directed toward the same object even if the associated
representations have been (cognitively) assigned different referents.
In chapter 5, I offer a description of the cognitive mechanism appealed to by the cognitive
theory. I explain how it works and how it delivers the relevant representational objects (i.e.,
EDUs) that we need in order to address issues (i)-(v) above. I also offer a detailed account of
this cognitive content by comparing it with the more well known notion of a proposition.
On this view, the explanatorily relevant contribution of an empty name is made cognitively
not linguistically; this contribution delivers something pretty much like a proposition (i.e.,
an EDU), which explains both the truth-evaluability of the relevant speech acts and the
behavior-guiding feature of the associated mental states. The theory is consistent with the
evidence on competence for proper names, presented in chapter 2, as well as with recent
psychological research on pretense. The account is also good enough to meet a challenge
posed by Walton 1990 with respect to the general fiction / non-fiction divide.
In chapter 5, I show how this machinery helps us understand the ordinary use of fictional
names as well as of empty names associated with failed scientific hypothesis. I think the
cognitive theory is well suited to illuminate other philosophical puzzles as well. I briefly
describe how it can be used to address some problems in metaphysics and metaethics, and
how it offers a solution to the longstanding problem of intentional inexistence owed to
Brentano 1874.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes by addressing a puzzle raised by uses of empty names in
negative existential constructions: i.e., expressions of the form ‘X doesn’t exist’, where ‘X’
is a referential term. We all know that Santa does not exist. And the same goes for Vulcan.
What we know is a piece of non-trivial information about the actual world: it is such that
there is no Santa, and no Vulcan. How is it that we manage to convey this information by
using names without referents and, a fortiori, without truth-conditions?
There are independent reasons to think that negative existential assertions do not involve
referential uses of empty names. On my view, we are better off understanding negative
existentials as involving self-referential uses, i.e., where the name, say, ‘Santa’, is used to
refer to itself. Thus, on this view, the speaker conveys some metalinguistic information
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about the name used in the negative existential sentence. Strictly speaking, this use of an
empty name is not empty: it refers to itself. Yet it is because ordinary referential uses of the
same name are empty that negative existential assertions are true.
According to this metalinguistic interpretation, an assertion of (4a) in the relevant context
will be properly interpreted as (4b).
(4a) Santa doesn’t exist.
(4b) ‘Santa’ doesn’t name something.
Chapter 5 concludes by describing two mechanisms—meaning transfer and presupposi-
tion accommodation—that speakers may exploit in order to get their audience to properly
interpret their use of a negative existential assertion.
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Chapter 2
On Problems with Descriptivism:
Psychological Assumptions and
Empirical Evidence
This paper offers an empirical assessment of Description Theories of Proper Names.1 We
look at empirical data from various sources, including lexical and cognitive development,
memory, and aphasia, to see whether they support Description Theories. It turns out that
Description Theories demand much more, in terms of cognitive skill, than what the data sug-
gest. We argue that Description Theories are lacking in empirical support. This undermines
their success as philosophical theories for proper names in natural languages.
2.1 Background
There is an ongoing philosophical debate with respect to proper names. The attention is
focused on two central questions. First, assuming that proper names refer, how is it that they
do? Second, what is the meaning (if any) of a proper name? Theories of names are classified
in three main groups, relative to their answers to these questions: Millian, Descriptivist, and
Hybrid. In this paper we start with a review of Mill but we will focus on theories of the
second kind.2
1This chapter was co-authored with Marilyn Shatz. A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Mind &
Language.
2Hybrid Theories claim that some descriptive information is necessary for reference-fixing purposes but
not for meaning-determination purposes. We do not discuss these theories anywhere in this paper.
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2.1.1 Mill’s view
John Stuart Mill 1864 offered what seemed to be the most intuitive answer to the question
of meaning for proper names: names are denotative but not connotative. Mill has been
paraphrased as claiming that the only meaning, if any, of a proper name is its referent. This
view has been defended and developed by Marcus 1961, Kripke 1980, and Donnellan 1966
and 1970 among many others. (See Reimer, 2003; Braun, 2007; and Lycan, 2006 for a more
detailed account.)
Mill’s view has one initial flaw. It does not offer a response to the question of reference
fixing for proper names. It is not, properly speaking, a complete theory of proper names.
This condition has been supplemented by means of what is called a “causal theory of
reference” (see Kripke, 1980, and Evans, 1973 for discussion). An important feature of
this theory is that it does not require the use of any identifying descriptive information.
As a result, the requirements for proper-name use and acquisition are very minimal. All
the speaker needs is to stand in the proper causal relation or have the proper referential
intentions. The speaker need not identify the descriptive information (if any) that other
competent speakers may associate with their use of the name.
2.1.2 Frege’s insight
The simplicity of this theory is compelling. Unfortunately, it is also problematic. Frege
1892 describes what seems to be a crucial inadequacy of Mill’s view. Consider the following
sentences: ‘Hesperus is Venus’ and ‘Venus is Venus’. If they are true, then both express,
according to the Millian, exactly the same content: that one object (i.e., the planet Venus) is
identical to itself. This is so because true identity statements use coreferential names, and
having the same reference is tantamount to having the same meaning.
Intuitively, however, it seems that ‘Hesperus is Venus’ is more informative, less trivial,
than ‘Venus is Venus’. Still, they vary only in the use of different but coreferential names.
Hence, the difference cannot be explained in terms of reference. Yet, appealing to reference
seems to be the only move available to the Millian. After all, there is supposed to be no
other feature of names that may be content-relevant.
To solve this problem Frege 1892 proposed a different theory of names. According to
this view proper names have reference (Bedeutung) and sense (Sinn). Frege’s “sense” is
commonly taken as an analogue of a definite description (see Dummett 1973 and 1981) for
a somewhat different interpretation). A definite description is an expression of the form
‘The F’ where ‘F’ is a predicate satisfied by a unique object. According to Rusell’s 1905
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traditional account, definite descriptions carry uniqueness and existential entailments. The
former entailment is of central importance. It guarantees that the definite description will
designate a single individual, thus being an ideal candidate to play the reference-fixing role
for proper names. Definite descriptions convey uniquely identifying information about the
designated object. An indefinite description, like ‘A PLANET’, will not do the work. It
cannot fix the reference of, say, ‘Venus’ , because the descriptive information it conveys
does not uniquely identify the object it describes.
The resulting theory claims that each proper name has an associated definite description.
Definite descriptions are meant to express senses and these are, according to Frege, abstract,
external, objects. For the speaker to understand a name she must grasp a sense. According to
Frege at least, what the speaker grasps determines the reference of her use of the name. This
view is usually called “descriptivism”. Following Reimer 2003, we call this, and similar
theories, “basic descriptivism”.
This explains how the reference gets fixed: i.e., the referent will be the object that
satisfies the definite description. It does not yet explain what determines the meaning of
a name. For that we need Frege’s further claim that the reference-fixing mechanism also
determines the meaning of the name. To put it somehow, names have two different levels
of meaning: the referent and the associated description. Call this, and similar theories,
“expanded descriptivism”. Since Frege and Russell, a great variety of description theories
have been offered. Section 2.2 explains how these theories diverge.
It is important to note that the explanatory power of descriptivism comes at a particular
cost. In order to be competent in the use of a (descriptivist) proper name, a speaker must rep-
resent or understand the relevant concepts expressed by the appropriate definite description.
It seems that speakers can be competent users of proper names with much less resources
than those required by descriptivist theories. It is our contention that this claim is confirmed
by the experimental data.3
Before we proceed, we want to clarify our argument. What does it mean to say that
competent speakers know, or understand, something?4 Following various Description Theo-
rists, we will argue (see section 2.6.1) that Description Theories are concerned with actual
3Millian theorists —most famously Kripke 1980— have criticized descriptivism on similar grounds.
Among other problems, Kripke points at what Devitt and Sterelny (Devitt and Sterelny 1999) call the “igno-
rance” problem. Briefly put, the claim is that a speaker who ignores exactly which properties identify the
object to which their use of a name refers, may nevertheless refer to it successfully.
4A traditional answer in philosophy, see Wittgenstein 1953 and Austin 1962, argues that linguistic compe-
tence is a matter of language use or knowledge-how. Another option is to take competence as an instance of
propositional knowledge, knowledge-that, which need not involve any actual use. This is still an open debate
in philosophy. Generally speaking, linguists subscribe to the competence / performance distinction; thereby
opening the door for a use-independent notion of competence. The distinction, however, is not widely accepted
among philosophers. See section 2.6.1 for further discussion.
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language use and, hence, that their answer to this question should be complemented with
empirical research. With this in mind, we use the terms ‘competent’ and ‘competent speaker’
simply to refer to a speaker who is able to use a name successfully, for the purposes at hand,
and according to the applicable standards.
If so, then Description Theories presuppose, at least, some kind of processing model.
In section 2.3 we offer a general picture of the cognitive skills required for proper name
processing according to Description Theories. These are what we call “the psychological
assumptions of descriptivism”. Section 2.4 evaluates these assumptions against the empirical
evidence.
Table 2.1 Varieties of Description Theories
Description Theories Rigidified Descriptions Meaning Determination
Expanded No: Mental Content Yes
Cluster Yes: Cluster Yes
Boethian Yes:@-transformed Yes
Causal Yes: Causal No
Two-Dimensional Yes: Causal and Partially
Counterfactual Two Meanings
Wide Scope Yes: Mental Content Yes
Metalinguistic No Metalinguistic
(see also footnote 5)
2.2 Varieties of descriptivism
There are seven distinguishable kinds of Description Theories of proper names. See Ta-
ble 2.1. They all vary depending on how they respond to the central questions: how do
names refer? And, what is the meaning of a name?
2.2.1 Expanded descriptivism
Frege 1892 and, under a certain reading, Russell 1905, proposed the view previously de-
scribed. This view, expanded descriptivism, claims that the mechanism of reference is given
by a definite description, and that the meaning of a name is both, the meaning of such
description and the referent. Suppose that S is a competent user of the name ‘N’. This view
entails that there is one definite description ‘DD’ which serves as the reference mechanism
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of ‘N’. Frege 1892 also claims that for S to be competent in the use of ‘N’, S must understand
‘DD’.
Thus, expanded descriptivism requires that a particular definite description, ‘DD’, con-
stitute the reference-fixing mechanism and the meaning of a name; it also claims that a
competent speaker must know this.
2.2.2 Cluster descriptivism
This latter requirement proved to be problematic for the reasons above presented (i.e., the
problem of ignorance). Subsequent theories have modified their requirements in order to
fix this problem. Cluster descriptivism claims that, instead of a single definite description,
the reference-fixing mechanism is given by the disjunction of all the definite descriptions
that the speaker associates with the use of the name. These might include descriptions
such as ‘the object that other speakers in my community refer to by ‘N’ .’ In its expanded
version, cluster descriptivism claims that this disjunction also defines the meaning of ‘N.’
Wittgenstein 1953 and Strawson 1959 endorse this view, and Searle 1958 seems to do so
(though he has two different stories). The expanded version requires that the speaker take
the cluster to be synonymous with ‘N’ and, hence, understand the disjunctive cluster in order
to use ‘N.’
Searle 1983 presents a somewhat different account. For this version the reference-fixing
mechanism does not constitute the meaning of the name. Thus, basic cluster descriptivism
does not require that S knows, or is able to single out, such description in order to under-
stand the meaning of ‘N.’ It does require, however, that S be able to identify the referent
as satisfying the relevant definite description in order to fix the reference of ‘N.’ This is
the requirement of a basic form of descriptivism. Otherwise, S will not be able to use
the proposed mechanism in order to fix the reference of ‘N.’ Furthermore, since expanded
descriptivisms include basic descriptivism, the latter requirement is common to both forms
of descriptivism.
2.2.3 Boethian expanded descriptivism
Boethian descriptivism claims that proper names express essential properties of their ref-
erents and that they do so via descriptions. One way to get this result is through the
@-transform of a definite description. The definite description ‘the second planet between
the Sun and the Earth’ uniquely identifies Venus. Now suppose that ‘@’ is a proper name of
the actual world. The @-transform of the description above is: ‘the second planet between
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the Sun and the Earth in @’. This latter description expresses a property that Venus has in
all possible worlds (according to Plantinga, an essential property).
Plantinga’s Boethian descriptivism (Plantinga, 1978) is also expanded. The reference-
fixing mechanism of ‘N’, say, ‘@-DD’ is the meaning of ‘N’. Thus, Boethian descriptivism
not only requires that S be able to identify the referent as satisfying the relevant @-
transformed description, but also that she understands such a description in order to be a
competent user of ‘N’.
2.2.4 Basic causal descriptivism
Some theorists prefer a basic form of descriptivism without endorsing an expanded version
(see Lewis, 1984, Kroon, 1987, and Jackson, 1998a). As presented in Lewis 1984, causal
descriptivism claims that the reference-fixing mechanism is constituted by a description that:
(1) may be rigidified, as in ‘the actual A’; (2) may be egocentric, as in ‘the actual A in my
town’; (3) may involve mental states, as in ‘the actual A in my town that I am thinking of’;
and (4) should involve relations of causal acquaintance, as in ‘the actual A in my town that
is the causal source of my A-thought.’
Call the latter a ‘causal, rigidified, description’.5 Basic causal descriptivism claims
that the reference-fixing mechanism of a proper name ‘N’ is given by a causal, rigidified,
description. It does not claim, however, that such a description also determines the meaning
of ‘N’. Thus, basic causal descriptivism does not require that S understands, or identifies,
such a description in order to understand the meaning of ‘N’. As any other descriptivism,
it does require that S be able to identify the referent as satisfying the relevant description
for reference-fixing purposes.6 This is how causal description theories differ from Kripke’s
view. According to the latter, even though the reference-fixing mechanism is causal, the
speaker need not be able to identify an object as satisfying any definite description to use a
name successfully.
5A rigidifier is an operator that makes of any given term a rigid designator. A rigid designator is a term that
refers to the same object in all the possible worlds in which that object exists —including counterfactual ones—
and does not refer in worlds in which it does not exist. The description ‘The president of the USA’ is not a
rigid designator, but the rigidified description ‘The ACTUAL President of the USA’ is. The latter description,
but not the former, refers to George Bush in counterfactual situations where the President is not Bush but Gore.
6Nelson 2002 defends what seems to be an expanded causal descriptivism. See Nelson 2002, p.410 on
different versions of causal descriptivism. Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson 2007 seem to have a similar story.
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2.2.5 Two-dimensional (expanded) descriptivism
Jackson 1998b and Chalmers 2002 defend theories according to which every proper name
has two meanings: a uniquely identifying property and the object that instantiates such
a property. This version is similar to causal descriptivism in that it does not identify the
meaning of a name with the mechanism used to fix its reference. As with causal theories,
the description used for reference-fixing may be causal, egocentric, etc. It can also be
counterfactual (e.g., ‘the object that in such counterfactual situation has such property’).
However, the description used to refer to the uniquely identifying property is at least part
of the meaning of the name. In this sense, it differs from causal theories by holding a view
closer to that of Expanded Description Theories. Two-dimensional theories do not explicitly
require that the speaker be knowledgeable about which description partly determines the
meaning of the name.
Two-dimensional descriptivism does require that a speaker S be able to understand the
relevant description in order to understand a name ‘N’ —even though it does not require
that S knows which description it is. It also requires that S be able to identify the referent as
satisfying the relevant description.
2.2.6 Wide scope expanded descriptivism
As proposed by Dummett 1981 and, on a certain reading, Russell 1905, this view is con-
sistent with an expanded description theory. It has been developed and strengthened, in
different ways, by Sosa 2001 and Stanley 1997. This theory presupposes Russell’s 1905
account of descriptions, according to which definite descriptions have two readings when
used in opaque contexts. The central claim of wide scope expanded descriptivism is that
proper names take a wide scope with respect to modal operators. It is also consistent with
the requirement of rigidified descriptions.
As such, wide scope expanded descriptivism has almost the same requirements as ex-
panded descriptivism. S must be able to identify the referent as satisfying the relevant
description. S must also understand the relevant description when using ‘N’.
2.2.7 Metalinguistic descriptivism
Metalinguistic descriptivism is meant to be only a theory of the meaning of proper names.
As such, it is not committed to any particular theory of the reference-fixing mechanism of
names. This makes it a distinct description theory, distinct from both basic and expanded
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versions. The central claim of metalinguistic descriptivism is that for any name ‘N’ there
is one single description of the form ‘the bearer of ‘N’ ’ such that it is the meaning of ‘N’.
No other description will do and no other restrictions can be put into the description. The
view was initially presented by Russell 1919 and later developed by Loar 1978, and Bach
1981. On this version, metalinguistic descriptivism is only committed to the claim that S
must understand ‘the bearer of ‘N’ ’ in order to be a competent user of ‘N’.
Katz 1994 offers a different version. He accepts the original claim about the meaning of
‘N’ while adding that such a description is necessary but not sufficient for reference-fixing.
On his “purely metalinguistic” view, the sense is given by the description ‘the thing which is
a bearer of ‘N’ .’ It is clear that this is not sufficient for reference fixing, since there normally
are several objects that bear the same name ‘N.’ 7
2.3 What descriptivism presupposes
We have presented the diverse claims that each of these versions make. Given the variety
of Description Theories it seems difficult to say what exactly they are all committed to.
Nevertheless, there is something they are all supposed to have in common. In this section
we will try to answer the following questions. First, what (if any) is (are) the common
claim(s) underlying all forms of descriptivism? Second, what is required for the claim(s) to
be fulfilled?
2.3.1 Towards an operative account of descriptivism
The first question has an easy answer. The different description theories we have presented
fall into three different groups: basic, semantic, and expanded. All of them appeal to psy-
chological (or internal) facts to account for referential uses of proper names. Basic versions
are committed to REFERENTIAL, semantic versions are committed to SEMANTIC, and
expanded versions are committed to both.
REFERENTIAL for any competent subject S, any name ‘N’ and some appropriate definite
description ‘DD’, S competently understands ‘N’ iff S refers to N by means of DD.
SEMANTIC for any competent subject S, any name ‘N’ and some appropriate definite
description ‘DD’, S competently understands ‘N’ iff S understands DD and DD is the
7What makes of this a purely metalinguistic view is the claim that the property of BEING A BEARER OF
‘N’ is not supposed to be a property of the object, but simply a relation that holds in virtue of certain linguistic
practices.
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content of ‘N’ for S.8
The second question, however, is not so easily answered. We want to see if the empirical
data support a description theory of names. To do so we need an operative account of
description theories. An operative account would give an answer to our second question:
what is required to confirm description theories? That, however, is exactly what we are
missing. We will offer such an account hoping that it is acceptable to description theorists.
Let us start by stating our assumptions. First, there is something to be said about the the-
ory’s goal. Is the theory about some logically possible language or about natural languages?
We presuppose it is a theory of the latter kind. Is it a theory of how ordinary competent
speakers of any natural language, say, English speakers use proper names? We presuppose a
positive answer to this question. If, contrary to what we think, description theories do not
purport to describe ordinary uses of proper names, then much of what we have to say in
this paper will be irrelevant for such theories. However, there are reasons to think that this
assumption is confirmed. For a detailed discussion of this point, see 2.6.1.
If description theories are concerned with ordinary uses of names, then they must presup-
pose that something like REFERENTIAL and SEMANTIC are true of the way in which
ordinary English speakers use proper names. This is our second assumption, which comes
with our third and final. We presuppose that description theories should be consistent with
the empirical data about ordinary English speakers’ use of names, which includes cognitive,
lexical, and neurological evidence.
This gives us a place from which to start. An operative account of description theories
will, at least, give us the psychological analogues —an operational version— of REFEREN-
TIAL and SEMANTIC. What must psychologically be the case in order for these to be true?
The rest of this section is devoted to developing the psychological picture of a competent
speaker according to description theories of names. In section 2.4 we present three kinds of
data (lexical, cognitive, and memory) arguing for a psychology that is incompatible with the
characterization presented here. The issue, then, is not whether description theories entail a
psychological account; we take that as a given. Rather, the issue is whether they do it in a
empirically supported way.
Let us start with what description theorists have to say. According to Stanley:
If the descriptive picture is true, then, for each expression in our language,
we possess a priori uniquely identifying knowledge about its referent. Such
a premise is more than just a useful tool in epistemological and metaphysical
8These two claims together illustrate the classical view of concepts as applied to proper names. See
Margolis and Laurence 1999, especially pp.21-23.
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theorizing. For if the descriptive picture is true, then we have a rich store of a
priori knowledge. [1997, p.565.]9
Description theories of names require “a rich store’ of “uniquely identifying knowledge
about [. . . ] referents”. We think it is fair to rephrase this in the following way. According to
description theories, competent speakers have a rich store of concepts or representations,
which they use to identify referents. These concepts are meant to be the cognitive correlate
of the central linguistic tool: definite descriptions. (From now on, we will loosely use
‘definite descriptions’ and, alternatively, ‘uniquely identifying concepts’ to mean pretty
much the same. Nothing central hinges upon the choice of terms.)
There are three different ways of understanding concepts (see Margolis and Laurence,
1999, and Rey, 1994): as mental particulars, abstract entities, or as abilities. Since our
central claim is that description theorists demand too much in terms of cognitive skills, we
will assume that their view on concepts is the least demanding one; i.e., concepts as abilities.
If our claim is true, then description theorists will be in fault whatever their concept ontology
may be.
On this view, the a priori knowledge that Stanley talks about turns out to be an ability.
Following the Descriptivist’s central claim, it is the ability to identify objects by assessing
their properties. Notice that this is true for all versions since both, REFERENTIAL and
SEMANTIC require the use of such knowledge either to fix reference or to determine
meaning.
This gives us our first psychological requirement of descriptivism. To competently
understand names is, at least partly, to be able to identify objects by assessing their prop-
erties. For example, one way to be competent in the use of ‘Venus’ is for a speaker to
be able to identify Venus as being the causal source of the visual experience that she has
when observing the morning star. This is the psychological analogue of REFERENTIAL,
which is a commitment of both basic and expanded descriptivism. Let us call this demand,
COGNITIVE.
COGNITIVE for any competent subject S, any name ‘N’, and the relevant definite descrip-
tion ‘DD’, S competently understands ‘N’ only if S is able to identify N as having the
unique properties expressed by ‘DD’.
9Stanley does not explicitly say what he means by ‘a priori knowledge’. One way to understand this, a
paradigmatic example perhaps, is the kind of knowledge that can be obtained by simply knowing the meaning
of a term. This seems to be what Stanley refers to by ‘a priori knowledge,’ in other words, the knowledge that
we have in virtue of the fact that we are competent speakers of a language. What is relevant here is not the
account of the a priori, but the claim that speakers have a rich store of conceptual knowledge simply in virtue
of their linguistic competence.
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In section 2.4 we present evidence that is incompatible with this picture. The argument
is simple. As we have seen, if description theories are true, then competent users of names
must, at least, be able to identify objects by assessing their properties. The evidence in 2.4.1
shows that competent understanding of names starts at about six months of age. However,
the data in 2.4.2 shows that property assessment is not in the early repertoire of infants. It
follows that competence for names does not require that the subject identifies objects by
assessing their properties and, hence, that something is wrong with description theories of
names. Section 2.4.3 shows that this separation between object identification and property
assessment is not simply eliminated through development. The data here show that even for
adults, who have a greater linguistic and conceptual expertise, there is such a split.
There is more to the descriptivist picture. Expanded versions claim that the meaning of
a name (i.e., the information it carries) is determined by a definite description and that it is
in fact the meaning of the latter. In other words, expanded description theories are not only
committed to the claim that what is stored (meaning) is the same, but also that the access to
it (via descriptions) is the same. This requires a particular information-processing model
according to which the meanings of names and descriptions have the same standing with
respect to storage and retrieval. In particular, if someone is unable to retrieve the appropriate
description —perhaps owed to some peculiar case of aphasia— then she should also be
unable to retrieve the relevant proper name; simply because they are, content-wise, the
same. At least that seems to be the idea behind Frege’s 1892 foundational claim that the
cognitive value of names is given by definite descriptions. This gives us another psycho-
logical requirement, this time it is the analogue of SEMANTIC. Let us call this principle;
MEMORY.
MEMORY for any competent subject S, any name ‘N’ and some appropriate definite
description ‘DD’, S cannot competently use ‘N’ without retrieving the content of
‘DD’.
In section 2.4.3 we argue against this claim. If expanded description theories are correct
then storing and retrieving the content of any given name is tantamount to storing and
retrieving that of the relevant definite description. In section 2.4.3 we present evidence of
double dissociation (i.e., selective impairment and preservation) of proper names, suggesting
that storage and retrieval of names differs from the rest of the lexicon. We also present
studies on how non-injured subjects store and retrieve names showing that names are more
difficult to recall than common nouns. This suggests that storing and retrieving a name is
not tantamount to storing and retrieving a definite description and, thus, that their contents
are not identical at all. It must be, then, that the claims of expanded description theories are
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mistaken.
COGNITIVE and MEMORY give us a psychological picture of basic and expanded
description theories of names. See Table 2.2. This picture fails to describe the way in which
ordinary speakers use proper names. This undermines their credentials as theories for proper
names of natural languages.
Table 2.2 Speakers according to Description Theories
Cognitive Memory
S is able to identify S cannot retrieve
objects by assessing N without
their properties retrieving DD
Basic / Expanded Expanded
2.3.2 A caveat
We want to prevent confusion about metalinguistic descriptivism. There are two versions of
it. On Kripke’s 1980 version, any given name ‘N’ is associated with the description ‘the
referent of ‘N’ ’. Those who defend the theory offer a different description: i.e., ‘the bearer
of ‘N’ ’. These descriptions denote two different properties. An object can be the referent of
a speaker’s use of ‘N’ without thereby being named ‘N’ (or bearing the name ‘N’). Whether
an object is a referent of ‘N’ depends on how a speaker uses ‘N’; whether it bears the name
‘N’ depends on social naming practices. As Geurts puts it, “bearing a name is like bearing a
tie. Like ties, names are seldom unique, but circumstances permitting they may be used for
referential purposes (. . . ). Taken on its own (. . . ) a name doesn’t refer any more than a tie
does” [Geurts, 1997, p.326].
Consequently, a speaker need not know which name has been given to an object (which
name it bears) in order to know it is the referent of her use of, say, ‘N’. All she needs to do
is take the relevant object to be the referent of the name. On Kripke’s version, metalinguistic
descriptivism is trivially true. What we have to say here does not go against this theory.
It does, however, speak against the less trivial version according to which speakers must
understand that objects can be given names that they bear.
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2.4 The evidence
In this section we review part of the literature on the psychology of proper names. This
includes studies in early lexical development, cognitive development, and name retrieval. In
so doing we intend to offer a picture of what competent users of proper names look like:
which lexical, cognitive and memory skills they use.
2.4.1 Early lexical development
Thanks to studies on early lexical development we know that proper names are among the
earliest words in an infant’s lexicon and that this is so even though the early lexicon is very
limited and generally biased for nouns over verbs (see Nelson, 1973, 1974; Gentner, 1982;
Choi and Gopnik, 1993; and Tardif, 2006 for discussion).
Jusczyk and Mandel 1996 studied how young infants (experimental subjects were be-
tween four and six months of age) react to familiar sounds, particularly their own names.
Various experiments were designed in order to determine how accurately these infants
represent their own names. In one experiment the infants were presented with six-sentence
passages, one of which included the infant’s name and another which included another
infant’s name with which she had been previously familiarized. The results suggest that
six-month-olds “detect the occurrence of their names in fluent speech passages” [Jusczyk
and Mandel, 1996, p.36-37]. Jusczyk and Mandel conclude that infants have detailed rep-
resentations of the sound patterns of their names, and that they detect their own names in
fluent speech sooner than they can detect other words. This suggests that names are special
lexical items. They do not come hand-in-hand with other words. (See Mandel, Jusczyk, and
Pisoni, 1995, for more on this issue.)
This supports our claim that young infants understand names competently. Apparently,
there is an important distinction between nouns, especially proper names, and other words.
For some or other reason, proper names are easier to learn. Studies on the noun bias show
that names do not demand the same cognitive skills as verbs and adjectives.10 Proper
nouns might be easiest of all because they simply require ‘N’ (or a sequence of sounds) to
10Gentner 1982, argues that this noun bias is owed to the fact that noun-encoded meanings are easier to
learn than verb-encoded ones. Nouns simply refer to things while verbs encode relational-meanings. Gentner
argues that there is a natural partition between objects and relations. Following a similar line of argument,
Waxman 1992 claims that infants understand that types of words relate to types of meanings, nouns to objects,
verbs to relations, and adjectives to properties. Snedeker and Gleitman 2004 claim that it is easier to learn
nouns because they require less information from the linguistic context to determine their meaning. Gillette,
Gleitman, Gleitman, and Lederer 1999 show that, even for adults, it is easier to make correct guesses about
nouns than about verbs.
22
relate to the bearer of ‘N’ in no specified way. Nouns require the mapping of sounds onto
non-linguistic contexts, which makes them easier to learn than verbs, which require more
linguistic information. Proper nouns in particular require the least amount of mapping: the
same sounds get mapped into the same unique context; i.e., the bearer. (See Piccin and
Waxman, 2007, for a lexical account.)
2.4.2 Cognitive development
Xu and colleagues (see Xu and Carey 1996, and Xu, Carey, and Quint 2004) argue for the
psychological independence of object individuation from property assessment in early in-
fancy. They begin by assuming Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, and Jacobson 1992 famous
results suggesting that an object-concept, i.e., BOUNDED PHYSICAL OBJECT, is genetically
encoded. Their goal is to test a hypothesis about the acquisition of descriptive (or sortal)
concepts, e.g., DOG, BALL, HAT, which provide criteria for identification and individuation.
Owed to Bower 1974, among others, the Object-first Hypothesis claims that infants may use
“spatiotemporal criteria for individuating and tracing identity of objects well before they can
use other property information” [Xu and Carey, 1996, p.114].
To test their hypothesis, Xu and Carey presented infants (age of experimental subjects
was 10 months) with events where an object (e.g., a rabbit) emerged from behind a screen
alternating with a second object (e.g., a cup) emerging from the other side of the screen.
Infants were presented with two outcomes when removing the screen. The expected outcome
presented two different objects, the unexpected one a single object. If infants were able to
identify objects by assessing their properties (e.g., shape), they should look longer at the
unexpected outcome.
The experiment was carefully designed to include three conditions, each of which ended
in either an expected or unexpected result. The first two conditions varied the circumstances
of presentation, the third provided a baseline. In the property condition, infants were initially
presented with one object (e.g., a truck) emerging from the right side of the screen. The
object was then returned behind the screen. Infants were then presented with a second object
(e.g., an elephant) emerging from the left side of the screen. The second object was returned
and the infant was presented with the expected (two objects) or unexpected (one object)
outcome. In the spatiotemporal condition, the experiment differed in only one feature:
infants were simultaneously presented with the two objects (e.g., a truck and an elephant) at
the beginning of the experiment. The baseline conditions simply included the presentation
of one or two objects coming from behind the screen with no earlier presentation of them.
The baseline conditions showed that infants had an intrinsic preference for (looked
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longer at) two objects. Given these conditions, a successful trial required that the infant be
able to overcome this preference. The results show that infants did overcome the baseline in
the spatiotemporal condition but not in the property one. This suggests that 10 month-olds
do have a concept of BOUNDED PHYSICAL OBJECT but no proper understanding of more
specific concepts, e.g., properties such as SHAPE.
Xu and Carey 1996 includes a comparative study between 10 and 12 month-olds. The
results showed that 12-month olds were able to overcome the baseline preference in the
property trial. Xu and Carey hypothesize that this difference is related the child’s stage in
lexical development. It is between these ages that infants begin learning common nouns.
In a more recent study, Xu 2002 found out that even nine-month-olds could use shape
information for object individuation if they were given linguistic aid: infants were able to
form a representation of two different objects when they were presented with different labels,
e.g., ‘Look, a duck!’ and ‘Look, a ball!’. However, in Xu et.al. 2004, Xu and colleagues
presented 12-month-olds with a different trial. This time they were presented with two
different objects that differed in color but not in shape (e.g., a red and a green ball). The
results show that even 12-month-olds were unable to make this distinction. This suggests
that at 12-months of age, infants do have a limited understanding of general notions, e.g.,
PHYSICAL OBJECT, SHAPE, but not enough of them to identify objects by assessing their
properties (see Xu et.al., 2004, p. 159). Thus, although it can be argued that 12-month-
olds do have at least some general property concepts, the evidence suggests that object
individuation and property assessment are two separate psychological processes.
It is important to note, first, that in order to identify an object by assessing its unique
properties, infants need an understanding of properties that develops over the second year of
life; and, second, that an initial understanding of general properties (12 months) takes place
a long time after infants show an understanding of proper names (6 months), as seen in the
previous section. Thus, assessing properties is not necessary to fix the referent of a proper
name. There must be something wrong with the claims of both basic and expanded versions
of description theories.
These claims strongly suggest that infants do not use definite descriptions (or uniquely
identifying descriptive concepts) either to fix the referent or to determine the meaning of
a proper name. Cognitively speaking, much less is required in learning and using proper
names than in uniquely identifying an object by discerning its properties.
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2.4.3 Memory for proper names
The suggested separation between reference and property assessment in early cognitive
development is confirmed by studies on memory for proper names. Because most of those
studies are with adults, they also suggest that this separation is sustained throughout devel-
opment. Furthermore, they offer an empirical basis from which to argue particularly against
semantic and expanded description theories (i.e., those that take definite descriptions to
determine the meaning of names).
Adults are able to use definite descriptions to fix the reference of a proper name. Kripke
1980 presents ‘Neptune’ as a case. Some time before astronomers were able to see Neptune,
it was hypothesized that something caused the changes in the orbit of Uranus. However, the
referent of ‘Neptune’ could not be determined as any salient unidentified object. The name
‘Neptune’ was, thus, introduced by means of a definite description, e.g., ‘the object that
causes the changes in the orbit of Uranus’. There seems to be a difference between adult
and infant use of proper names. Is this a qualitative difference? Do adults process names in
very different ways? Or, alternatively, is this just a quantitative difference? Do adults simply
aid themselves by using more information? An answer to these questions comes from an
answer to a different, but related, question: do adults necessarily use definite descriptions
in their acquisition and use of proper names? The empirical evidence suggests a negative
answer. Adult use of proper names is not qualitatively different from that of infants.
Anderson and Hastie 1974 tested undergraduates on processing information depending
on whether it was introduced by a proper name or a definite description. Subjects were
given a number of predicates (‘F’,‘G’ and ‘H’) about a person A and introduced her with a
proper name ‘N’ such that N = A. They were then given different predicates (‘R’,‘Q’ and
‘S’) about the same person, but this time the person was introduced by means of a definite
description ‘DD’, without the subjects knowing so, such that DD = B. They were then told
that A = B. This forced the subjects to make inferences when asked to verify a sentence
that used either term (i.e., ‘N’ or ‘DD’) followed by the predicates introduced by means of
the other term (e.g., having ‘N’ followed by ‘R’,‘Q’ and ‘S’. Non-inferences (e.g., ‘N is F’)
were introduced for comparison.
Inferences with ‘DD’ took longer than inferences with ‘N’. In fact, ‘N’ inferences took
the same time as ‘N’ non-inferences. ‘DD’ inferences, however, took up to twice as long as
‘DD’ non-inferences. Anderson and Hastie claim that this is owed, first, to the fact that when
the information is initially stored as belonging to two different individuals, two memory
nodes, A and B, are created. Second, they claim that when the identity A = B is established,
the proper name ‘N’ is directly connected with the second node B; whereas the definite
description ‘DD’ is only directly connected with the node B and indirectly connected with A
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by means of the identity A = B. According to Anderson and Hastie, the inferences went as
follows: first, for the proper name there were only two steps from ‘N’ to B and from B to
the predicates ‘R’,‘Q’ and ‘S’; second, for the definite description, there were four steps,
from ‘DD’ to B, from B to ‘N’, from ‘N’ to A and from A to the predicates ‘F’,‘G’ and ‘H’.
This difference in processing suggests that, even for adults, definite descriptions are not
necessary for understanding proper names. Further evidence supports this claim.
Names are difficult to remember. Tip-of-the-tongue problems, show this very clearly. Ev-
eryone has, at some point, been unable to recall someone’s name, while knowing pretty well
who that person is. The speaker is acquainted with the referent, she might be able to describe
the referent, she also knows the name, and yet the name is not retrieved. Folk-psychology
describes this as the tip-of-the-tongue or TOT phenomenon.
The TOT phenomenon has prompted several models on how proper names are processed.
Cohen 1990 tested the differences between processing meaningful and meaningless ex-
pressions. The results show that recalling proper names is just as difficult as recalling
meaningless, non-word, expressions (e.g., ‘wesp’, ‘blick’). Based on this evidence, Cohen
argues that the TOT problems with proper names are owed to a lack of semantic associa-
tions. On her view, proper names are detached from conceptual representations. Some, see
Valentine, Brennen, and Brédart 1996, argue that names are not absolutely meaningless. For
example, the name ‘Baker’ conveys the information that the bearer is of English origin or an
English speaker. Even in this case, however, it is generally agreed that proper names are
vulnerable in terms of retrieval and that this is owed to the fact that “a proper name conveys
almost no information about the entity it names” [Valentine et.al., 1996, p. 108].
Several models intend to account for this evidence in terms of lexical access (see Valen-
tine et.al. 1996 for a detailed survey of these models). Most models require three different
kinds of processing units: 1) word recognition units; 2) biographical information, or seman-
tic information, units; and 3) face recognition units. Word recognition units are required
to identify the name either from within speech or within the lexicon. Face recognition
units are required to identify the object to which the name refers. Semantic information
units, however, are not a necessary part of the process. Speakers can in fact have access to
such biographical information about the referent of the name, but it is not necessary for the
production of proper names. If it were so, then there would be more entry points, within
memory, from which to access a name. Proper names would not be difficult to retrieve.
In their review of the different models of lexical access for proper names, Valentine and
colleagues conclude by defending
A functional architecture of face naming which is compatible [. . . ] with [. . . ]
the notion that proper names are pure referring expressions. One important fea-
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ture of this architecture is that it does not assume that identity-specific semantic
information constitutes a necessary pathway to names. Simulations using an
interactive activation version of this model produced results consistent with
the fact that names are more difficult to retrieve than identity-specific semantic
information. [Valentine et.al., 1996, p.139]
The data on the TOT phenomena and the processing models presented suggest that
proper names and definite descriptions are independently stored and retrieved. These are
good reasons to think that they have different semantic values. More evidence comes from
further studies. Cohen and Burke 1993 review the evidence on memory for proper names,
suggesting that they are meaningless and doubly dissociated from other parts of the lexicon.
The latter claim is supported by evidence from cases of anomia and selective preservation of
names.
LeDorze and Nespoulos 1989 and Semenza and Zettin 1989 present clinical cases of
anomia. The patients suffered brain damage and, as a result, had a dramatic inability to
retrieve proper names. Le Dorze and Nespoulos studied 24 aphasics, 5 of which were
cases of pure anomia, while Semenza and Zettin present a single patient. Semenza and
Zettin’s patient was unable to “deal with purely referential non-descriptive semantic rela-
tions” (Semenza and Zettin, 1989, p.679). Their patient showed no problems when learning
and retrieving other types of words. Semenza and Zettin argue that the best explanation
of this is to take names as purely referential expressions: “they denote the individuals or
the entities that are called by them, [. . . ] but do not describe any property or imply any
attribute” (Semenza and Zettin, 1989, p.679). Lucchelli and Renzi 1992 support a similar
line of argument. They hypothesize that proper names are tags that permit the identification
of their bearers but that, on their own, tell nothing of the properties of these bearers. In a
similar way, Hadar, Jones, and Mate-Kole 1987 argue for a disconnection between semantic
and phonemic lexicons in cases of anomic aphasia.
Names are not only selectively impaired, they can also be selectively preserved. Van
Lancker 1990 and Semenza and Sgaramella 1993 present cases of selective preservation
of personal names. In both studies, the subjects were able to recall the names of certain
familiar faces, without being able to retrieve any biographical information with respect to
the referents. Goodglass and Wingfield 1993 present evidence of a similar phenomenon
regarding names of places. Based on this evidence, Semenza and Sgaramella argue that
proper names are doubly dissociated from other parts of the lexicon (e.g., common names).
Brédart, Brennen, and Valentine 1997 argue that the case for double dissociation is fairly
limited to comprehension and, even there, to some cases. However, they do accept (see
Valentine, et.al. 1996) that the evidence suggests the existence of preservation of proper
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names ‘in the context of impaired comprehension of proper names’ (Valentine, et.al. 1996
p.81-82). For more recent studies see Hadar, Wenkert-Olenik, and Soroker 1998, for studies
on anomia see Kohn, and Goodglass 1985. Kambanaros and Steenbrugge 2006 discuss the
differences between nouns and verbs based on anomic and other kinds of aphasia. Avila,
Lambon, Parcet, Geffner, and Gonzalez-Darder 2001 study how proper name retrieval may
be cued by word similarities; and Diaz, Lindin, Galdo-Alvarez, Facal, and Juncos-Rabadán
2007 offer an ERP study on face recognition and TOT problems in naming.
In sum, studies on memory suggest that uniquely identifying information, the kind of
information that definite descriptions carry with them, is not necessary for either storing
(acquiring) or retrieving (accessing) a proper name. When it comes to retrieval, proper
names are vulnerable in a way in which common nouns are not — consider the problems of
anomia, selective preservation, and TOT phenomena. This suggests that proper names are
dissociated within semantic memory.
Memory-wise, proper names are expensive while common nouns — and, with them,
definite descriptions — are cheap, and this is not because there is a lot of information that
is carried by a proper name, as semantic and expanded description theories suggest. The
evidence goes in the opposite direction. Names are difficult to retrieve because they carry
so little information. This is predicted by all the models that offer an account of the TOT
phenomena. This seems natural. After all, we do tend to forget names but we do not seem
to forget definite descriptions. See Table 2.3.
The data suggest that storing and retrieving proper names is completely different, and
independent, from storing and retrieving definite descriptions. This should not be the case if
definite descriptions were to determine the meaning, or semantic value, of proper names. If
the descriptivist story were true, one should expect the human mind to treat the content of
a name in exactly the same way as that of a definite description. After all, the content of
any given name is supposed to be one and the same thing as that of an appropriate definite
description. This supports our claim that the content of a proper name is not determined
by a definite description and that expanded description theories fail on the psychological
evidence.
2.5 Preliminary Conclusions
We have argued (see sections 2.2 and 2.3) that description theories — whether basic, se-
mantic, or expanded — are committed to the claim that definite descriptions are necessary
either for reference fixing (see REFERENTIAL page 17), meaning determination (see
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Table 2.3 Actual Memory and Descriptivist Demands for Names
Memory for Proper Names Description Theories
(1) Name retrieval is difficult: (1) Retrieving N is just
TOT problems, anomia, etc. like retrieving DD.
(2) Name retrieval does not (2) Retrieving N requires retrieving
require access to descriptive unique descriptive information.
information.
(3) Names carry very minimal, (3) N carries, unique,
information about the referent. descriptive, information.
SEMANTIC page 17), or both. Operational counterparts of these claims — COGNITIVE,
and MEMORY— were offered (see section 2.3.1, especially page 19). In section 2.4 we
presented empirical evidence on how speakers acquire and use proper names. The evidence
suggests that COGNITIVE and MEMORY are unsupported. Description theories lack a
proper empirical standing.
We have made a case, on developmental grounds, against COGNITIVE. Proper Names
are among the first words of an infant’s lexicon. Some minimal understanding of reference
is, of course, needed for this to be the case, possibly founded in prelinguistic knowledge or
natural preparedness.11 If uniquely identifying concepts were required for reference-fixing,
then an understanding of them should also appear as early in the prelinguistic period (6
months). This however is mistaken. There is evidence of an understanding of properties
developing only slowly—let alone uniquely identifying ones developing early. This under-
mines the empirical standing of description theories. To fix the reference of a name, it is not
necessary to identify the object as falling under this or that uniquely identifying concept
(i.e., as satisfying the relevant definite description).
We also made a case, on neuropsychological grounds, against MEMORY. Proper names
are very costly memory-wise; their acquisition and production does not require access to
biographical information about the referent, which is the kind of information that a definite
description contributes. Names and descriptions are different for the human mind. Storing
11Regarding the prelinguistic understanding of reference see Hall 2002. See Wellman and Gelman 1997 and
Gelman 1990 on distinctions such as the person/non-person and animate/inanimate. Even psychologists who
generally disavow unlearned principles recognize the need for some preparedness. See, for example, Rakison
and Lupyan 2008.
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and retrieving a name is not tantamount to storing and retrieving a definite description. This
further undermines the case of semantic and expanded description theories. Storing and
retrieving a name is not tantamount to storing and retrieving a definite description.
2.6 Objections and replies
In sections 2.4 and 2.5 we argued that description theories fail on empirical grounds. In
this section we support our claim on different grounds by showing that our criticism is of
philosophical relevance. First, we support our assumption stated earlier that philosophical
theories of language are concerned with actual language use by showing why this is so.
Second, we consider a possible objection from description theories. We give reasons to think
that the evidence we have reviewed involves a competent understanding of names. Finally,
we deal with the general issue of whether psychological evidence is of any philosophical
interest. We briefly mention different areas of philosophical debate where evidence from
cognitive psychology has directly changed the course of the discussion. We contend that
these arguments show why philosophers should pay attention to the psychological evidence.
2.6.1 Accounting for natural languages
Description theories of names are part of a broader philosophical project concerned with
language itself. Lewis 1975 offers a simple formal description: languages are abstract things
constituted by a set of ordered pairs of the form <S,M>, where the first object is a sentence
and the second a meaning. A satisfactory account of a language’s grammar is, then, one
that gives us the rules by means of which we get the set of ordered pairs that constitute that
language. Speaker competence becomes, on this view, a relation between a person and the
set of ordered pairs so construed. It tells us what a person must know in order to understand
and produce the relevant ordered pairs. There are infinitely many different languages, natural
languages being a subset of them. The latter are, presumably, those languages constituted by
the ordered pairs that actual human individuals can learn, understand, and produce. Hence,
a satisfactory philosophical account of natural language must determine what actual human
individuals must know in order to understand and produce the ordered pairs of sentences
and meanings that they actually understand and produce. How are we going to determine
this? In one way or other we are bound to make reference to actual speakers, those who are
competent language users. The question is, what should we look at when referring to actual
speakers?
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It is important to distinguish two ways in which actual language use can be said to
be relevant: qua explanans and qua explanandum. Judging by the literature, it seems
less controversial to claim that language use is relevant in the latter sense. Philosophical
theories of natural language describe what is required to use a natural language competently.
Description theorists, like Dummett, claim this explicitly—see also Jackson 1998a, p.203;
Stanley 1997, p.564; Kroon 2004, p.4-5; and Lewis 1975:
What we have to give is an account of what a person knows when he knows
what a word or expression means, that is, when he understands it. [. . . ] An
account of understanding language, i.e., of what it is to know the meanings of
words and expressions in the language, is thus at the same time an account of
how language functions, that is, not only of how it does what it does, but of
what it is that it does. [Dummett, 1973, p.92; see also Dummett, 1993]
We may suppose, then, that actual language use is relevant enough for philosophers to
care about qua explanandum. The important question is then, whether or not actual language
use is relevant qua explanans. Is language use a relevant source of explanation to understand
what speakers do when they use a language?
Lewis 1992 gives a straight answer that represents the view of other highly influential
philosophers such as Stalnaker 1999 and Kaplan 1989 and a standing tradition in philosophy
thereof: “Surely it is our use of language that somehow determines meaning” [Lewis, 1992,
p.106]. If use determines meaning and linguistic competence is partly, as a matter of fact,
knowledge of meaning, then language use becomes a source of explanation of linguistic
competence. The arguments in section 2.4 are the result of taking this claim seriously. We
agree with Schiffer 2003 and 2006 that a proper account of linguistic competence must
include an account of “the information processing that underlies, and thus accounts for, the
person’s ability to understand utterances in her language” [Schiffer, 2006, p.281.]
So language use turns out to be quite relevant for the philosophy of language. We
recognize different ways of studying language use. The studies reviewed in section 2.4 give
a good idea of the various approaches one might want to pursue.
2.6.2 A descriptivist reply
It is reasonable to distinguish between what enables a speaker to understand a language and
the way in which she actually produces and comprehends her utterances [see Smith 2007, p.
962]. Chomsky’s competence / performance distinction has given place to a tradition that
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takes evidence of the latter sort to be irrelevant for the former. Can description theorists
follow a Chomskian strategy and explain away the counter evidence by taking it to be about
performance? We think not.
Recent work in psycholinguistics suggests that competence and performance are not
as separate and independent as the quote suggests. “If, for example, a language processor
is constrained by limitations of human working memory, that processor itself may have
an impact on the very nature of syntactic structure” [Shatz, 2007a, p.6]. (See Lewis and
Vasishth 2005 for a case study on the relation between memory and syntax and Diesendruck
2007 for an account of the interactions between the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic
aspects of language acquisition.) It is difficult not to see how the evidence in section 2.4
bears at the level of the function computed.
To illustrate this, let us suppose that description theorists understand names as Chomsky
understands grammar. By analogy, then, description theorists can say their theories describe
actual speakers’ competence, but not actual speakers’ performance.
If such were the case, then the resulting arguments would look more or less like this.
First, infants in fact know enough about definite descriptions in order to use them when fix-
ing the reference of names; there is no lexical evidence of this because definite descriptions
require certain performance skills that infants lack. Second, all speakers in fact understand
names as synonymous with some definite description; the evidence goes astray because it
measures performance, and performance requires a lot more than just semantic knowledge.
In short, the lexical and some of the memory problems here presented would not affect
description theories. Such arguments seem to save the day for them. But, do they really?
First, the Chomskian analogy has its limits. It is meant to be about knowledge of lan-
guage, not about cognitive capacities in general. If such is the case, then description theorists
still have to explain how it is that young infants understand definite descriptions (competence,
not performance) even though they show no evidence of an ability to understand property
concepts and representations. Claiming that infants have a prelinguistic understanding of
that rich store of concepts that definite descriptions require is far-fetched. It goes beyond
the claims of even the more rationalist students of cognitive development (see Gelman and
Williams 1998 for discussion). Unless description theorists can show that infants know a lot
more than what cognitive psychologists tell us about them, it is not clear how they will solve
the cognitive problem (see sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2) simply by claiming to offer theories of
competence, not performance.
Second, the problem of memory (see section 2.4.3) would still be standing. Description
theories would still have to explain why there is selective impairment and preservation of
proper names. Unlike the tip-of-the-tongue phenomena, these do not seem to be problems of
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performance. Remember that we are supposing that these theories are, at least, interested in
describing actual speakers’ competence. If for a competent, healthy speaker, proper names
and definite descriptions go hand-in-hand, then there should not be selective impairment or
preservation in non-normal cases. Any brain damage that affects proper names should also
affect definite descriptions and, with them, common nouns. Accounts of anomic aphasia
seem to bear upon the proper level of description, that of the function computed.
Perhaps there is a way to circumvent this problem. What if it is not the name, but the
route between name and definite description that is damaged? Though less clearly, this
might still be viewed as a problem of performance. The speaker cannot produce the name,
but still knows it. Would this work?
We do not think so. For that to be the case, names and definite descriptions must be
stored in different locales. This, unfortunately, seems inconsistent with semantic and ex-
panded descriptivism, according to which the content of a definite description is the meaning
of the name. A description theorist should expect that whatever is stored in the name-locale,
the access to which is impaired, must be the same as what is stored in the description-locale,
the access to which is preserved. If not identity —perhaps that is not the best way to read
the claim that a definite description determines the meaning of a name— there should be,
at least, a necessary connection between the meaning of a name and that of the relevant
definite description. Description theories would require an auxiliary hypothesis to explain
why, even though they are necessarily related, the brain still benefits from storing names and
descriptions separately and can access one but not the other.
2.6.3 If not definite descriptions, what then?
If the descriptivist is correct, competent users of names use definite descriptions. The
evidence presents speakers that do not require descriptions to understand proper names. So,
either description theories are mistaken or the subjects in question do not understand proper
names competently. We need a different account of the use of proper names — i.e., an
account of, at least, the reference-fixing mechanism for proper names — that is consistent
with the evidence. In this section we offer a sketch of the kind of story we support.
On our view, the problem of reference-fixing can be solved in terms of a natural pre-
paredness of speakers to understand the reference relation. This view is importantly distinct
from other non-descriptivist accounts, such as La Palme Reyes, Macnamara, Reyes, and
Zolfaghari 1993. First and foremost, unlike La Palme and colleagues, we do not think
that common nouns play a necessary role. An understanding of common nouns appears
much later (12-18 months) than an understanding of names (6 months). Second, we do not
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claim that an understanding of reference per se must be innate. We take our claim for a
natural preparedness to be easier to support. All that our argument needs is the existence
of a prelinguistic ability to understand reference, and a lack of it with respect to definite
descriptions. There is evidence for both claims.
On the one hand, there is independent evidence suggesting that reference is unlearned,
independent of perceptual characteristics, universal across languages, and primitive for all
languages. Most importantly, however, understanding reference seems to require some
uniquely human cognitive abilities.
In a recent, and very detailed, review of the literature in comparative psychology, Penn,
Holyoak and Povinelli 2008 argue for a distinctively human cognitive capacity: the ability
to interpret the environment symbolically, by using higher-order, abstract, relations. If their
claim is correct, then this uniquely-human, cognitive endowment, is good enough to account
for the natural preparedness of humans to understand and use names. All that speakers
need to do is identify a pair of physical objects (e.g., a unique sequence of sounds and
an entity) and take one to stand for, or point to the other. This, together with Spelke and
colleagues’ 1992 finding that a notion of BOUNDED PHYSICAL OBJECT is not acquired
through experience, gives us the ingredients we need: i.e., the abilities to both identify
objects (referents) and understand abstract relations (reference).
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that understanding properties, and with them,
common nouns, is not prelinguistic. Even more, the evidence suggests that proper names
and common nouns develop separately, with nouns appearing much later than names. Not
surprisingly, there are tracks of this in adulthood, as the evidence from memory on proper
names suggests.
We may now face the objection that if description theorists are correct, competent users
of proper names must use definite descriptions. The speakers presented all through sec-
tion 2.4 seem to use names competently without any need of definite descriptions. Then,
either description theorists are mistaken or those subjects do not understand proper names
competently. There is, however, evidence suggesting that those speakers have everything
they need to understand reference. Their human cognitive endowment is such that they do
so. Indeed, as the evidence in section 2.4 shows, human infants as young as 6 month-olds
demonstrate the integration of the needed components. They are naturally prepared to do so.
2.6.4 Why philosophers should care
Frege 1917 seemed to think that philosophy had nothing, or little, to learn from psychology.
Philosophical theories were meant to be logical, not psychological. But things have changed
34
since. Goldman 1993 describes this shift very well: “while René Descartes and David Hume
created their own theories of the mind, contemporary philosophers must give respectful
attention to the findings of scientific research” [Goldman, 1993, p.xii].
The recent history is replete with interactions between philosophy and the cognitive
sciences. Goldman 1993 and Stich 1994 report many philosophical applications of cognitive
science. Philosophy of language is not an exception. Recent work by Leslie 2007 and
2008 shows how important cognitive psychology is for semantics. Other studies have also
used empirical data particularly in relation with the theory of reference. See, for example,
Segal 2001, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich 2004, Braisby, Franks, and Hampton 1996,
Jeshion 2009, and Coates 2009.
Description theories claim that speakers associate a set of uniquely identifying properties
with their use of names, either for reference-fixing or for meaning-determination purposes.
The empirical findings on actual uses of names show that these cognitive requirements
are not a necessary part of the use of names. The evidence clearly shows that description
theories of names are mistaken. This is why we think that philosophers should care about
the evidence we have reviewed.
2.7 Concluding remarks: Where are we now?
The evidence we have presented shows that description theories are badly equipped as
theories of linguistic phenomena. Their claims about the reference and meaning of proper
names presuppose more, in terms of cognitive and lexical skill, than what speakers actually
require. The studies reviewed give empirical support to our initial claim: a speaker can
successfully use a name even if she lacks the cognitive skills that description theorists say
she should have.
More recent studies give further support to this claim. Valentine and Darling 2006
present one more case in which names and descriptive information are processed in different
ways. Hollis and Valentine 2001 show evidence that there are different kinds of names.
Personal and landmark names seem to be purely referencing expressions, while place names
seem to give some kind of (perhaps cultural) information. None of them, however, carry
uniquely identifying information. Brédart and Valentine 1998 show that names behave dif-
ferently from terms that do carry descriptive information about the referred object. Brédart
and colleagues 2005 confirm the claim that accessing semantic (biographical) information
about the referent is not necessary for proper-name processing.
We proposed natural preparedness as an alternative account for proper name acquisition
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— hence, as an alternative account of reference-fixing for proper names. Further evidence
was given to support this account. Valentine and colleagues 1996 present different models
of proper-name processing that are consistent with this view. However, there are still some
open questions for both the psychology and philosophy of proper names.
2.7.1 Psychology
On the psychological side of things, we have not said anything as to how this fits into a
more general view of language. There is an interesting question with respect to nonhuman
animals, as to whether they can understand proper names. It seems uncontroversial, for
example, that dogs — and perhaps also chimpanzees — understand their own name. It
would be surprising, however, if dogs can understand higher order abstract relations like that
of reference. Would this prove that the alternative model offered is mistaken? We believe
not, for several reasons.
First, there are good reasons to think that language use is a uniquely human ability.
Shatz 1994 and 2007b presents evidence that even toddlers use language in a way that shows
an understanding of higher order, relational, abstract reasoning, and even Theory of Mind
abilities such as understanding false belief. Penn and colleagues’ 2008 forceful argument
supports this view. They offer a great array of evidence on behalf of the distinctiveness of
the human mind. Their view encompasses different areas of human cognition including
language, Theory of Mind, logic, and causal thinking. Humans are able to “reinterpret the
world in a symbolic-relational fashion” by understanding higher-order, abstract relations.
Their central claim is that this cognitive capacity, “evolved in only one lineage - ours.
Nonhuman animals didn’t (and still don’t) get it” [Penn, et.al., 2008, p.129].
Second, the very same feature that makes language a uniquely human ability gives
plausibility to the preparedness account. Understanding symbols and reference requires an
understanding of higher-order abstract relations —e.g., understanding that the word ‘Jon’
refers to Jon. Others have argued that more advanced uses of proper names (e.g., identity
statements) require an understanding of higher-order relations as well (Perner, Rendl and
Garnham, 2007). Thus, even if infants look like dogs in their early understanding of names,
given that they, and only they, progress beyond that at least raises the question of whether
there are no underlying differences between infants and dogs in name understanding from
the very beginning. This possibility leads to another question: what do nonhuman animals
understand when they identify their names?
Penn and colleagues 2008 have an answer here. According to them, even though there
is functional discontinuity between humans and nonhuman animals, there is still no unex-
36
plainable gap in between. They claim that “different species, as well as different modules
within the cognitive architecture of a given species, approximate different features of a PSS
[Physical Symbol System] to varying degrees” [Penn, et.al. 2008, p. 128]. It may be that
nonhuman use of names is importantly different by not requiring the use of higher-order
relations, but yet approximate enough to be regarded as some kind of comprehension of
names (see Shatz, 2008).
2.7.2 Philosophy
On the philosophical side of things, we have not said anything with respect to other elements
from the debate on proper names. These include modal contexts, belief reports, fictional
names, and negative existential statements, among others. Anti-descriptivists like Kripke
1980 and Soames 2002 have argued that names and definite descriptions work differently
within modal contexts. For example the name ‘Aristotle’ and the description ‘the last great
philosopher of antiquity’ behave differently within the sentential context ‘X is necessarily
the last great philosopher of antiquity’. Psychological studies on counterfactual reasoning
might shed some light on how it is that names are used in these contexts (see, for example
Perner, et.al., 2007).12
Description theorists have argued that the way names behave within belief reports (e.g.,
‘Aristotle believed that Plato was fond of dogs’) supports their view. Others, like Soames
2002 and Stalnaker 1999, argue that this behavior should not be explained in terms of the
semantics of proper names. The evidence on semantic memory for proper names seems to
support something like the latter view. This, of course, requires further discussion. Some-
thing similar can be said about the use of fictional names (e.g., ‘Pegasus’) and negative
existential statements (e.g., ‘Plato does not exist’). These are cases where the names used
lack a referent. How is it, then, that speakers manage to use them meaningfully? Studies on
pretense and fictional reasoning, as well as specific studies on the use of fictional names,
may prove to be of help here —Everett and Hofweber 2000 offers a good introduction to the
philosophical debate on these issues.
This paper has one further important limitation. It makes a contribution to the philosoph-
ical debate about theories of reference-fixing for proper names. This, however, is just one
among various non-descriptivist theories (see, for example, Devitt, 1981, and Evans, 1982).
We do not offer an adequate discussion of such theories. Doing so is certainly desirable.
Unfortunately, it is also beyond the scope of this paper.
12There is, of course, philosophical literature on this topic. Unfortunately it is too extended to be mentioned
here. For an introduction, see Reimer 2003 and Lycan 2006.
37
2.7.3 Conclusions
Our claim is still standing. Description theories are ill-equipped as theories of what compe-
tent speakers understand when using proper names. We have offered considerable evidence
against the claim that learning how to use a proper name requires an understanding of
uniquely identifying properties, or that names convey uniquely identifying information
about their referents. Description theories fail both as theories of reference-fixing and
theories of meaning for proper names in natural languages.
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Chapter 3
The Puzzle of Names
The literature is unclear on whether informativeness and substitution failure constitute two
different problems for a theory of proper names in natural languages. In this paper I argue
that the problems are intimately related and show how the tradition has failed to notice it. I
offer an account of why they are so related and present a new version of the problem. The
resulting formulation gives us a good idea of the kind of solution required.
Introduction
Frege 1892 presents the problem of informativeness as a problem about some uses of identity
statements. He does not present it as a problem of belief ascription or propositional attitudes.
Russell 1905 presents the problem of substitution failure as a problem about belief ascription
or propositional attitudes. He does not present it as a problem of informativeness. This
way of posing the problems has proven fruitful. Since Frege and Russell, many—with the
probable exception of McKay and Nelson 2005 and Swanson 2006—have followed them in
conceiving informativeness and substitution failure as two separate and independent issues;
thus, allowing us to understand better what these problems are about.
This is evident in the way in which different philosophers have tried to solve the prob-
lems. Millians seem to agree that they must deal with two different issues. Kripke 1979
addresses the problem of substitution failure, but does not say much (if anything) about
informativeness. Something similar goes on in Soames 1989 and 2002. Likewise with
descriptivists. In his presentation of what he dubs “the Frege-Russell problems” Kroon 2004
takes them to be different, independent problems. Even contemporary reviews of the topic
(see Braun 2007 and Lycan 2006) still present them as two separate issues.
I believe we have learned enough. Informativeness and substitution failure are not two
separate, independent, issues. They go hand-in-hand. They are so closely related to each
other that one wonders whether they are really two different problems. In section 3.1 I
47
will present each problem with some detail. Section 3.2 offers four different solutions
from philosophers with opposing theoretical views. The evidence suggests that the alleged
“problems” are intimately related since any solution to one problem is proved to be enough
to solve the other. Section 3.3 gives a brief description of the historical context. It seems
that philosophers, in general, have failed to notice this intimate relation. In section 3.4 I
offer an explanation, in psychological terms, of why these issues are so intimately related. I
conclude in section 3.5 by describing this relation and reformulating the problems in a way
that points toward the kind of solution required.1
3.1 The puzzles
3.1.1 Informativeness
Frege’s 1892 puzzle about informativeness can be easily stated. The sentences in (1) and
(2) differ, information-wise, amongst each other. For example, (1a) is trivial while (1b) is
not, and (2b) may convey new information to an addressee who is already familiar with (2a).
Yet, they merely differ—i.e., (1a) from (1b) and (2a) from (2b)—in their use of different but
coreferential names: ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’.
(1a) Melville is Melville.
(1b) Melville is Bartleby.
(2a) Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(2b) Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
Given a plausible view of names according to which they contribute only their referents,
we have a problem explaining where this difference in informativeness comes from. The
problem seems clear, but what is not is the very notion of INFORMATIVENESS. What does
it mean to say that (1b) is informative while (1a) is not, or that (2b) can be informative in
contexts where (2a) is not?
Frege’s 1892 own account is not helpful. He says, for example, that (1a) is “valid a priori”
and “called analytic” while (1b) provides “very valuable extensions of our knowledge” and
is not “a priori.” He also says that (1b), but not (1a), can be used to express a discovery and
that, unlike (1a), it is not self-evidently true. These distinctions are not very useful. We
know, thanks to Kripke 1980, that being knowable a priori does not preclude some truth
1 Before getting started, a brief warning. I am concerned with informativeness and substitution failure as
they pose conditions on a satisfactory account of proper names for natural languages like English and Spanish.
Thus, I will not be concerned with how, or even if, these problems arise for formalized languages.
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from expanding our knowledge. We are left with the unclear idea of “knowledge expansion”.
In a more recent rendition of the problem, Braun 2007 says that (1a) and (1b)—and a
fortiori (2a) and (2b)—differ in informativeness because “a rational, competent, speaker
could understand both and yet think that one is true and the other false” [p.492]. Notice,
however, that the criterion of informativeness is psychological: two sentences differ in
informativeness if a normal subject can give opposing credences to both (e.g., believing one
and disbelieving the other). Thus, mental states play a central role in this understanding of
informativeness. Indeed, this is what most philosophers do. They either explicitly appeal to
belief and other mental states, as Wettstein 1989 does, or presuppose them, as Kroon 2004
and Lycan 2006 do.
Thus, another way to understand the differences in informativeness, for example, be-
tween (2a) and (2b), is to notice that (3a) and (3b) can both be true.
(3a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(3b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
If this is, as it seems, our best way to understand what we mean by “informativeness,”
then it is important to note that the notion itself is speaker, or subject, relative. Here is an
initial formulation of the problematic notion.
INF: For any pair of sentences S 1 and S 2, which are not necessary falsehoods and which
vary only in the use of different coreferential names, a normal subject A, and a context
c, S 1 and S 2 differ in informativeness in c iff A believes one and does not believe the
other in c.
This account has a limitation. There are many ways in which an utterance of mine can
be informative. For example, it can be informative in virtue of its presuppositions or by
updating the information my audience has about my mental states (e.g., when you already
know who won the prize and I truly say: Jon won the prize). The problem of informativeness,
and my account thereof, is not concerned with any of these. It focuses on the way in which
an utterance can be informative in virtue of its subject matter. A good feature of INF above
is that it explains not only the difference of informativeness among necessary truths, like
(1a) and (1b), but also among contingent truths, like (2a) and (2b).
Two important claims follow from what I have said. First, informativeness is not a
property that sentences have simpliciter but relative to a speaker—if you prefer we can
say it is a relation.2 This claim is of great importance. If it is true, then differences in
informativeness are directly tied to attitudinal mental states.
2Or, if you are not satisfied, we can define it as BEING INFORMATIVE-TO-S and then claim it is a property
that statements have simpliciter. That does not affect my argument, since it is still (now explicitly) referring to
the mental states of the speaker.
49
Second, in order to describe how the difference of informativeness takes place, par-
ticularly between speakers and pairs of sentences, one must allow for the possibility of
substitution failure as in (3a) and (3b). One cannot explain why (2a) and (2b) differ for
Andy without accepting the truth of (3a) and (3b) and, ultimately, of (4a) and (4b), which
are both instances of substitution failure of coreferential terms within belief reports.
(2a) Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(2b) Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
(3a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(3b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
(4a) Andy believes that Melville is Melville.
(4b) Andy does not believe that Melville is Bartleby.
The problem is this: (2a) and (2b) differ in informativeness, but vary simply in using
different correferential terms. And this is the cause: a normal agent can believe one without
believing the other, which in turn gives place to substitution failure. It seems, then, that
informativeness becomes a problem only when there is substitution failure.
3.1.2 Substitution failure
But, what is substitution failure? There is substitution failure whenever the substitution of
correferential terms fails to preserve the truth value of the original sentence. The sentences
in 5, all of which are true, illustrate this.
(5a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(5b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
(5c) Melville is Bartleby.
Russell 1905 thinks that (5a)-(5c) constitute a problem for any theory of denoting
expressions like ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’. He starts by assuming Leibniz’s principle of
Indiscernibility of Identicals according to which if X is identical with Y, then whatever
is true of X is true of Y (e.g., whatever is true of Melville is true of Bartleby). Russell
adds: “either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or
falsehood of that proposition.” [p.215]. This is, briefly put, the principle of substitutivity.
The principle seems intuitive and almost evidently true. That is precisely why its failure is
problematic. It is so evidently true that it should not fail; the substitution of two terms that
denote exactly the same object (e.g., ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’) should not alter the truth or
falsehood of the proposition expressed.
One can choose among many options to solve the problem. Two obvious ones are: (i)
to claim that names contribute more than just their referent, or (ii) to directly reject the
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possibility of substitution failure (e.g., claiming that (5a) and (5b) cannot both be true.
Descriptivists, like Frege, have followed (i) claiming that the semantic contribution of a
name is not exhausted by its referent but includes a description. Millians, who believe that
names semantically contribute just their referent, have followed both (i) and (ii): the former
with non-semantic strategies (see Stalnaker, 1987, Recanati, 1993, and Swanson, 2006) and
the latter with different counterintuitive moves (see Braun, 2006, Salmon, 1986 and 2006,
Soames, 2002, and plausibly Marcus, 1981). One of the counterintuitive results of the latter
strategy is that normal subjects turn out to be either illogical or irrational.3
Following option (i) requires one to accept that subjects may ascribe incompatible
properties to the same object. If the sentences in (5) are true, it seems safe to infer that
Andy ascribes both properties AUTHORING Moby Dick and NOT AUTHORING Moby Dick
to the same object, namely, Melville. Accepting this is certainly not the same as ascrib-
ing irrationality to normal subjects, but it is still problematic, specially if, as is generally
admitted, normal subjects with normal conceptual abilities do it. So we have a further
problem. Substitution failure is caused by lousy property attributions: what explains this
phenomenon? The traditional answer is to claim, explicitly or not, that normal subjects may
sometimes fail to notice the truth of some identity statements. This seems especially true of
cases like (1a)-(1b) and (4a)-(4b), where it is obvious that competent speakers do ignore
such information.
There are, as is natural, many different stories you can tell about this ignorance—I
will present two of them in this paper—but if the story is to be of any use, it must explain
how acquiring knowledge about identity statements can make a cognitive difference by
precluding competent speakers from attributing incompatible properties to the same object.
This, in turn, is tantamount to claiming that true identity statements are informative. If they
were not, then coming to learn them would not preclude the subject from making such poor
property attributions. And thus, we would not have an account of substitution failure.
As you can see, this gets us back into the problem of informativeness. For claiming
that true identity statements are, or can be informative, requires one to assume a difference
between trivial and informative identity statements such as (1a) and (1b). And this difference
of informativeness between pairs of sentences that vary in using different correferential
terms is, as we saw in the previous section, a problem. This suggests a formulation of
3Salmon 2006 and Braun 2006 seem to follow this path. They distinguish between illogical and irrational
attitudes. Surprisingly enough Salmon does not say what illogical amounts to, see Salmon 1989 and 2006.
Braun 2006 claims that a rational speaker may accept the identity statement (5c) and the substitution of names
in (5a) and (5b). Doing so is rational. This entails a logical contradiction, however. Braun accepts this is
illogical. He does not say what the difference is between being “illogical” and being “irrational.” Schiffer
2006 and 1987 offers objections to Braun and Salmon.
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substitution failure among the following lines.
SUBS: For any two coreferential names ‘N’ and ‘M,’ any context c, and a normal subject
A: ‘N’ and ‘M’ are subject to substitution failure within reports in c of A’s first-order
belief states iff A does not believe that ‘N is M’ is true in c.
Two important limitations apply. There are many ways in which two coreferential names
may fail to be substitutable within belief reports. They may fail to substitute because the
reports are of different orders (e.g., Andy believes that Bartleby is Melville, but he does
not believe that he believes that he believes that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick, even though he
believes that Melville did; he has not thought about this). Traditionally, the problem has
been taken to be about first-order belief reports. The account above is consistent with this
limitation.
Second: parallel to the case of informativeness, the failure to substitute salva veritate
concerns only the subject matter of the belief report: i.e., the ascribee’s mental states. Sub-
stitution failure is not something that concerns the embedded sentence as it may appear
outside of a belief report. Presumably, there is no substitution failure in such cases (e.g.,
‘Melville is Melville’ and ‘Melville is Bartleby’ have the same truth-value).
Note that SUBS describes not only cases where names fail to be substituted within belief
reports with a contingent truth in the embedded clause: e.g., (5a) or (5b). It also accounts
for substitution failure within belief reports that have a necessary truth in the embedded
clause e.g., (4a) and (4b). This constitutes another parallel between substitution failure and
the problem of informativeness. Contingent and necessary truths appear to be on the same
standing with respect to both. I believe there is an intimate relation between both problems.
(4a) Andy believes that Melville is Melville.
(4b) Andy does not believe that Melville is Bartleby.
(5a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(5b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
(5c) Melville is Bartleby.
Substitution failure is a problem because (5a) and (5b) are both true even though the
embedded sentences vary simply in their use of different correferential terms. And this was
the cause: a normal agent may fail to notice the truth of an identity statement such as (5c).
This ignorance, however, gives place to the problem of differences in informativeness. It
seems, then, that substitution failure constitutes a problem only when there are differences
in informativeness.
In this and the previous section I have shown how differences in informativeness come
with substitution failure and vice versa. This suggests that, in so far as they are problematic,
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informativeness and substitution failure go together. In section 3.2, I will present four
different solutions to the problems. I will describe how they are meant to solve one or the
other and show how they also solve the remaining problem, which they were not (at least




Frege 1892 explicitly solves informativeness by appealing to “senses.” He does not explicitly
offer a solution to substitution failure, but his views on indirect speech offer an explanation.
My goal will be to show that any one of these moves, either appealing to indirect speech or
to “senses,” is good enough to solve both problems.
Frege on informativeness
Frege 1892 claims that there is only one way to account for differences in informativeness:
A difference could arise only if the difference of the signs corresponds to a
difference in the way in which the designated objects are given. [Frege, 1892,
p.199]
And later on
[It] is plausible to connect with a sign [. . . ] not only the designated object,
which may be called the nominatum of the sign, but also the sense (connota-
tion, meaning) of the sign in which is contained the manner and context of
presentation. [Frege, 1892, p.200]
Briefly put, proper names have referents and senses. Different proper names for the same
referent may have different senses. How does this solve the problem of informativeness?
Recall our problematic sentences:
(1a) Melville is Melville.
(1b) Melville is Bartleby.
If sentence (1b) is true, then ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’ have the same referent. Yet they
differ in informativeness. How can this be? Answer: very simply, the names have different
senses that determine the sentences’ meanings. ‘Melville’ presents Melville as, say, the F;
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whereas ‘Bartleby’ presents Melville as, say, the G. Sentence (1a) conveys the information
that the F is the F, which is trivial. Sentence (1b) conveys the information that the F is the
G, which is informative. End of story.4
Now, let me ask, does this account for substitution failure? Remember our other
problematic sentences:
(5a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(5b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
(5c) Melville is Bartleby.
Given the truth of (5c) and the principle of substitutivity, we should be able to substitute
‘Melville’ for ‘Bartleby’ in (5b) without altering its truth-value. We cannot do this because
it is inconsistent with (5a) being true. Why does the substitution fail? Can we give the same
story as above? Can we say, for example, that names have different senses that determine
their meanings? ‘Melville’ presents Melville as, say, the F; whereas ‘Bartleby’ presents
Melville as, say, the G. Hence, the embedded sentence in (5a) conveys information about
the F, while that in (5b) conveys information about the G. End of story!
This much is clear by now: Frege’s account of the differences in informativeness also
explains why there is substitution failure. This, however, is not something Frege claims
explicitly. He seems to have a separate treatment of substitution failure.
Frege on substitution failure
Here is what Frege says about direct and indirect speech, which turns out to solve the
problem of substitution failure.
When words are used in the customary manner then what is talked about are
their nominata. [. . . ] In indirect discourse words do not have their customary
nominata; they here name what customarily would be their sense. [. . . ] The
indirect nominatum of a word is therefore its customary sense. [Frege, 1892, p.
200]
The embedded sentences in (5a)-(5b) are used indirectly. Frege’s theory says that the
expressions used in those sentences, say, ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby,’ change their reference.
They now refer to their customary senses, say, the F and the G respectively. How can we use
this to account for substitution failure? Answer: very simply, the names are used indirectly,
so, according to Frege, they refer to their customary senses. They have different customary
4I do not intend to take Frege’s story as a version of descriptivism. I simply use definite descriptions in
pretty much the same way as Frege does: as a way to represent a sense.
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senses. Hence, they refer to different things. So the principle of substitutivity does not apply.
Problem solved.5
This account, in terms of indirect speech and reference, presupposes the existence of
senses. So, it presupposes Frege’s account of differences in informativeness. But it is not a
mere extension of the latter. Some such extension is the Fregean account I offered aboved.
Frege does more than just extending his view of informativeness, he adds an important claim:
that attitude contexts are special in that reference gets shifted within them. As I showed
above, one can explain substitution failure, without making such a claim, by merely adding
senses. Let us suppose that this solution is different from the one about informativeness.
If so, then I am obliged to ask: does the indirect-speech solution solve the problem of
informativeness?
Suppose all we have is Frege’s theory of indirect speech. It says that names with different
senses in direct speech will not be coreferential within belief reports. This offers a simple
solution to the problem of informativeness. Why do (1a) and (1b), or (2a) and (2b) differ in
informativeness? Answer: we know the names ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’ are coreferential in
all of them. That is why (1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b) have the same truth-value. Nevertheless, the
indirect speech theory tells us that they are not coreferential in (5a)-(5b), because they cannot
be substituted salva veritate. Thus, says the indirect speech theory, the names must have
different senses. If so, then ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’ do not convey the same information.
This explains why (1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b) differ in informativeness. Problem solved!
Frege’s account of the differences in informativeness accounts for substitution failure.
Frege’s indirect-speech account of substitution failure explains the differences in informa-
tiveness. If a theory works with one problem it works with the other. The solutions go
together.
5Whether or not you think this solution is the same as the above one depends on what you take to be doing
the explanatory work. Is it the fact that names change their reference in belief reports? Or is it the fact that the
names in question have different senses? Here are some reasons to think it is the latter. On the one hand, if,
for some reason, the names where to have the same sense, regardless of whether they change reference from
nominatum to customary sense, substitutivity holds—which obviously does not solve the problem. On the
other hand, if, for some reason, names where to keep their customary reference and sense in indirect speech,
assuming they have different senses, substitutivity would fail because the names have different meaning. This
strongly suggests that the difference in senses is doing the explanatory work. Still, the explanations seem to be
different. Frege’s indirect-speech solution says that substitutivity fails because the names are not coreferential
within the scope of attitude verbs. The Fregean solution I gave before claims that the principle fails because
the names are not synonyms, both in direct and indirect speech. Of course, one might as well put it differently
and claim that both solutions say that substitutivity fails because the names have different senses.
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3.2.2 Recanati on belief reports
Recanati 1993 offers an account of substitution failure based on the dual claim that declara-
tive sentences, in general, are sensitive to embedding contexts and that ‘that’-clauses (e.g.,
‘Andy believes that . . . ’) are peculiar contexts where the content expressed by the embedded
sentence is underdetermined: i.e., there is no single, semantically determined, way of finding
out what is expressed by the embedded sentence. In this sense, ‘that’-clauses are ambiguous.
As such, the content expressed by the embedded sentence need not coincide with the one
it would express outside of the clause. This allows for the possibility that ‘Melville wrote
Moby Dick’ and ‘Bartleby wrote Moby Dick’ express the same content outside yet not inside
a ‘that’-clause.
Recanati 1993 agrees that names semantically contribute only their referent, but claims
that referring expressions, in general, pragmatically contribute a way of presenting their
referent. As with Frege’s “senses,” it is unclear what these “modes of presentation” are.
Recanati suggests that ‘Melville,’ for example, presents Herman Melville as ‘MELVILLE’ or,
alternatively, as CALLED ‘MELVILLE’. It is this pragmatically conveyed information which
help “enrich” what is otherwise the underdetermined content of the embedded sentence. The
mode of presentation, whatever that is, is added to the content of the embedded sentence.
This is, claims Recanati 1993, a pragmatic process that becomes truth-conditionally relevant.
This is how the account explains substitution failure:
Suppose someone says (5a). If the hearer contextually assumes that the ascriber
is being ‘faithful’ to the believer, he will be led to assume that the ascribed
belief concerning Melville involves a mode of presentation [. . . ] which includes
the descriptive concept ‘called “Melville”.’ Hence, the hearer will assume that
the believer thinks of Melville as ‘Melville;’ he will take the reference of the
‘that’- clause as a quasi-singular proposition involving a certain (de re) concept
over and beyond the reference of [. . . ] ‘Melville.’ [Recanati, 1993, p. 358]
And what is a “quasi-singular” proposition? Assuming propositions are structured sets
of objects (e.g., referents and properties), the proposition expressed by ‘Melville wrote
Moby Dick’ within (5a) is something like (5φ ):
(5a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(5φ ) <<Melville, ‘Melville’>, AUTHORING Moby Dick>
Similarly, the proposition expressed by ‘Bartleby wrote Moby Dick’ in (5b) is something
like (5ψ):
(5b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
(5ψ) <<Melville, ‘Bartleby’>, AUTHORING Moby Dick>
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If (5φ ) and (5ψ), respectively, are the contents of the embedded sentences in (5a) and
(5b), then substitution failure should be expected: using different names, ‘Melville’ or
‘Bartleby’, delivers different contents and, hence, belief reports that may have different
truth-values.
Suppose you like this reply to the problem of substitution failure. If I am correct, it
should also explain the differences in informativeness. Remember the puzzle? Sentences
(1a)-(1b), and (2a)-(2b), differ in informativeness even though they vary merely in using
different correferential names.
(1a) Melville is Melville.
(1b) Melville is Bartleby.
(2a) Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(2b) Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
The sentences in question do not vary in truth-value, so we should not expect them to
vary in terms of the contents they express. According to Recanati’s “enrichment” story,
embedded declarative sentences are enriched by “modes of presentation,” which are them-
selves pragmatically conveyed by the names used. This is so because, in general, referential
terms convey these “modes of presentation,” but they do so in a pragmatic way. If this is
so, then, all uses of ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’ pragmatically present their referents as called
‘Melville’, and as called ‘Bartleby’. This happens even in declarative sentences such as
(1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b). This is enough to explain the differences in informativeness.
Even though both sentences of the pair express the same proposition, (1a)-(1b) and
(2a)-(2b) do so by pragmatically conveying different modes of presentation of Melville.
While (2a), for example, presents the author of Moby Dick as ‘Melville,’ (2b) presents the
same object as ‘Bartleby.’ Hence, the difference in informativeness between both sentences.
Similar considerations apply to (1a)-(1b) and their difference in informativeness.
It seems that Recanati’s ambiguity/enrichment story on ‘that’-clauses not only accounts
for substitution failure but also explains why there are differences in informativeness.
Solving one problem goes hand-in-hand with solving the other.
3.2.3 Plantinga and the Boethian compromise
I have presented two different solutions to the puzzles: Frege’s descriptivist and Recanati’s
anti-descriptivist. They both confirm my hypothesis: informativeness and substitution fail-
ure are solved together. Let me now present another, quite different, descriptivist solution:
Plantinga’s 1978 account of substitution failure.
Plantinga 1978 claims of proper names: (a) that they express properties; (b) that these
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properties are essential to the name’s referent; and (c) that “different proper names of
an object can express logically equivalent but epistemically inequivalent essences of that
object.” [p.130]. (a) is meant to capture Frege’s intuitions while (b) satisfies the Boethian
compromise.6 As for (c), things are more complex.
Plantinga relies on a simple view of essential properties: P is an essential property of
x iff in every world where x exists x has P and in no world is there an object y, distinct
from x, which has P. According to this view, any given object has a plethora of essential
properties. One can easily transform a contingent property of a given object into an essential
one by turning them into “world-indexed” properties. In this sense being the author of “The
Boethian compromise” in the actual world would be an essential property of Plantinga.
Plantinga points out an inconvenience. Conceived as such, any essential property of a
given object is logically equivalent with all the remaining essential properties of the same
object. For example, in all and only those worlds in which Plantinga has the property above
mentioned he also has the property of being the author of “The Nature of Necessity” in the
actual world. It follows from this (together with the principles of Plantinga’s theory) that
any proper name of an object expresses all the essential properties of that object.
That this is a problem is shown by the fact that it does not solve any of the puzzles.
Consider the problem of informativeness: why do (1a)-(1b), or (2a)-(2b), differ?
(1a) Melville is Melville.
(1b) Melville is Bartleby.
(2a) Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(2b) Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
Suppose then that we accept (a) and (b). It follows that ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’ express
the same properties of Melville, namely, all of its essential properties. Hence, it follows that
(1a) and (1b) express exactly the same proposition and, thus, do not differ content-wise. So
we have no explanation of the difference in informativeness.
Plantinga’s solution is simple: accept (c). In other words, we must accept that, even
though they express logically equivalent contents, ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’ may express
epistemically inequivalent contents. Plantinga does not say much about what makes two
properties be “epistemically inequivalent”. He does have a very simple, and very Fregean,
criterion for making distinctions of epistemic equivalence between properties.
As you may recall, someone might believe (2a) without believing (2b). Andy is, in fact,
such a person. According to Plantinga, Andy’s different propositional attitudes towards
(2a) and (2b) are sufficient to show that (2a) and (2b) express different propositions: “and
6According to Plantinga, Boethius was the first philosopher to claim “that names express individual
essences” see 1978, p.128. He calls this view “Boethianism”.
58
this is due to the fact that their singular terms express different properties.” ‘Melville’ and
‘Bartleby’ both express essences of Melville, “but epistemically inequivalent and hence
different essences.” [Plantinga, 1978, p. 129-30].
Now, to say that Andy might believe (2a) without believing (2b) is the same as saying
that (5a) and (5b) may both be true; and this is the problem of substitution failure.
(5a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(5b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
In other words, Plantinga’s reason to think that coreferential names may express epis-
temically inequivalent properties is the very same that makes us think that substitution may
fail for some coreferential names. It is not surprising, then, that Plantinga’s theory solves
this latter problem: it is built into the theory.
Why is there substitution failure? Answer: very simply, proper names express essential
properties of objects. Coreferential names may express epistemically inequivalent properties.
When such is the case, sentences that differ merely in using different coreferential names
may express different propositions. When this happens, there is substitution failure.7 End of
story.
Plantinga also offers an account of informativeness. In his own words,8
Since ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’ express epistemically inequivalent essences of
Melville, (1a) and (1b) express epistemically inequivalent propositions, so that
(1b) can be informative.
Why is there a difference in informativeness between (1a) and (1b)? Answer: very
simply, proper names express essential properties of objects. Coreferential names may
express epistemically inequivalent properties. When such is the case, sentences that differ
merely in using different coreferential names may express different propositions; one may
be informative while the other is not. Hence, a difference in informativeness between (1a)
and (1b), and similarly between (2a) and (2b), may arise. End of story.
As you can see, Plantinga’s solution to the problem of informativeness is the same as
Plantinga’s solution to the problem of substitution failure. To make this even more clear,
note Plantinga’s own remarks concerning his account of informativeness: “Surely this is
the natural and intuitively plausible position; surely a person could believe (1a) and (2a)
7This solution, however, is somehow circular. There is substitution failure because sentences using different
coreferential names may express different propositions. This begs the question: how do we know they express
different propositions? Plantinga’s answer is, now, circular: because someone may believe what is said when
using one name without believing what is said when using the other name (i.e., because substitution fails).
8Plantinga, 1978, p. 134. I have modified the text to fit the examples of this paper. In the original text
Plantinga has ‘Hesperus’ for ‘Melville’ and ‘Phosphorus’ for ‘Bartleby’. Sentences (1a) and (1b) correspond
to his (26) and (19), respectively.
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without believing either (1b) or (2b).”9 If I am not misreading Plantinga, he claims that “the
natural and intuitively plausible position” about differences in informativeness is the one
that accounts for substitution failure within attitudinal contexts.
Once again, we reach the same conclusion. Plantinga’s account of substitution failure
explains the differences in informativeness. Even Boethians think that the solutions for these
problems go together.
3.2.4 Stalnaker on two-dimensionalism
Stalnaker 1978 offers a theory of assertion in terms of an interaction between the content of
the uttered sentence and the context of the conversation—hence the two dimensions. Context
affects content in two ways: it determines what is said and its truth-value. This can be
represented formally by means of a two-dimensional matrix, such as A, where propositions




Content affects context in two other ways: it adds the act of assertion to the context
set (i.e., the set of shared presuppositions of the conversation) and reduces it by elimi-
nating possibilities incompatible with what is asserted. The goal of the assertion is to
get the audience to exclude possibilities incompatible with what is said. In terms of the
two-dimensional formal account, the goal of a conversation is to reduce the context set in a
single, non-ambiguous, way.
Three pragmatic rules describe the way in which this goal is achieved: the proposition
asserted must be true according to some, and false according to other, possibilities in the con-
text set;10 a proposition must be expressed and have a truth-value relative to all possibilities
in the context set; and the same proposition must be expressed relative to each possibility
within the context set. It might be that the original context defines a matrix with necessary
propositions (i.e., violating the first rule) and different ones relative to different worlds
(i.e., violating the third rule). That is the case of matrix A. It gives us several candidates
9Plantinga, 1978, p. 134. Again, I have modified the original text to fit the examples.
10These “possibilities” are usually understood as ”possible worlds” which represent possible ways for our
world to be. They are not, in this sense, individual or partial possibilities of this or that thing being thus or so.
They represent, rather, the totality of the world as being thus or so.
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to the content of the assertion. We cannot pick a proposition because our direct rules of
interpretation do not yet tell us what was asserted.
If this happens, Stalnaker advises us to reinterpret the utterance by taking the speaker
to be saying something true. The diagonal proposition of the associated matrix repre-
sents the results of such reinterpretation. Formally speaking, this process is understood as




Matrix †A advises us to exclude possibility w2 and keep w1, thereby reducing the context
set in a single, unambiguous, way. Stalnaker 1978 argues that this model is good enough
to explain the differences in informativeness. Consider our problematic sentences (1a) and
(1b).
(1a) Melville is Melville.
(1b) Melville is Bartleby.
Suppose I say (1b) to Andy, “Melville is Bartleby”. Now suppose there are two different
possibilities as part of the context: w1 where Melville is Bartleby and w2 where ‘Melville’
and ‘Bartleby’ refer to two different people who happen to be close friends. This generates




How do I manage to say something informative? Stalnaker answers:
Now if we try to bring the initial context set into conformity with the third
principle by shrinking it, say by throwing out world [w2], we will bring it into
conflict with the first principle by making the assertion trivial. But if we look
at what is actually going on in the example, if we ask what possible states of
affairs the speaker would be trying to exclude from the context set if he made
that statement, we can work backward to the proposition expressed. A moments
reflection shows that what the speaker is saying is that the actual world is [w1]
and not [w2]. What he means to communicate is that the diagonal proposition
of the [original] matrix [. . . ] is true. [Stalnaker 1978, p. 91]
This explains how (1b) is informative and (1a) trivial and, thus, how these two sentences
differ in informativeness. Assertions determine two-dimensional matrices that must be
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compatible with the speaker’s presuppositions. Asserting (1b) generates a matrix with
necessarily true and necessarily false propositions, thus giving place to a contingent diago-
nal. This diagonal proposition is informative. Asserting (1a) generates a matrix with only
necessarily true propositions, thus giving place to a necessarily true diagonal. Neither this
nor the horizontal propositions of the matrix are informative. That is why (1a) and (1b)
differ in informativeness. End of story.
Does this same story explain substitution failure? It seems it does. Remember the puzzle.
Suppose I utter (5b) because I want to report Andy’s beliefs to Victor.
(5b) Andy does not believe that Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
Suppose that w1 is the actual world, w2 is a world in which ‘Melville’ and ‘Bartleby’
refer to different people (none of which is the actual Melville) and where Melville wrote
Moby Dick, and w3 is similar to w2 but here Bartleby wrote Moby Dick. This gives us matrix
C for the embedded sentence ‘Bartleby wrote Moby Dick’ in (5b).
C w1 w2 w3
w1 T F F
w2 F F T
w3 F F T
Now consider the case of (5a), which determines matrix D for the embedded sentence
‘Melville wrote Moby Dick’.
(5a) Andy believes that Melville wrote Moby Dick.
D w1 w2 w3
w1 T F F
w2 F T F
w3 F T F
Given this distribution over possibilities, we are asked to reinterpret both assertions
as saying something true. As a result, (5b) asks us to exclude possibility w2 and keep
possibilities w1 and w3, as illustrated by the diagonal of matrix C, whereas (5a) asks us to
exclude possibility w3 and keep possibilities w1 and w2, as illustrated by the diagonal of
matrix D.
This accounts for substitution failure by explaining why we cannot substitute ‘Melville’
for ‘Bartleby’ even if they are correferential in the actual world. Assertions determine
two-dimensional matrices that must be compatible with the speaker’s presuppositions. The
embedded sentence in (5b) conveys the proposition illustrated by the diagonal of matrix C.
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The embedded sentence in (5a) conveys the one illustrated by the diagonal of matrix D. The
matrices differ, that is why the names are not substitutable. End of story.
Stalnaker 1987 is hesitant to put things the way I did. To extend the same solution to
the problem of substitution failure, says Stalnaker, we need a matrix compatible not only
with the presuppositions of the speaker but, also, with the presuppositions of the subject of
ascription. And here is where this difference is supposed to be relevant: “When the beliefs
of the subject are very different from the presuppositions of the speaker, it is not always
obvious how this is to be done.” [Stalnaker, 1987, p.126]
This, however, is (if at all) a problem for the two-dimensional proposal of Stalnaker. It
is certainly not the problem we are interested in. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that
we find a way to solve this problem i.e., a way to define a matrix compatible with both the
speaker’s and the subject’s presuppositions.11 What would be the solution to the problem of
substitution failure?
Suppose I utter (5a) and (5b), with the corresponding substitution failure among the em-
bedded sentences. When uttered in the actual world, they contradict each other. What does
Stalnaker’s theory say about them? Define a matrix compatible with Andy’s presupposition
that Melville is not the same person as Bartleby. Include counterfactual possibilities, like w2
and w3 above. The resulting matrices represent different propositions expressed in different
worlds. Diagonalization yields different derived matrices for the different embedded sen-
tences. They do not contradict each other, they simply express different, logically consistent,
propositions.
It is clear how this accounts for the failure of substitution. If the embedded sentences
express different propositions, the names are not substitutable. It should also be clear that
the same story applies to the differences in informativeness. I utter (1a) and (1b). If the
reinterpretation of (1a) gives a necessary truth and that of (1b) a contingent one—as I have
shown—then (1b) is informative and (1a) is not.
So much for Stalnaker’s account of differences in informativeness and substitution
failure. If one problem is solved, the other is too. One more reason to think they go
hand-in-hand.
11Stalnaker does seem to have a rather obvious way to do this: “The propositional concept we construct is
one not for the sentence as [the ascribee] would use or understand it, but for the sentence as the speaker and
addressee would use and understand it if they were in the possible worlds relative to which the propositional
concept is being defined.” [1987, p. 127].
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3.3 A historical account
I hope to have convinced the reader that the problems of informativeness and substitution
failure are intimately related. Most philosophers in the tradition have failed to notice how
strong and important this relation is. Surprisingly or not, it has been unnoticed by some and,
at most, simply assumed by others.
Frege 1892, for example, seems to be a paradigmatic case of those who take informative-
ness and substitution failure to be two separate issues. As I have shown, his two solutions
are completely different, even though each could have been generalized to account for the
remaining case. The same seems to happen with Recanati 1993. He offers a solution to
substitution failure and says close to nothing about informativeness. Given that he is an
advocate of direct reference, it would be strange for him to do this if he had thought the
issues were so closely related. Similar considerations apply to Barwise and Perry 1983,
Crimmins and Perry 1989, and Salmon 1986. Soames’ 2002 case is different. His account
of informativeness is closely related to his account of substitution failure. But the way he
presents them, one of them being a problem posed by propositional attitudes but not the
other, suggests that he takes them to be two different problems. The same goes for Lycan’s
2006 and Braun’s 2007 recent introductions to the philosophy of proper names. Both agree
that Millianism faces four different challenges, informativeness and substitution failure
being two of them. They do not say if the problems are related, and certainly do not seem to
think they are closely related at all.
Things are clearer with Russell 1905. He knows Frege’s informativeness puzzle well
enough. Nonetheless, he does not consider it among the puzzles that any good theory should
solve; all he deals with is substitution failure.12 According to Russell, Frege’s puzzle is
simply about “why it is often worthwhile to assert identity.” [1905 p. 214]. This suggests
that Russell assumed that they were two different problems. The same goes on with Quine
1980. His goal is to deal with the problem of substitution failure, which he considers to
be owed to the presence of referential opacity. There is no reason to think that Quine is
unaware of Frege’s informativeness puzzle, yet he says nothing about it, even though identity
statements appear all over the text.
With Kripke 1979 things are a bit unclear. He presents a new puzzle, this time about
12It is important to say that I am not claiming, or implying, either that Russell did not know there was some
such puzzle or that he did not have a way of explaining it. It may very well be that Russell does not pay
attention to this puzzle, say, because he thinks it does not arise for idealized languages. If such is the case, then
better for me. If this historical view of Russell is correct then Russell did think that they were two different
unrelated problems. My point is not that Russell fails to account for the puzzle. Not at all. My point is that
Russell fails to notice that these two puzzles are so intimately related with respect to natural languages that it
is hard to see why they are two distinct puzzles.
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belief, involving substitution failure, but does not offer any solution to any of, what I take to
be, closely related problems. He seems to be concerned pretty much only with substitution
failure, though it could be argued that he is assuming that informativeness is closely related
to it.
Finally, there are other philosophers, like Plantinga 1978, Stalnaker 1978 and 1987, and
Jacob 2003, who seem to think that the problems are closely related, somehow. Plantinga
1978 does think that a proper solution should account for both, but he clearly takes them to
be two different problems that cannot be solved by non-Fregeans. Stalnaker 1978 and 1987
offers pretty much the same solution to both problems, but he explicitly says that these are
two separate issues, given that substitution failure presents one further obstacle having to do
with the ascription of attitudes. Jacob 2003 presents both issues as problems of intentionality.
He takes them to be related to each other but says nothing about their relation, and it is fair
to say that he takes them to be different issues.
There is, truly speaking, no general consensus about how to understand differences
in informativeness and substitution failure. Things are a bit worse when it comes to how
these issues relate to each other. The literature suggests that there is no consensus that
takes informativeness and substitution failure to be substantially different, just as much
as it suggests that there is no agreement that takes them to be as intimately related as I
have claimed them to be. I hope the arguments I have presented may contribute to such an
agreement.
3.4 Why is there substitution failure?
I have argued that, given our current understanding of the phenomena, differences of in-
formativeness and failures of substitution go together and their explanations too. I have
not claimed, or argued, that this is necessarily so. Things could be otherwise, but they are
not. And it is important to see why this is so, for understanding the way in which these
phenomena actually relate is central to any proper account of them.
Consider a world in which there are differences in informativeness, but no failures of
substitution. How would that world look like? This is a world in which (1a)-(1b), and
(2a)-(2b), differ in informativeness.
(1a) Melville is Melville.
(1b) Melville is Bartleby.
(2a) Melville wrote Moby Dick.
(2b) Bartleby wrote Moby Dick.
65
What does this imply? Recall our formulation of informativeness:
INF: For any pair of sentences S 1 and S 2, which are not necessary falsehoods and which
vary only in the use of different correferential names, a normal subject A, and a context
c, S 1 and S 2 differ in informativeness in c iff A believes one and does not believe the
other in c.
If the formulation is correct, the claim—which we are assumming—that (1a) differs in
informativeness from (1b) presupposes that as a matter of fact a competent subject, say,
Andy, assents to one and not the other. I say “assents” to avoid being tendentious. In this
way we leave open the question about Andy’s mental states and, hence, the question of
substitution failure.
Now, suppose that, for some unexplained reason, among the inhabitants of world wδ
there is a linguistic practice according to which all coreferential terms are substitutable
salva veritate within attitudinal contexts. It is important to note that this is only a change
in linguistic practice and is meant not to include any cognitive or psychological difference
between human beings here in the actual world and the inhabitants of wδ . In particular,
suppose that speakers in this world use the term ‘schmelieves’ that we define as:
schmelieve: For any subject A and any names ‘m’ and ‘n’; if m=n then A schmelieves that
m is F iff A schmelieves that n is F.
Suppose, furthermore, that we have really good evidence to the point that Andy
schmelieves (1a). Hence, (4a) is true and, given that (4c) is also true, (4d) follows:
(4a) Andy schmelieves that Melville is Melville.
(4c) Melville is Bartleby.
(4d) Andy schmelieves that Melville is Bartleby.
Is there anything strange about this situation? A world like this is certainly metaphys-
ically and logically possible. But is it cognitively possible? That is to say, can human
subjects have mental representational states that match the uses of ‘schmelieves’ without
thereby losing anything essential to human cognition? The answer, I believe, is negative. To
illustrate it, let me begin by pointing at some surface oddities of schmeliefs.
Ascribing schmeliefs to subjects may very well help illuminate their behavior. If all you
know about Moby Dick is that Bartleby wrote it, and you wonder why Andy keeps buying
different editions of Moby Dick I can explain his behavior by saying: Andy schmelieves
that Bartleby is the best author of the English tradition. Yet, ascribing schmeliefs is, by
far, not as explanatory as ascribing beliefs. It cannot explain why, for example, normal
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agents assent to one but not the other of the problematic pair of sentences (1a)-(1b). Andy’s
distinctive assents to the distinct sentences is not an inference from the ascriber’s use of
‘schmelieves;’ it is a puzzling fact that cannot be explained unless ‘schmelieves’ allows for
some hyperintentionality, which it precludes by definition.
To further illustrate this point, consider the following extension of the scenario above.
Andy loves Moby Dick and he wants to meet the author. One day he is told that Bartleby
will be presenting a book in the coffee shop downstairs. He assents to both ‘Melville wrote
Moby Dick’ and ‘Melville is Melville’, but not to ‘Melville is Bartleby’. Given this, the
definition of ‘schmelieves’ above, and the fact that Melville=Bartleby, we should conclude
that Andy schmelieves that Melville will be presenting a book in the coffee shop downstairs.
Now, suppose further on, that Andy assents to ‘Bartleby is the worst writer of the English
tradition.’ Given this situation, it is terribly unclear what we can do (if anything at all) to
understand and predict Andy’s behavior on the basis of schmelief ascription. Should we
expect him to go to the coffee shop downstairs? After all, Andy schmelieves that Melville
is the best writer of the English tradition and he schmelieves that he will be presenting a
book downstairs. Yet, Andy was told that Bartleby would be the one presenting and he does
assent to ‘Bartleby is the worst writer of the English tradition.’ Should we, then, expect him
not to go downstairs? We have, I am afraid, no clue of what to expect from Andy.
To see what is missing, both linguistically and cognitively, we can begin by looking
at ordinary belief-ascriptions. The natural result, in the scenario above, is to take Andy to
believe that Bartleby will be presenting a book downstairs, that Bartleby is not Melville, and
that Bartleby is the worst writer of the English tradition. A natural prediction would follow:
Andy will not go downstairs to look for whoever is presenting the book. This illuminates
both why Andy assents to one but not both sentences in (1a)-(1b) as well as his, otherwise
strange, behavior with respect to Melville and his book presentation. Linguistically speak-
ing, we are missing a more illuminating attitude verb. Cognitively speaking, we would be
missing more.
Leslie (see Leslie 1987, 1994, and 2002) notes that one of our characteristically human
cognitive abilities, that of pretending that something is the case, depends upon the ability
to understand “object substitution” : i.e., the ability to assign props, or stand-ins, as the
referents of representations. Object substitution requires that humans be able to raise a rep-
resentation, say and create an uninterpreted copy of it. Leslie 1987 takes this uninterpreted
copy to be the mental analogue of a quoted sentence.
To illustrate, consider a case of pretense involving object substitution: to pretend of
a banana that it is a telephone. To do so, one must be able to go from the representation
that this is a telephone to representing that ‘this is a telephone’. Once we have the latter,
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different props may be assigned as referents of, say, ‘this’: e.g., a banana. At this point
one can pretend that this is a telephone, even when ‘this’ refers to a banana. It would be a
mistake, however, to interpret ‘this’ as contributing the banana to the interpretation of the
representation this is a telephone. Interpreting the representation this way would give place
to mistaken inferences: e.g., that this telephone is a fruit. Mental states exhibiting object
substitution, like this one, preclude such reference-based interpretations and inferences,
since referents are precisely what is substitutable in them.
Leslie 1987 forcefully argues that object substitution is closely related with the referen-
tial opacity of “mental state terms such as believe, expect and want” [Leslie 1987, p.416].
This “referential opacity” is nothing more than the phenomenon of substitution failure.
For example, “the prime minister of Britain” and “Mrs. Thatcher” refer at the
time of this writing to the same person. Therefore, anything asserted about the
prime minister of Britain, if true, must be true of Mrs. Thatcher as well. If it
is true that the prime minister of Britain lives at No.10 Downing Street, then
it must be true that Mrs. Thatcher lives at No.10 Downing Street. But put this
proposition in the context of a mental state term and this no longer holds. Thus,
“Sarah-Jane believes that the prime minister of Britain lives at No.10 Downing
Street” in no way entails the truth (or falsehood) of “Sarah-Jane believes that
Mrs. Thatcher lives at No.10 Downing Street.” In a mental state context one
can no longer “look through” terms to see what they refer to in deciding such
issues. The mental state term suspends normal reference relations.” [Leslie
1987, p.416]
The relation between substitution failure in mental state reports and object substitution
in pretense is clear: in both cases it would be wrong to interpret the relevant referential
terms as contributing their referents; in both cases, reference-based interpretations would
yield mistaken inferences. Unlike with ‘schmelieve’, there is an “isomorphism” between
hyperintensional mental state terms such as ‘believe’ and mental representational states such
as pretense. The former exhibit substitution failure, the latter exhibit object substitution.
Leslie 1987 claims this isomorphism is “not coincidental”. To explain it Leslie posits
An underlying form of internal representation that possesses these semantic
properties [i.e., referential opacity]. Mental state expressions and pretense
both depend cognitively on these representations and therefore inherit their
properties. [Leslie 1987, p.416]
This “underlying form of internal representation” has been shown to be relevant not only
for pretense (see Leslie 1987 and Friedman and Leslie 2007), but also for the development
of an understanding of mental states (see Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 1985) and, with it,
for the development of moral reasoning (see Wellman and Miller 2008).
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I think this gives us a very good idea of what would be missing if we were to have
just the cognitive correlate of non-hyperintensional attitude verbs such as ‘schmelieve.’ If
cognitive psychologists are correct, there would be no understanding of pretense, false belief,
and, apparently also, social-practical reasoning.
Consider, for example, what would be of pretense if all we were to have were schmeliefs.
Suppose Jon plays the role of Oedipus, Carla plays that of Jocasta, and Michael plays Laius
in a representation of Sophocles’ drama. To understand the representation I must come to
schmelieve that Oedipus killed Laius and married Jocasta. But, as a matter of fact, Jon
is Edipus, Carla is Jocasta, and Michael is Laius. Assuming that all there is to mental
representational states are schmeliefs, it follows that to understand the representation I must
also schmelieve that Jon killed Michael and married Carla. But this is, very clearly, wrong.
If all we had were non-hyperintensional mental states like schmeliefs, we would not be able
to understand acts of fiction making.
If Leslie 1987, 2002, and Friedman and Leslie 2007 are correct, then “mental hyperinten-
sionality” turns out to be a design feature of human cognition. If so, and assuming attitudinal
verbs are part of a broader machinery for explaining human cognition and predicting human
behavior, it is not surprising that a good number of attitudinal verbs are hyperintensional.
These, I hope, are good enough reasons to think we do need something else than just
schmeliefs and schmelief-ascription. A world with differences in informativeness but no
substitution failure seems to require some substantial departure from what seems to be actual
human psychology.
3.5 A working hypothesis
The ability to have mental states exhibiting object substitution sheds some light over our
problematic phenomena: informativeness and substitution failure. As we saw with pretense,
these mental states are such that the proper interpretation of the representation involved
is not fixed by the semantically determined reference. Suppose that a single actress plays
all the central roles in Sophocles’ drama. In such a case I can understand that Oedipus
killed Laius without believing (or pretending) that Laius killed Oedipus, even if I know
that ‘Oedipus’ and ‘Laius’ refer to the same actress. Furthermore, I must do so if I am to
understand the theatrical representation. It is exactly this kind of mental state that is involved
in cases where there are differences in informativeness and failures of substitution.
As it is clear from the example above, mental states involving object substitution allow
for “reference” substitution, but not for “sign” substitution. In the theatrical representation,
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that Oedipus killed Laius does not entail that Laius killed Oedipus even if, in that context,
‘Oedipus’ and ‘Laius’ refer to the same individual (i.e., a virtuous actress). A subject would
fail to understand the theatrical representation if she made this kind of inference. These are
contexts where a difference in signs (e.g., between ‘Oedipus’ and ‘Laius’) matters for the
interpretation even without a corresponding difference in reference. This difference in signs
can amount to a difference in informativeness or give place to failures of substitution.
If our representational mental states were to map only into the semantically determined
interpretation, differences in informativeness and failures of substitution would be a mystery.
We would have to complicate the semantics in order to account for them. But we have
independent reasons to avoid following this line, at least with respect to proper names (see
Garcı́a-Ramı́rez and Shatz forthcoming).13
If, however, we allow representational mental states to map into something else than just
the semantically determined interpretation, then informativeness and substitution failure are
a natural result. Two or more sentences may not differ in their semantic content and yet
differ with respect to the signs they use to convey that content. And it may very well be that
this difference of signs is the “something else” that representational mental states map into.
Recall our formulation of the problem:
INF: For any pair of sentences S 1 and S 2, which are not necessary falsehoods and which
vary only in the use of different correferential names, a normal subject A, and a context
c, S 1 and S 2 differ in informativeness in c iff A believes one and does not believe the
other in c.
The claim was: if a normal speaker assents to (or believes) one sentence without assenting
to (or believing) the other, we have reasons to think there are differences in informativeness.
If we take the relevant representational mental states to map into something else (e.g., the
signs themselves) than just semantic content, we would have an explanation of why there
are different attitudes (e.g., assent and dissent) without there being semantic differences. All
we need is for the representations to involve different, yet coreferential, signs.
The same goes for substitution failure:
SUBS: For any two coreferential names ‘N’ and ‘M’, any context c, and a normal subject
A: ‘N’ and ‘M’ are subject to substitution failure within reports in c of A’s first-order
belief states iff A does not believe that ‘N is M’ is true in c.
13It is worth noting that some traditional ways to complicate the semantics (i.e., by appealing to descriptive
information) would not even solve the problem. Consider the case of the single person enacting Sophocles’
drama. Even if we take ‘Oedipus’ to mean “the F” and ‘Laius’ to mean “the G”, a competent subject would
still be allowed to go from believing (or pretending) that Oedipus killed Laius to believing (or pretending) that
Laius killed Oedipus, since she would know that, as a matter of fact, the F = the G.
70
The claim was: two coreferential names fail to substitute within attitudinal contexts
whenever the relevant subject fails to accept the truth of the corresponding identity statement.
Once more, if we allow for representational mental states to map into something else than
just the semantically determined interpretation we get an explanation of substitution failure.
If there are, for example, belief-like mental states that map not only into semantic differ-
ences but also into sign differences, then the latter may be relevant to belief formation: e.g.,
a speaker may believe that N is N and disbelieve that N is M even though ‘N’ and ‘M’ are
coreferential. Now, if different (yet coreferential) signs guide the speaker’s belief formation
in different ways, then different (yet coreferential) signs will not be interchangeable within
reports of the speaker’s belief states. Reporting the belief states of such a speaker in the
relevant context will involve substitution failure.
This suggests that what gives place to both problematic phenomena is the presence of
different names, full stop. It also suggests a new way to describe the problem which I would
like to propose as a working hypothesis.
NAME PUZZLE: Any two different coreferential names ‘N’ and ‘M,’ will: (i) give place to
differences in informativeness; and (ii) fail to be substitutable within ‘that’-clauses iff
the associated attitudes of the relevant subject A map into something else but semantic
content.
This formulation prompts many questions, all of which I shall leave unanswered here.
Which strings of sounds count as different names? How can a representational mental state
map into something else than the semantically determined interpretation? What needs to be
the case, cognitively speaking, for there to be differences of informativeness and substitution
failure relative to a normal subject A? All of these should be addressed by a substantial
account of the phenomena in question. I do not intend to do such thing in this paper, but
in its sequel (see Garcı́a-Ramı́rez forthcoming). I will be satisfied to have shown that the
apparently distinct problematic phenomena of informativeness and substitution failure are
intimately related and why this is so.
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An Integrated Account of Substitution
Failure
Most “referentialist” accounts of the phenomenon of substitution failure (e.g., Stalnaker
1978, Salmon 1986, and Soames 2002) have focused either on the “mind” or the “language”
side of the phenomenon. A proper account, however, must include both the linguistics
and psychology of substitution failure. The goal of this paper is to offer such an account.
The account is based on: (i) psychological data from studies on name processing; and (ii)
linguistic data concerned with belief-report sentences and predicate-meaning-transfer. The
psychological account shows why and how the human mind may fail to identify coreferential
names and the linguistic data explains how speakers may use belief-report sentences to target
such phenomena. This integrated account is tailor-made to fit a referentialist semantics for
proper names.
Introduction
The referentialist theory of names claims that names contribute only their referent to the
content of the sentence where it is used. There are many good philosophical (see Kripke
1980, Donellan 1960 and 1970, Putnam 1975, and Marcus 1961), linguistic (see Stalnaker
1978, Recanati 1993, and Swanson 2006), and psychological (see Garcı́a-Ramı́rez and Shatz
forthcoming) reasons to think that this theory is correct. Yet, the theory is not without
problems. A major one of these is presented by the phenomenon of substitution failure.
There is substitution failure whenever the substitution of coreferential expressions fails
to preserve truth value. If the referentialist theory is correct, coreferential names make
exactly the same semantic contribution; thus, they should affect truth values in exactly
the same way. This is consistent with the truth of (1a)-(1c) but not with that of (2a)-(2b).
Referentialism is, at first glance, inconsistent with substitution failure.
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(1a) Dr. Zemph wrote Psychoanalysis.
(1b) Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
(1c) Dr. Zemph is Clare Quilty.
(2a) Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph wrote Psychoanalysis.
(2b) Humbert does not believe that Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
Several philosophers (see Salmon 1986 and 1989, Soames 1989 and 2002, Stalnaker
1987, Crimmins 1998, Crimmins and Perry 1989, and Recanati 1993 among many others)
have tried to show how substitution failure can be the result of non-semantic mechanisms,
thereby saving the day for a referential semantics. All of them, however, have focused
on the linguistic features of substitution failure: explaining, for example, the behavior
of subordinate clauses, attitudinal verbs, semantic pretense, and presupposition carrying
expressions. As a result, they have either speculated on, or not dealt with, an important
part of substitution failure: the explanation of the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to
the phenomenon. In this paper I will offer some such explanation. Doing so will not only
complete the picture but will also help us find a more adequate linguistic account of the
phenomenon.
I start, in section 4.1, by describing the phenomena in need of explanation. I will
argue that, strictly speaking, there is substitution failure only within reports of attitudinal
mental states (e.g., ‘John believes that . . . ’), though there seem to be uses of other sentential
constructions in equal need of explanation. In section 4.2, I present some psychological
data on the processing of names. I focus mainly on evidence concerning the mechanisms
of storage and retrieval of proper names, but will also make use of studies on the semantic
assumptions that play a role in the acquisition of proper names. Based on this evidence,
section 4.3 offers the psychological side of my theory by showing why and how speakers
may fail to realize that two names are coreferential. Section 4.4 completes my theory by
describing a linguistic mechanism that may help us better understand belief reports that
exhibit substitution failure. In section 4.5 I apply the integrative part of the theory by
showing how it can solve Frege’s famous problem of informativeness as well as Kripke’s
puzzle about belief. Finally, section 4.6 offers some extra support to the theory by showing
how it can be used to solve some further puzzles.
4.1 How much substitution failure is there?
I said that there is substitution failure whenever the substitution of coreferential expressions
fails to preserve truth-value. The tradition has generally focused on propositional attitude
ascriptions. To illustrate, consider the sentences in (1) and (2), all of which are true.
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(1a) Dr. Zemph wrote Psychoanalysis.
(1b) Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
(1c) Dr. Zemph is Clare Quilty.
(2a) Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph wrote Psychoanalysis.
(2b) Humbert does not believe that Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
Some seem to think there is substitution failure also among simple sentences such as
those in (3). The examples are owed to Saul 1997.
(3a) Clark Kent came into the phone booth, and Superman came out.
(3b) Dan dresses like Superman.
(3c) Superman was more successful with women than Clark Kent.
Others seem to think there’s also substitution failure within epistemic contexts that are
not mental state reports, such as (4a) which is allegedly true and (4b) which is false (both
sentences are uttered by E in Ann Arbor).
(4a) It is a priori that I am here.
(4b) It is a priori that E is in Ann Arbor.
Strictly speaking, only the examples involving attitude ascriptions exhibit substitution
failure. Let me explain why. First, we know, as a matter of fact, that Superman is an F iff
Clark Kent is an F. Hence if we want to accept that there is substitution failure in (3a)-(3b)
and that (3c) is true, it must be that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are not being used as
coreferential terms. If we insist, however, that the names are used coreferentially, then we
must accept that (3a)-(3b) do not exhibit substitution failure and that (3c) is false. There
seems to be no more evidence to consider in these cases. Speaker intuitions may argue
against this latter move, but these intuitions seem compatible with the claim that the names
involved are not being used coreferentially.1 Either way, there seems to be no substitution
failure in (3). Notice, however, that we cannot make the same claim about (2a)-(2b), for
even though we know that Dr. Zemph is an F iff Clare Qulity is an F, we have independent
reasons to accept (2a)-(2b) as true. In this case, there is extra evidence to consider. We know,
because we have observed his behavior, that Humbert doesn’t believe that Clare Quilty
wrote Psychoanalysis. Attitude ascriptions seem more puzzling.
Second, there are good reasons to think that either the sentences uttered by E in (4a) and
(4b) are not synonymous or that both (4a) and (4b) are false. It seems true that whenever a
speaker utters the English sentence ‘I am here’ she manages to say something true. So it
seems appropriate to say that competent English speakers know (in some broad sense of
‘knows’) that every utterance of ‘I am here’ expresses a true proposition. The best way to
1The comic-book story suggests that Superman and Clark Kent are two temporal parts of the same
individual.
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put this is as follows: it is a priori that an utterance of ‘I am here’ is true. Now, one thing is
the truth-value of a proposition expressed in a context and another thing is the proposition
itself. There is a big step between accepting that competent English speakers know a priori
the truth-value of a given utterance and accepting that competent English speakers know a
priori which proposition it is they know the truth-value of. To know that by uttering ‘I am
here’ I’ll be expressing the proposition that E is in Ann Arbor I need to know that E is the
speaker of the utterance and that Ann Arbor is the place of the utterance, and there is no
a priori way to know any of these. That is exactly why (4b) is false. This leaves us with
two options, either E asserts that it is a priori that E is in Ann Arbor by uttering (4a), or E
asserts that it is a priori that his utterance of ‘I am here’ is true. If the former is the case,
then (4a) is false and so it has the same truth-value as (4b). If the latter is the case, then the
use of ‘I’ and ‘here’ in (4a) are not coreferential with the use of ‘E’ and ‘Ann Arbor’ in (4b).
Either way, there’s no substitution failure here.
I agree with Saul 1997, nonetheless, that there is something puzzling about (3), specially
if we also accept that such sentences may be uttered by speakers who know that Superman
is Clark Kent. Since I think a proper account of the sentences in (3) takes ‘Superman’ and
‘Clark Kent’ to be used as having different referents, I still need a story that explains how a
competent speaker may use such terms in such ways in light of her knowledge, and how she
may successfully communicate this use to her audience. The account of substitution failure
I want to present should be good enough to illuminate this.
4.2 The evidence
How is it that natural language speakers process names? Which limitations are in place
when speakers acquire new proper names? To answer these questions I will look at studies
on memory and cognitive development. The evidence suggests that certain accounts of sub-
stitution failure are misguided and, as I will argue, it also suggests an alternative resolution
of Frege’s puzzle.
4.2.1 Memory
Research on memory has suggested that proper names are uniquely and arbitrarily linked
with faces in semantic memory (see Semenza and Zettin 1989, Semenza and Sgaramella
1993, Valentine, Brennen, and Brédart 1996, and Werheid and Clare 2007; for related
research on names of places see Goodglass and Wingfield 1993). The processing models
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associated with these studies suggest that no descriptive information about the referent of
the name is necessary for proper name processing.
Names are difficult to remember. Everyone has, at some point, been unable to recall
someone’s name, while knowing pretty well who that person is. This problem is, as Kaplan
puts it, “a looming fact of life” [1990, p.105]. The speaker is acquainted with the referent,
she might be able to describe the referent, she also knows the name, and yet the name is not
retrieved. Folk-psychology describes this as the tip-of-the-tongue or TOT phenomenon.
Cohen 1990 tested the differences in processing meaningful and meaningless expressions.
The results show that recalling proper names is just as difficult as recalling meaningless,
non-word expressions (e.g., ‘wesp’, ‘blick’). Based on this evidence, Cohen argues that
the TOT problems with proper names are ascribable to a lack of semantic associations. On
her view, proper names are detached from conceptual representations. There are different
interpretations of the evidence, of course, but there is general agreement that proper names
are vulnerable in terms of retrieval and that this is owed to the fact that “a proper name
conveys almost no information about the entity it names” [Valentine et.al. 1996, p. 108].
This is not to say that they provide no information whatsoever. A proper name like ‘John’,
for example, may convey the information that the referent is English, or of English origin.
The important claim is that, according to Valentine et.al. 1996, proper names do not convey
any uniquely identifying information that could allow us to single out their referents.
This point very clearly suggests that proper names are not, in any way, reliably associated
with files containing descriptive information about their referents. This goes against all
theories that intend to explain substitution failure in terms of descriptive information that is
supposed to be both conveyed by the use of proper names and truth-conditionally relevant
in belief reports. This is the case even for some “referentialist” accounts such as Recanati’s
1993. On his view, names contribute their modes of presentation (MOFPS) to the truth
conditions of belief-reports, each name having a different MOFP. These MOFPS are supposed
to be mental files in the form of encyclopedia entries that include descriptive information
about the referent of the name. The theory (see Recanati 1993, p.184-187) presupposes
an intimate relation between the linguistic and the psychological modes of presentation.
That is how names are supposed to contribute the descriptive information associated with
their psychological MOFP in a way that is truth-conditionally relevant within belief reports.2
2On Recanati’s own words (or almost): “Suppose someone says (2a). If the hearer contextually assumes
that the ascriber is being ‘faithful’ to the believer, he will be led to assume that the ascribed belief concerning
Dr. Zemph involves a mode of presentation [. . . ] which includes the descriptive concept ‘called “Dr. Zemph”.’
Hence, the hearer will assume that the believer thinks of Dr. Zemph as ‘Dr. Zemph’; he will take the reference
of the ‘that’- clause as a quasi-singular proposition involving a certain (de re) concept over and beyond the
reference of [. . . ] ‘Dr. Zemph’ ” [Recanati 1993, p.358].
79
Theories like this are undermined by the empirical evidence and appear to be inconsistent
with what cognitive psychologists have to say about the latter.
In most models (see Valentine et.al., 1996 for a detailed survey) the files containing
descriptive information about the referent do not play a necessary role in name retrieval.
Speakers can access such descriptive information about the referent of the name, yet this is
not necessary for comprehension and production. If such were the case, as Recanati’s model
predicts, then there would be more entry points, within memory, from which to access a
name. If so, then proper names should not be specially difficult to retrieve.3 The evidence
clearly shows that this is not the case. Descriptive information, of the sort we find in an
encyclopedia entry, is stored in separate and independent storage spaces from that of the
name. Studies on anomia seem to confirm this while suggesting that names are dissociated
from descriptive information. For a detailed account of the neuropsychology of proper
names see Semenza 2009.
Furthermore, studies on lexical and cognitive development suggest that infants as young
as 6 months of age show comprehension of their own names while still being unable to
process descriptive information such as being called ‘N’. For a more detailed discussion of
these issues and the relevance of these data for the philosophical debate on proper names
see Garcı́a-Ramı́rez and Shatz forthcoming.
The central point is clear: in order to access a proper name within memory it is not
necessary to also access descriptive information about its referent. That is why names are
difficult to retrieve and why there is selective impairment and preservation of names (i.e.,
nomic aphasia, see Semenza 2009). There is, briefly put, no intimate relation between
the proper name and the descriptive information that it may be associated with. In some
cases (e.g., early infancy and anomia) there might not even be any descriptive information
associated with the name. Without this intimate relation, accounts of substitution failure that
appeal to descriptive information that is somehow contributed by the name seem implausible.
They fail on psychological grounds.
4.2.2 Semantic assumptions for proper names
Hall 2002 reviews different studies on how semantic knowledge aides proper name acquisi-
tion. He considers four different assumptions, two of which are of great importance for our
discussion: first, speakers presuppose that there is only one object per name; and, second,
3Note that the claim that the descriptive information may be “arbitrarily” associated with the name makes
no difference here. If the information is to be always associated with the name, as Recanati claims, it must
always offer extra entry point from which to access the name. This would make names easier to retrieve.
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speakers presuppose there is only one name per object.4
One object per name
Hall 1996 conducted a study designed to show that children as young as 4 years of age have
the default assumption that in order for something to be a proper name it must apply to only
one object. Hall divided the subjects (ninety 4-year-olds) in two groups. Both groups heard
a novel word, e.g., “ZAVY”, modeled in an ambiguous sentence context, e.g., “This dog is
. . . ”, that supported both proper name and adjective interpretations of the novel word. Group
one heard the novel word applied to a drawing of a single object with a salient property (e.g.,
a striped dog). Group two heard the novel word applied to a drawing of two objects with the
same salient property (e.g., two striped dogs). The study predicted that children in group
one would interpret the novel word as as a name, while children in group two would take it
to be an adjective.
To test this prediction children in both groups were presented with three sets of drawings
including (a) the labeled object or objects, (b) an object of the same kind as the labeled one
but lacking the salient property (e.g., a non-striped dog), and (c) an object of a different
kind with the same salient property (e.g., a striped umbrella). The study then assessed how
the children in both groups would extend their interpretations of the novel word by asking
questions that used the novel word in ambiguous ways (i.e., consistent with both proper
name and adjective interpretations). The experimenters would ask: “Is this dog ZAVY?” or
“Is this umbrella ZAVY?” The results confirmed the hypothesis that 4-year-olds assumed
that proper names can only apply to single objects. Children in group one refused to extend
the use of the novel word to apply to more than one object, while children in group two did
not.
In a different study, Hall 1996 also showed that the “one object per name” assumption is
a default one which can be revised given enough evidence. In other words, children initially
refuse to accept that two objects (e.g., two different kids) may have the same name, but this
assumption can be revised given enough evidence. To show this Hall presented the subjects
with unambiguous proper name use of novel words, e.g., “This dog is named ZAVY”, and
assessed their interpretations of the words. Children in both groups made a proper name
4A third assumption, “salient individuals”, was first noted by Katz, Baker, and Macnamara 1984 in a
study with 3 year olds. They noted that children’s acquisition of novel words varied according to the sentence
environment in which they were presented, when applied to human-like objects (e.g., a doll). Proper name
interpretations followed syntactic contexts like ‘This is X’ whereas adjective interpretations followed contexts
like ‘This is an X’ (see also Bloom, 1990). This restriction, however, did not apply when the novel word was
used to refer to objects that were not human-like (e.g., a colored block). A further study by Gelman and Taylor
1984 replicated this finding. This suggests that speakers would normally interpret a novel word as a proper
name if it applies to salient individuals.
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interpretation even though they heard the novel word applied to more than one object. The
evidence suggests that, unless given evidence to the contrary, speakers presuppose that
to each name corresponds only one object. Anecdotal evidence (see Macnamara 1982),
showing that children are in fact reluctant to accept that two objects (e.g., two friends) can
have the same name, supports this claim.
Hall’s 1996 study shows evidence on behalf of two different claims. First, that when
interpreting “ZAVY” in an ambiguous environment “This dog is. . . ”, children will interpret
the word as a proper name if the context singles out a salient referent. Children will interpret
the novel word as an adjective if the context does not single out a salient individual. This
suggests that when interpreting a novel word in a syntactically ambiguous environment,
speakers will take it to be a proper name if the context also provides enough evidence to
single out the word’s referent. In the case of the experiments this is achieved by presenting
the subjects either with a drawing of a single dog or one of multiple dogs. Second, the study
also shows that, once they have interpreted the novel word as a name, children will refuse to
extend its use to refer to other individuals. This assumption may be revised, as Hall shows,
when given enough evidence to the contrary.
Another way to put these claims is to say that in contexts that provide a single salient
referent, speakers normally interpret novel words as proper names and that whenever in-
terpreting a word as a name speakers will not extend it to refer to multiple objects. This
naturally prompts the question: why do speakers go from the evidence of a single referent to
a proper name interpretation? Hall’s suggestion is that speakers normally assume that there
is only one object per name.5
One name per object
If speakers presuppose that to each name corresponds only one object, it seems natural
that they also presuppose that, if they encounter a new name, it must belong to a different,
previously unnamed, object. Hall and Graham 1999 conducted a different study intended to
show that children do aid themselves with this assumption; i.e., they assume that to each
object corresponds only one name.
Forty-eight 4 and 5-year-olds and forty eight 3-year-olds heard a novel word as it was
applied to a familiar stuffed animal (e.g., a stuffed dog). Subjects were divided in two
5In conversation, Eric Swanson has mentioned that these claims would be in better standing if it could be
shown that children prefer the proper name interpretation even in plural environments such as “These dogs are
ZAVY and LAVY”. It seems to me that such experiment could, in principle, offer some such support. Yet I
have some reservations about its implementation. In any case, I leave the job of designing such experiments
to psycholinguists. Suffice it to say that, as far as I know, the evidence available in the literature does not go
against Hall’s claims.
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groups. Group one heard the novel word (e.g., ‘X’) modeled syntactically as a proper name
(e.g., “This dog is named ‘X’ ”). Group two heard the word modeled as an adjective (e.g.,
“This dog is very X”). All subjects were then presented with a second stuffed dog. They
were asked to determine which of the animals was the referent of a second novel word (e.g.,
‘Y’). Both groups were then divided in half: one half of each group heard the second word
modeled as a proper name (e.g., “Show me a dog that is named ‘Y’ ”); the remaining half
heard the second word modeled as an adjective, e.g., “Show me a dog that is very ‘Y’ ”.
Once the subjects decided which object was the referent of the second new word, they were
asked whether the word in question could also apply to the object they did not choose.
Hall and Graham predicted that the choice of reference for the second novel word would
vary across groups. In particular, they predicted that children would reject having two names
for the same object. Thus, subjects in group one who heard the second novel word ‘Y’
modeled as a proper name would take it to apply to the second stuffed dog and reject the
possibility that it apply to the other, previously named, dog. A contrasting claim was made
about those (group two) who heard the first novel word modeled as an adjective. Hall and
Graham predicted that children would not reject applying two adjectives for the same object.
In particular, they predicted that children would not be driven to apply a second adjective
to the new, unnamed, object. And, when they did apply another adjective to an unnamed
object, the subjects would not refuse to extend the second adjective to the previously named
object.
The results confirmed their general prediction that children’s interpretations were “signif-
icantly affected by the lexical form classes of the two novel words” [Hall and Graham 1999,
p.88]. This use of lexical categories was particularly strong with respect to proper names,
suggesting that children presupposed that new names only apply to previously unnamed
objects or, alternatively, that to each object corresponds only one name.
[I]f both words were modeled as proper names, children showed the strongest
tendency to select the unlabeled object as the referent of the second word
and, having chosen that object, to deny that the second word could apply to
the already-labeled object (e.g., as if one dog could not be both “Fido” and
“Rover”) [Hall and Graham 1999, p.88].
The studies presented in Hall 2002 suggest that, from a very early stage of development,
speaker knowledge of proper names includes two default assumptions that can be dubbed as
“unique reference” and “unique naming”. According to the former, a single proper name
refers to only one object—I deal with homonyms in 4.3.2. According to the latter, individual
objects have only one name or, better put, different names refer to different objects. To
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say that both assumptions are “default” is to underscore the fact that, when given enough
evidence to the contrary, speakers do revise their assumptions and accept the exceptions.
Here’s some anecdotal evidence that supports the claim that these assumptions carry on
through development until adulthood. The National Gallery in London dedicates one hall to
French impressionism. It exhibits, among other things, some four or five paintings by Monet.
All but one of these paintings are attributed to some Claude O. Monet. The remaining one is
attributed to a Claude Monet. My wife, who is an admirer of Monet’s work, was surprised.
She confessed to wonder whether there were two Monets, Claude O. and Claude. Her doubt
was, I think, completely justified. Why else would a curator use two names, ‘Claude’ and
‘Claude O.’ for the same artist?
What is important for the philosophical discussion is what these assumptions tell us
about what speakers normally do when acquiring two different names that, by accident
or not, have a common referent: i.e., the scenario where substitution failure appears. The
empirical evidence suggests that speakers start by assuming that a given name, say m, refers
to only one individual and that such name m will be enough to refer to that individual in
all circumstances. Hence, they assume as well that a different name, say m’, will refer to a
different individual. It follows that cases where two different names, say m and m’, refer
to the same object will be considered exceptions and, hence, will not be accepted unless
given enough evidence to the contrary. It should not be a surprise, then, that speakers do
not give the same credence to property ascriptions that differ merely in the use of different
coreferential names. Thus, it should not be a surprise that these cases give place to sub-
stitution failure—it would be surprising if they didn’t. What is most important is the fact
that the existence of the phenomenon (i.e., of substitution failure) seems to have more to do
with speaker’s assumptions about names than with the semantic content of names strictly
speaking.
As I will show in what follows, this evidence suggests an explanation of what goes on
when speakers competently understand two names and yet fail to realize they are coref-
erential. Even though illuminating this psychological state of the speaker is relevant to
understand substitution failure, it is not all there is to the phenomenon. There may be attitude
ascriptions exhibiting substitution failure where the ascriber doesn’t use names but, say,
demonstratives. Furthermore there may be adequate attitude ascriptions with substitution
failure where we cannot appropriately claim that the ascribee is processing or understanding
exactly the same name that the ascriber is using. I am aware of this. Still, the evidence does
illuminate, at least, part of the phenomenon. It is this relevant evidence that suggests an
account that, as I will argue, offers the best explanation of the data.
84
4.2.3 The localization of labels
What happens when a speaker takes two labels to denote different objects? Anderson and
Hastie 1974 tested undergraduates on processing information depending on whether it was
introduced by a proper name or a definite description. Subjects were given a number of
predicates (‘F’,‘G’ and ‘H’) about a person A and introduced her with a proper name ‘N’
such that N = A. They were then given different predicates (‘R’,‘Q’ and ‘S’) about the same
person, but this time the person was introduced by means of a definite description ‘DD’,
without the subjects knowing so, such that DD = B. This generated the assumption that the
proper name and the definite description denoted different objects. The subjects were then
told that A = B. This forced the subjects to make inferences when asked to verify a sentence
that used either term (i.e., ‘N’ or ‘DD’) followed by the predicates introduced by means of
the other term (e.g., ‘N IS R’, ‘N IS Q’, and ‘N IS S’). The subjects were also asked to verify
sentences using terms and predicates that were initially introduced together. These were
non-inferences (e.g., ‘N IS F’) used for comparison.
Inferences with the definite description took more processing time than those with the
proper name. In fact, name inferences (i.e., verifying sentences such as ‘N IS R’) took the
same time as name non-inferences. Description inferences (i.e., verifying sentences such as
‘DD IS F’ and ‘DD IS G’) took up to twice as long as description non-inferences (e.g., ‘DD
IS R’). Anderson and Hastie claim that this is due, first, to the fact that when the information
is initially stored as belonging to two different individuals, two memory nodes, A and B, are
created. Second, they claim that when the identity A = B is established, the proper name ‘N’
is directly connected with the second node B; whereas the definite description ‘DD’ is only
indirectly connected with node A by means of a third node A = B.
This difference in processing suggests that, when taken to be about different objects,
the information is stored in unrelated storage spaces. This evidence, together with the
assumptions described above (i.e., unique reference and unique naming), suggests that when
presented with different but coreferential names—and without enough counter evidence—
speakers will normally store the information associated with each name in different unrelated
files.6
6From now on I will use ‘file’ and ‘storage space’ interchangeably. There is no commitment to any
particular account of concepts, or memory, in my use of them.
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4.3 The psychological side
The studies on memory (section 4.2.1) suggest that proper names are, memory-wise, task
specific and localized. They suggest that a unique cognitive architecture and memory re-
sources are required for proper name processing. The studies on nomic aphasia in particular
(see Semenza 2009) suggest that proper names are memory-wise isolated from the rest of
the lexicon. Part of this specificity of names results in their being localized: the descriptive
information that may be associated with a name is stored separately. The result is an impor-
tant independence of storage and retrieval. Storing and retrieving a name is not the same as
storing retrieving descriptive information.
Given this cognitive limitation, the studies on the acquisition of names (section 4.2.2)
suggest that whenever a speaker acquires two novel names that she takes to belong to two
different individuals she will store these names in two unrelated files, thereby granting
independent patterns of inference. Whether the names in fact are coreferential will be
immaterial to the way the subject stores them in memory.
4.3.1 The account
This, to my mind, explains how a competent and rational speaker can successfully use two
different names (e.g., ‘Dr. Zemph’ and ‘Clare Quilty’) and still fail to realize that they are
coreferential. So long as the speaker presupposes that such names label different objects,
there is nothing puzzling about it. If so, then we also have a resolution of Frege’s 1892
puzzle. Many philosophers (see Recanati 1993, Crimmins and Perry 1989, Jacob 1990,
Fodor 1990, Richard 1990, and Kaplan 1989) agree that any solution must meet Frege’s
constraint:
[I]f x believes y to be F and also believes y not to be F, then there are distinct
modes of presentation m and m’ such that x believes y to be F under m and
disbelieves y to be F under m’. [Schiffer, 1978, p. 180]
The empirical evidence I have presented proves its philosophical worth by suggesting
an alternative interpretation of Frege’s constraint, what I dub “storage constraint”. On this
reading, there is no need of descriptive information that must be associated with names in
any way.
storage constraint:
[I]f x believes y to be F and also believes y not to be F, then there are distinct
names m and m’ stored in different files, such that x believes y to be F when
associated with m and disbelieves y to be F when associated with m’.
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This account makes use of two central notions: DIFFERENT NAMES and DIFFERENT
FILES. The latter seems less confusing. Two given sets of information are stored in different
files whenever access to them generates similar patterns of inference as those studied by
Anderson and Hastie 1974 as described above. The important contribution of this notion,
i.e., DIFFERENT FILES, is that the information so stored is inference-wise unrelated, which
explains why the subject can ascribe incompatible properties to objects associated with
different files. The other notion, i.e., DIFFERENT NAMES, is less clear and seems to get us
into trouble.
There may be, as I said, attitudinal ascriptions with substitution failure involving demon-
stratives and not proper names (e.g., “Peter thinks that we are here not there”). It may be
objected that the evidence I have given on proper names is irrelevant for these cases since it
is about proper names and not demonstratives. Let me now clarify my argument. I do not
take my account to be the only one consistent with the evidence. Rather, I take it to offer
the best explanation of the available evidence, which includes psychological data on proper
name processing as well as linguistic data on substitution failure. The lack of equivalent
psychological data on demonstratives is not itself a problem. In so far as there is no evidence
against it, the account stands on the available evidence. (This theory will also, of course,
rest on its explanatory power; for more on this see section 4.6.) I believe the resulting theory
offers a satisfactory explanation of the mental states that underlie substitution failure. The
outcome is something like storage constraint*:
storage constraint*
[I]f x believes y to be F and also believes y not to be F, then there are distinct
referential expressions m and m’ stored in different files, such that x believes
y to be F when associated with m and disbelieves y to be F when associated
with m’.
This formulation, however, is still problematic. There may be adequate attitude as-
criptions that exhibit substitution failure in cases where the ascribee may not properly be
said to understand exactly the same referential expressions used by the ascriber. Suppose
you’re trying to describe Pierre’s behavior and that Pierre is a monolingual French speaker.
You might as well say something like “Pierre believes we are here (pointing to A on a
map) not there (pointing to A on a map)”. It seems inappropriate to say that Pierre stores
‘here’ and ‘there’ in unrelated files. Or consider a more hackneyed example. Hammurabi, a
famous ancient astronomer, believed that Hesperus but not Phosphorus was visible in the
evening. Yet, we can be pretty sure that Hammurabi didn’t understand either ‘Hesperus’ or
‘Phosphorus’.
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To avoid getting into trouble with these cases we must make certain assumptions explicit.
Notice, first, that all attitudinal ascriptions (in general) must meet the following simplified
correspondence principle if they are to be acceptable (let alone true):
correspondence:
S will successfully ascribe the attitudinal state of Fing that R to Y by using a
sentence of L of the form “Y F’S that R” where ‘Y’ is a referential term, ‘F’ is
an attitudinal verb and ‘R’ is a sentence of L of the form “N is P” where ‘N’ is a
referential term and ‘P’ a predicate, iff S’s use of ‘N’ somehow corresponds to
the mental representation that the ascribee associates with the property denoted
by ‘P’.7
Since it is an assumption of the debate that the attitudinal ascriptions with substitution
failure are not only acceptable but also true, correspondence makes explicit an important
assumption of the debate. If we take this assumption into account, we get the official
formulation of the storage constraint.
storage constraintOFFICIAL
[I]f x believes y to be F and also believes y not to be F, then there are distinct
corresponding referential expressions m and m’ stored in different files, such
that x believes y to be F when associated with m and disbelieves y to be F when
associated with m’.
I believe that storage constraintOFFICIAL delivers an adequate psychological account
of the relevant mental state of the ascribee in an attitudinal ascription with substitution
failure. But before we can have the whole account, we need to clarify what counts as distinct
referential expressions. To simplify things, I will focus on proper names, but the criteria I
will offer should be applicable to referential expressions in general.
7I owe this suggestion to Lenny Clapp. The principle is simplified because it is silent about cases where
attitudinal ascriptions are expressed by using complex sentences in the embedded ‘that. . . ’ clause. The
formulation should be clear enough to see how it can be extended to cover these latter cases. If the reader
worries about the phrase “somehow corresponds” here’s one way in which it can be understood. To say that
S’s use of ‘N’ in her ascription of Y’s attitudinal states corresponds to the relevant mental representation in Y’s
mind is to say that ‘N’ is the referential term that Y would use to report her own state if she were a competent
user of L. Or alternatively, to say that there is such correspondence is to say that if Y were a competent
monolingual speaker of L the relevant representations she would associate with the property denoted by ‘P’
would correspond to the object she would refer to by ‘N’.
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4.3.2 How to count names
How do speakers go on individuating names? I think the answer to this question is fairly
intuitive, though subtle. I will present three different criteria that may generally guide
speakers in individuating names. These criteria need not be infallible. The view I’m about
to defend is a close cousin of Kaplan’s 1990 “common currency” view of names. Yet, as
you will see later on, our views differ importantly when it comes to explaining substitution
failure.8 There is an intuitive way to distinguish between names. This is the way in which
‘Dr. Zemph’, ‘Clare Quilty’, ‘John’ and ‘George’ are all distinct, and the way in which
‘John’ and ‘John’ are not. I will call this the “phonographer’s” criterion.
phonographer: two strings of symbols or sounds count as two different referential expres-
sions if the strings differ phonemically.
Although very intuitive, this criterion alone is insufficient, since it fails to capture a
distinction that seems equally important: that between homonymous names. Speakers do
presuppose (see 4.2.2) that names have only one referent. But, as a matter of fact, different
referents may share the same string of sounds as their names: e.g., George Bush and George
Bush, Aristotle Onasis and Aristotle the Stagirite. This would not be a problem if we did
not have good reasons to distinguish between homonymous names. But we do have such
reasons. Speakers may not only, and intelligently, utter sentences that require some such
distinction, e.g.,‘George Bush is not George Bush’ or ‘Aristotle did not write Aristotle’s
works’, they may also have mental states that seem to make the same requirement. In so
far as speakers may associate different (and sometimes incompatible) sets of information
under what phonemically counts as the same name, we need to count homonymous names
as different names.
There is, then, a second intuitive sense in which ‘George Bush’ and ‘George Bush’ are
two different names. I will call this the “reference” criterion.
reference: two given strings of symbols count as different referential expressions if they
have different referents.
Clearly, this criterion alone is not enough. By itself, it does not help us distinguish
between coreferential names like ‘Dr. Zemph’ and ‘Clare Quilty’ or ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’.
These distinctions are not only intuitive but necessary if we are to make sense of the storage
constraint. Speakers naturally take names that differ phonemically or orthographically to be
8First, because Kaplan 1990 merely hints at some such explanation; he does not develop it. Second,
because Kaplan thinks we must “attack a version of Frege’s principle of compositionality” [1990, p.95]. The
theory I here present does not follow any such strategy.
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distinct and it may be in virtue of this that they end up storing the information associated
with each name under different files. It seems, then, that we need both criteria. Thus, the
reasonable thing to do is to take both criteria as offering, each of them, conditions for two
strings of symbols to count as different names.
Finally one last criterion owed to Kripke 1980 and Kaplan 1990: the “history” criterion.
history: two phonemically identical and coreferential expressions count as different if they
result from two distinct historical events that coincide, phonemically and referentially,
by sheer accident.9
Now, if we take these criteria to offer generally trustworthy conditions for two strings of
sounds (or symbols) to count as two different names, the result is what I call “difference”:
difference: two strings of symbols count as different names either:
δ1: because they differ phonemically; or
δ2: because they differ referentially; or
δ3: because they differ historically.
According to these criteria, speakers will normally take any two strings of symbols that meet
either one of δ1, δ2, or δ3 to count as different referential expressions. This is good enough
for the purposes of the storage constraintOFFICIAL.
I am aware that these criteria may have odd metaphysical consequences, though I
would be skeptical about drawing such conclusions.10 What matters here is how speakers
count names. The metaphysical nature of this individuation may be uninteresting. Human
understanding is what is of interest here.11
Briefly put
On this view, a rational and competent speaker may fail to notice that two distinct expres-
sions are coreferential, even though she may know what both refer to, because she has
9On Kripke’s 1980 words: “two totally distinct ‘historical chains’ that by sheer accident assign phonetically
the same name to the same man should probably count as creating distinct names despite the identity of
referents. The identity may well be unknown to the speaker, or express a recent discovery.” p. 8 ft. 9.
10It is a consequence of these criteria that if two instances of the phonetic string ‘David’ are used to refer to
different objects they count as different names. Some have objected to this conclusion (see Kaplan, 1990). On
their view, David Hume and David Kaplan “have the same name”. I think it is useful to distinguish between
names and naming traditions and to notice that it is only the former, not the latter, that is semantically relevant.
David Hume and David Kaplan have the same name as David Lewis in the sense that they are all part of the
same old western tradition of using the string ‘David’ to name male individuals. But it’s not true that David
Hume, David Kaplan, and David Lewis have the same name in the sense that we can use this common name as
a singular term to refer to any of them, or to successfully substitute David Hume’s name for David Kaplan’s.
See Kaplan 1990 for a similar yet alternative distinction in terms of “generic” names.
11For a similar approach toward drawing metaphysical conclusions from cognitive accounts, see Leslie
2008, p. 34.
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stored them in different files. This is the psychological account of substitution failure that I
favor. I do so, at least, for three reasons: first, it is empirically substantiated (in the sense
described); second, it is very cheap cognitively (i..e, it does not make any extraordinary
cognitive demands on the side of speakers); and third, it helps us solve all the relevant
puzzles.
4.4 The linguistic side
Several philosophers (see Salmon 1986 and Crimmins and Perry 1989) have underscored
the similarity between ‘that. . . ’ clauses and quotations. Just like the latter, the former may
refer either to contents of the words within them or to the words themselves. Recanati 1993
argues, convincingly I think, that there is one more respect of similarity. Like quotations,
the reference of ‘that. . . ’ clauses is underdetermined in much the same way as that of a
demonstrative. There is no linguistic rule determining the reference of my use of ‘he’. To
find out what the speaker refers to by her use of ‘he’ the hearer must ask what the speaker can
plausible be referring to. Something similar happens with quotations and ‘that. . . ’ clauses.
Quotations may or may not refer to the sentence-type within them; ‘that. . . ’ clauses may or
may not refer to the proposition expressed by the sentence within them.
According to Recanati 1993 any resolution of this underdetermination must meet two
constraints:
top-down: the interpretation must be a plausible candidate for the status of content of the
ascribed belief or speech act.
bottom-up: the interpretation must be recoverable from the embedded sentence.
The important point, claims Recanati, is that the interpretation process involved in the
bottom-up constraint may involve what he calls “optional p-processes” which are “like
enrichment or transfer which take the interpreter from the basic semantic value of a sub-
expression to some further non-basic value” [p. 356]. Recanati describes one such process
that makes use of descriptive information supposed to be intimately related with proper
names. As I said before, this proposal lacks empirical support. But there is, at least, one
other enrichment or transfer process that can help us out here: predicate meaning-transfers.
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4.4.1 Meaning transfers
Speakers commonly use expressions to convey something different from its ordinary or
conventional content. Names of people ordinarily refer to their bearers, but they seem to
be also used to refer to other objects that stand in a salient relation to them. Names of
writers, for example, are commonly used to talk about their work. So we can say, in a
seminar on German Idealism, that “Kant is very obscure and confusing”. In so doing, we
do not intend to refer to Emmanuel Kant himself but to his work, and the common ground
of the conversation includes a salient relation between the german philosopher and his
philosophical oeuvre. Similar cases of deferred interpretation are illustrated in the examples
(owed to Nunberg 1979) in (5).
(5a) Dr. Zemph enjoyed hearing himself read aloud.
(5b) I am parked out back.
(5c) The chair you’re sitting in was common in nineteenth century parlors.
(5d) Caedmon, who was the first Anglo-Saxon poet, fills only a couple of pages of this
book of poetry.
(5e) The ham sandwich is waiting for his check.
Nunberg 1993 and 2004 distinguishes between deferred interpretation, a phenomenon
mainly concerned with predicates, and deferred reference, a phenomenon mainly concerned
with indexicals and other referential expressions. Based on evidence on sortal crossings,
Nunberg argues that the examples in (5) are best understood as cases where the meaning
transfer is applied to the predicate. In (5b), for example, the predicate ‘being parked out
back’ gets interpreted as “being the owner of a car that happens to be parked out back”.
This lets us maintain coreferentiality in constructions that ordinarily impose conditions of
identity, like those in (5a) and (5d).
I follow Nunberg 1979 and 2004 in taking these phenomena to be the result of a mecha-
nism of “meaning transfer” by means of which the speaker lets the hearer identify a property
ψ as the correct interpretation of a predicate ‘P’ that ordinarily refers to a different property
φ . Nunberg argues, convincingly to my mind, that whether this mechanism is semantic (i.e.,
lexicalized) or pragmatic will vary from case to case.12 In any case, this distinction will be
orthogonal for our purposes. The proposal I am going to present depends on there being
meaning transfer on the predicates, not the names, involved in cases of substitution failure.
12“[T]his is not a simple matter of privative opposition: the mere fact that an alternation is in some way
conventionalized does not mean that it no longer has any pragmatic basis. In the extreme case, alternations
may be preserved in the lexicon as the disjecta membra of transfers that no longer have any productive role in
the language . . . At the other end of the scale, there are uses like in the ham sandwich cases that are obviously
extralexical—that is, as generated exclusively by pragmatic principles, with no need of any lexical specification.
In the middle, however, lies a very broad range of productive alternations whose state is less clear” [Nunberg
2004, p.351-52].
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Hence, we can keep a simple and homogeneous “referentialist” semantics for names.
What are the conditions for “deferred interpretation” or predicate-meaning-transfer?
Nunberg 1979 and 2004 defends two different criteria: functionality and noteworthiness.
For a predicate ‘P’ to transfer its meaning from φ to ψ there must be a relation, or
function, mapping φ to ψ . This can be in either of two ways: either because there is a
relation between the properties, for example, when φ resembles or evokes ψ as with WOLF
and RAPACIOUS; or because there is a salient relation between the bearers of φ and ψ ,
as between authors and their work. This relation must be part of the common ground of
the conversation, and ψ—the alternative interpretation—must be among the “set of things
that the speaker might rationally be construed as intending to refer to in a given context”
[Nunberg 1979, p.157]. This gives us the “criterion of functionality”:
functionality: Let Φ and Ψ be sets of properties that are related by a salient function
gt :φ→ψ . Then if P is a predicate that denotes a property φ∈Φ, there is also a predicate
P’, spelled like P, that denotes the property ψ , where ψ=gt(φ ). [Nunberg 2004, p.348]
What matters in these cases is what the hearer can do given: (i) the information available
in the conversational context; and (ii) the information given by the speaker. For every context
there are, of course, indefinitely many different functions mapping the ordinary referent to
different values. The hearer must be able to pick out the correct function on the basis of the
information from (i) and (ii). Because of this, Nunberg points out, the relevant function must
be “contextually salient”. To illustrate, consider the following example. Two friends decide
to buy several bottles of wine, from the same region and same grape, to find out which year
produced the best harvest. A salient function in this context is the function “x was produced
in y” that maps wine bottles into years. This allows one of the friends to point at a bottle
and say “I lived in Toledo then”.
Now, Nunberg points out that not all functions between sets of properties, not even
all salient functions, will be acceptable for predicate-meaning-transfers. In the German
Idealism seminar, for example, it is acceptable to say “Kant is obscure and confusing” but
not “Kant is printed on alkaline-free paper”. There seems to be some pragmatic criterion
limiting the kinds of properties that can be transferred. According to Nunberg, this is given
by the “criterion of noteworthiness”:
noteworthiness: Predicate transfer is only possible when the property contributed by the
new predicate is “noteworthy”, which is to say one that is useful for classifying or
identifying its bearer relative to the conversational interests. [Nunberg 2004, p.349]
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So how exactly is this supposed to work? Nunberg’s proposal is rather simple. All we
need is a function that substitutes predicates. What speakers do by deferring the interpreta-
tion of the predicates is simply plugging in a different predicate into the same spot while
leaving unchanged the sentence’s logical form. Substituting predicates for saliently related
predicates that refer to noteworthy properties according to the conversational interests does
not result in any harsh or heavy alteration of the sentence’s composition or computation.
To illustrate consider (5b).
(5b) I am parked out back.
The predicate ‘BEING PARKED OUT BACK’ refers to a property φ that cars have depend-
ing on their geographical location. It is not a property that speakers can have. The indexical
‘I’, however, refers to the speaker who utters (5b). According to the deferred interpretation
account, what the speaker means to say by uttering (5b) is that she has the property of having
her car parked out back. For this to be the case, the predicate ‘BEING PARKED OUT BACK’
must transfer its meaning from φ to ψ , a property that speakers have in virtue of owning
cars with certain geographical locations. By doing so, the LF of (5b) is left unchanged. The
logical spot that was left for a property like φ is now occupied by another referent of the
same kind, a property like ψ . All this is possible because the relation between φ and ψ is
mediated by a relation, salient in the conversational background, between speakers and the
cars they own.
This gives us a good idea of how predicate transfer works (see Nunberg 1979, 1995,
and 2004 for details; see Ward 2004 for an alternative account). The lesson is that there is
something like deferred interpretation whenever: (i) the speaker puts the hearer in a situation
where the latter can identify the relevant function mapping the ordinary interpretation on
to the intended one; (ii) the intended interpretation is among the reasonable ones that the
speaker may intend given a context; and (iii) the function is salient in that context.
4.4.2 Deferred interpretation and belief reports
This is my hunch: a phenomenon like deferred interpretation takes place in contexts of
substitution failure, and this explains the differences in truth-value that result from substi-
tuting names. To make my point I will contrast two kinds of contexts, with and without
substitution failure, associated with belief reports. It is well known that belief reports have,
at least, two readings, de re and de dicto, one of which (de re) is not subject to substitution
failure. First, consider a context with no substitution failure such as context a.
context a:
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Suppose we are talking about the history of psychoanalysis, about which Pro-
fessor Humbert has written a lot. He is not present in our conversation, but
his views about the topic are being discussed. We are wondering, in particular,
whether Clare Quilty plays an important role in the history of the discipline. We
are not sure about the merits of his Psychoanalysis and More Psychoanalysis.
You’ve read Humbert’s reviews and know what he thinks of them. So you go
on and say: “Humbert thinks Clare Quilty is a pivotal element in the history of
psychoanalysis”.
What matters for this conversation is what Professor Humbert, a specialist, thinks of
Clare Quilty himself. The philosopher’s rendition of this belief report would be something
like: “Humbert thinks of Clare Quilty that he is [. . . ].” And there is no difference here
between that and the following alternative paraphrase: “Humbert thinks of Dr. Zemph that
he is [. . . ].” This suggests that in certain contexts of belief ascription the ascribee’s presup-
positions about the referential expressions that correspond to those used in the report—i.e.,
‘Clare Quilty’ and ‘Dr. Zemph’—are either not so relevant or not relevant at all.
Next consider a context exhibiting substitution failure, such as context b.
context b:
Suppose that, as we are having our discussion about the history of psychoanaly-
sis, Professor Humbert enters the room. You and I know that Clare Quilty will
be presenting his new book at the bookstore downstairs, but Humbert doesn’t.
After a while, you announce: “Did you know that Clare Quilty will be visiting
us later on today?” Professor Humbert is surprised: “I thought it would be Dr.
Zemph, presenting his new book!” You, of course, don’t know what to say.
Professor Humbert is such an expert that you are afraid of correcting him. In
order to ease your bewilderment I say to you: “Humbert does not believe that
Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis”.
It seems clear that my utterance cannot have a de re reading. It is common knowledge to
both of us that Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis, and that Professor Humbert knows who
is the author of the work. There is, however, an important difference between context a and
context b. In context a the question under discussion is the history of psychoanalysis and
not Humbert’s thoughts or behavior. Hence, the purpose of your belief report in context
a is not to explain Professor Humbert’s thoughts or behavior. Rather, your belief report
is concerned de re with Clare Quilty and his relevance to the history of psychoanalysis.
That is why you can be paraphrased as saying “Humbert thinks of Clare Quilty that he . . . ”.
However, once the ascribee himself and his thoughts are at issue in the conversation (as
in context b) and, most importantly, once it becomes a goal of the conversation to explain
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the ascribee’s thoughts and behavior, the belief report is not concerned anymore with Clare
Quilty.
So how are you supposed to interpret my utterance of ‘Humbert does not believe that
Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis’ in context b? The correct interpretation, to my mind,
is quite intuitive. What I am saying is not so much that Humbert does not believe of Clare
Quilty himself that he authored Psychoanalysis, nor am I saying that Professor Humbert
does not know who the author of Psychoanalysis is. What I am saying is, more likely,
something about Humbert’s presuppositions concerning the name ‘Clare Quilty’: e.g., that
he does not associate ‘Clare Quilty’ with the property of authoring Psychoanalysis. This
naturally prompts the question: how can a speaker use a name ‘N’ within a belief report
in order to convey information about the ascribee’s presuppositions about a corresponding
referential expression? As I hinted above, I believe this is done through something like the
predicate-transfer mechanism described above.
Start with two different and saliently related sets of predicates, PΦ and PΨ, and their
corresponding sets of properties Φ and Ψ, defined as:
PΦ: all predicates pφ i that apply to N; where ‘N’ is ‘Clare Quilty’.
PΨ: all predicates pψ i; where pψ i=gt(pφ i); where gt(pφ i) maps any property φi ∈Φ into
the property of naming the bearer of such property—i.e., a corresponding property
ψi ∈Ψ.
Φ: every property φi to which the corresponding predicate pφ i refers.
Ψ: every property ψi to which the corresponding predicate pψ i refers.
The function gt(pφ i) is salient: as a matter of fact for every predicate in PΦ there is a
corresponding PΨ predicate in virtue of there being a name associated with each φi property.
That there is some such correspondence is simply part of the conversational background. In
particular, these sets include two homonymous predicates, pφ 1 and pψ 1, which refer to two
different properties, φ1 and ψ1, respectively.
pφ 1: BEING THE AUTHOR OF Psychoanalysis.
pψ 1: BEING THE AUTHOR OF Psychoanalysis.
φ1: AUTHORING Psychoanalysis.
ψ1: NAMING THE AUTHOR OF Psychoanalysis.
This satisfies the functionality criterion on predicate transfer (see page 93). The cri-
terion of noteworthiness, as you may recall (see page 93), depends on the conversational
interests. It is clear in context b—the one exhibiting substitution failure—that talking about
names and not their bearers will be useful. In particular, the property of NAMING THE
AUTHOR OF Psychoanalysis is useful to classify its bearer—i.e., ‘Clare Quilty’—relative
to the ascribee’s mental states—i.e., Humbert’s presupposition that ‘Clare Quilty’ and ‘Dr.
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Zemph’ are not coreferential—the representation of which is the goal of the belief report
in question. Aside from their intuitive relevance, there are good reasons to think that these
presuppositions can be salient in the conversational background. As Swanson 2006 and
others have noted, proper names are presupposition-carrying expressions, and these presup-
positions may be satisfied by the local context of a belief report—i.e., the ascribee’s set of
beliefs.13
Finally, if by uttering (2a) or (2c) a speaker manages to convey information about the
name used in the belief report, it must be fairly obvious, in the conversational background,
that in using the name the speaker really intends to mention it.
(2a) Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph wrote Psychoanalysis.
(2c) Humbert believes that Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
In this case what is missing is not an account in terms of meaning transfer or deffered
reference but, rather, the simple observation that speakers ordinarily use names in order to
mention them. Geurts 1998b has made such observation on independent grounds—i.e., in
connection with the phenomena of non-descriptive negations:
All things considered, language users don’t seriously try to make formal dis-
tinctions between linguistic expressions and their names. Instead they simply
use an expression to refer to itself, whenever the need arises. It follows from
this that ALL expressions of any language are equivocal in a way: besides their
ordinary meaning(s), they can also be used to designate themselves. [Geurts
1998b, p. 291.]
This explains how in uttering ‘Humbert does not believe that Clare Quilty wrote Psycho-
analysis’ in context b I let you know something about Humbert’s belief states, namely, that
he does not associate ‘Clare Quilty’ with the author of Psychoanalysis. The name ‘Clare
Quilty’ is used to refer to itself and the predicate ‘being the author . . . ’ undergoes a transfer
of meaning in virtue of which it gets interpreted as referring to a different property: a
property that applies to names rather than to bearers thereof. Now, given that the information
conveyed is about the name used, this also explains why (2a) and (2c) may differ in truth val-
13 Swanson 2006 claims that a speaker’s use of a name, say, ‘Clare Quilty’, presupposes that both speaker
and hearer associate the same thing with ‘Clare Quilty’. And this presupposition seems to be salient since,
according to Swanson, it becomes part of the information that a speaker “gleans at” when being informed about
the truth of (1a)-(1b), which is meant to offer an explanation of the difference in informativeness between both
sentences. According to this view, what a hearer learns from an utterance of (1b) is that the man she associates
with ‘Clare Quilty’ wrote Psychoanalysis.
(1a) Dr. Zemph wrote Psychoanalysis.
(1b) Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
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ues. Or, to put it differently, why (2a) and (2b) may both be true in a conversational context
where the participants presuppose that ‘Dr. Zemph’ and ‘Clare Quilty’ are coreferential:
(2a) Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph wrote Psychoanalysis.
(2b) Humbert does not believe that Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
This is the linguistic account of substitution failure that I favor. It comes with three
kinds of virtues. First, it is consistent with the central tenets of a referentialist semantics
for referential uses of proper names: i.e., that they are singular terms and rigid designators
that semantically convey only their referents. Furthermore, the account is consistent with
semantic innocence: the idea that one and the same expression has the same meaning
inside and outside of ‘that. . . ’ clauses. This is so because, on my view, when it comes to
belief reports with substitution failure the relevant names are used self-referentially and
self-referential uses contribute the same meaning (i.e., the name itself) inside or outside of
‘that. . . ’ clauses.14 Second, this view is also consistent with Recanati’s 1993 constraints
(see page 91) on how to solve the underdetermination of ‘that. . . ’ clauses. Third, by making
no use of descriptive information that is linguistically or psychologically associated with
proper names, this account is also consistent with the psychological account of substitution
failure that I have already argued for (see section 4.3).
4.5 Integrating the accounts
I have offered what I take to be two sides of a single account of substitution failure: the
integrative theory. On the psychological side (see section 4.3), I have shown how a subject’s
cognitive state looks when she fails to realize that two names are coreferential (e.g., the
case of Humbert with ‘Dr. Zemph’ and ‘Clare Quilty’). Unless there is enough evidence
to the contrary, normal speakers will take different names (e.g., ‘Dr. Zemph’ and ‘Clare
Quilty’) to name different objects and, hence, they will store the information associated with
each name under separate files. Given this localization of information, the subject may have
incompatible beliefs about what, as a matter of fact, turns out to be one and the same object.
If the psychological account is credible, then there must be a way in which speakers
exploit the cognitive state of the ascribee for the purposes of the conversation. On the
linguistic side, the account explains how speakers may use sentences like (2a)-(2c) to convey
such information, which results in belief reports that use of different coreferential names
14Other philosophers who take themselves to be referentialists (e.g., Soames 2002, and Salmon 1986) seem
to have a different view. Swanson, in conversation, has said that on this other view names always convey the
same meaning. Thus, names always contribute their referent, even in belief reports that exhibit substitution
failure. I will not argue here against their view. I am satisfied if my account is considered to be an alternative
referentialist theory of proper names.
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and have different truth-values.
(2a) Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph wrote Psychoanalysis.
(2c) Humbert believes that Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
To explain this I appeal to the mechanism of meaning transfer for predicates and to a
self-referential use of proper names. This latter aspect of the account should be underscored.
It is not as if, on my view, proper names have two different semantic contents: their referent
and themselves. What I am claiming is, rather, that when engaged in the job of ascribing
attitudes with substitution failure speakers use the relevant names in a self-referential manner
and not in the ordinary way. They do so in a way that hearers may pragmatically identify
that something like this is the right interpretation. It is because of this that the integrative
theory retains semantic innocence together with the claims that proper names are singular
terms and rigid designators.
On this view, a belief report like (2b) is properly interpreted as (2d)
(2b) Humbert does not believe that Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
(2d) Humbert does not believe that ‘Clare Quilty’ names the author of Psychoanalysis.15
To see how the integrative theory works it will be useful to consider two different yet
closely related long standing philosophical puzzles: Frege’s and Kripke’s.
4.5.1 Solving Frege’s puzzle
The integrated account of substitution failure offers itself as an account of differences in
informativeness. To illustrate, consider the following passage from Nabokov’s script for
Kubrick’s “Lolita”:
H: Who is the man that I’m looking for?
L: Do you remember Dr. Zemph?
H: Dr. Zemph? Was it him?
L: Not exactly. Do you remember the car that used to follow us around? Do you
remember the guy who called you at the motel?
H: Yes, I remember very well.
L: And yet, you still haven’t guessed?
H: Tell me who it was.
L: It was Clare Quilty.
H: Who was Clare Quilty?
15This analysis raises the question as to whether one can say things like ‘Humbert believes that Clare Quilty
wrote Psychoanalysis and consists of two words’ to mean something like “Humbert believes that ‘Clare Quilty’
names the author of Psychoanalysis and consists of two words”. I address this same worry, with a different
example, in section 4.6.7.
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L: All of them, of course.
H: You mean, Dr. Zemph, he was Clare Quilty?
L: Yes, Dr. Zemph is Clare Quilty. That’s the man you’re looking for.
If you have not seen the movie yet (or read the book) you should know that H (i.e.,
Professor Humbert) has personally met with Dr. Zemph as well as with Clare Quilty. He
knows them both by acquaintance. The dialogue shows that Humbert is unable to properly
associate the information he is given by L (i.e., Lolita). He remembers pretty well who
called him, who he met with at the house (i.e., Dr. Zemph) and who he met with at the motel
(i.e., Claire Quilty). Yet he is unable to realize that he has met with the same individual all
along. Furthermore, even after he is told that Clare Quilty is the bearer of all these properties,
Humbert is still clueless. The end of the dialogue confirms this by pointing out, among other
things, that Humbert takes the identity sentence ‘Dr. Zemph is Clare Quilty’ to be of great
informative value.
Even though he is personally acquainted with the referent of both ‘Dr. Zemph’ and
‘Clare Quilty’, Humbert, an intelligent professor and writer, has not been given enough
evidence to realize that ‘Dr. Zemph’ and ‘Clare Quilty’ do not denote different objects.
Given this absence of contrary evidence, and the fact that ‘Dr. Zemph’ and ‘Clare Quilty’
differ phonemically (and orthographically), it is plausible to think (see section 4.2.2) that
Humbert takes them to correspond to different objects. Thus, it is natural to think that he
stored the names, together with the information associated with them, in different storage
spaces. This explains why he remains clueless all through the dialogue, until he is explicitly
told that Dr. Zemph is Clare Quilty. On this account, the fact that Humbert finds such a
statement to be informative is explained in terms of the information he gleans at from the
context together with Lolita’s statement.
Lolita knows that ‘Dr. Zemph’ and ‘Clare Quilty’ are coreferential but, through the
dialogue, she realizes that Humbert presupposes that they refer to distinct individuals. This
information, which describes the cognitive state that yields substitution failure according to
the psychological account I gave (see section 4.3.1), becomes salient in the context. Lolita
can exploit that information in order to convey something about the names used and how
they relate to each other. The intuitive interpretation of Lolita’s utterance of ‘Dr. Zemph
is Clare Quilty’ is not that “the man at the motel is the man in the car”. This kind of
information has already been presented by Lolita and Humbert has failed to draw the right
inferences. The intuitive interpretation is, rather, something like “Dr. Zemph is also named
‘Clare Quilty’ .” And all this can be done through the same linguistic mechanism that, on
the view I defend, speakers exploit in contexts with substitution failure.
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This account of Frege’s puzzle takes informative identity statements to be properly
interpreted in a metalinguistic manner. Thus, some kind of metalinguistic or symbolic
understanding is required, on this view, to understand such statements. Perner, Rendl and
Garnham 2007 offer some independent psychological evidence supporting this claim. Ac-
cording to Perner and colleagues, a proper understanding of identity statements is tied to
an understanding of false belief, both of which seemed to be owed to the development of
higher order cognitive abilities.
4.5.2 Solving Kripke’s puzzle
According to Kripke 1979 there’s something puzzling about belief.
Peter may learn the name ‘Paderewski’ with an identification of the person
named as a famous pianist. Naturally, having learned this, Peter will assent to
“Paderewski has musical talent”, and we can infer — using ‘Paderewski’, as we
usually do, to name the Polish musician and statesman:
(6a) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent.
Later, in a different circle, Peter learns of someone called ‘Paderewski’ who
was a Polish nationalist leader and Prime Minister. Peter is skeptical of the
musical abilities of politicians. He concludes that probably two people . . . were
both named ‘Paderewski’. [. . . ] Peter assents to, “Paderewski had no musical
talent”. Should we infer . . . :
(6b) Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent.
[Kripke 1979, p.265.]
How can anyone be in Peter’s situation? The integrated account has a simple answer.
First, it must be noted that none of the criteria for name counting (see section 4.3.2) deliver
the result that ‘Paderewski’ and ‘Paderewski’ are two different names. They don’t differ
phonetically, referentially, or (one might presume) historically. But these criteria do help us
understand what goes on with Peter.
In section 4.2.2 I offered some evidence suggesting that in general speakers assume that
to every name corresponds only one referent. This assumption, however, was presented as
revisable. Whenever they have enough evidence to the contrary, speakers will take, say, two
phonemically identical names to denote different objects and, hence, will store them under
unrelated files. The account I am proposing takes Peter to be in such a situation.
There is something strange about Peter’s case because he has conflicting evidence: he is
acquiring a new name (i.e., ‘Paderewski’) that he assumes refers to one and only one indi-
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vidual. But he is also given extra information. He is first introduced to a use of ‘Paderewski’
that refers to a famous pianist, then to a use of it that refers to a politician. Peter is convinced
that politicians are terrible musicians. For Peter, this is evidence that a politician cannot be a
famous pianist and, hence, that the two uses of ‘Paderewski’ that he has been confronted
with do not in fact refer to the same thing. Briefly put, Peter falsely believes that he has been
confronted with two phonemically identical yet referentially distinct names. The integrated
theory predicts that in these cases subjects will take such uses of the relevant name to count
as distinct names and, hence, will be stored in unrelated files.
That is why Peter may be said to believe both that Paderewski had and lacked musical
talent without thereby ascribing irrationality to him. He has a false belief, an important one
perhaps, but he is certainly not stupid.
4.5.3 Non-linguistic believers?
The integrative account relies on the assumption that the ascribee has some understanding of
reference and proper names. There is evidence that this understanding appears in humans at
an early age (6 months) and that it constitutes some kind of prelinguistic preparedness (see
Garcı́a-Ramı́rez and Shatz forthcoming). Thus, this account does not require a full blown
linguistic competence on the side of the ascribee. In this sense, it can be extended to account
for belief reports that are concerned with non-linguistic believers, so long as they have an
understanding of reference and proper names.
I am skeptical, however, that there are any such cases. Elsewhere (see Garcı́a-Ramı́rez
forthcoming) I have shown that there is substitution failure only when the ascribee can be
said to ignore a relevant identity statement. If so, then substitution failure arises only when
the belief reports are concerned with linguistic believers—or, at least, with subjects that
understand reference, proper names, and identity statements.16 This seems to be supported
by the literature. The traditional cases of substitution failure (e.g., Frege’s and Kripke’s
puzzles) very explicitly presuppose linguistic competence on the side of the ascribee.
16Perner, Rendl, and Garnham 2007 present evidence that an understanding of identity statements requires
higher order cognitive abilities, such as those involved in false-belief tasks. Cognitive psychologists associate
these abilities with Theory of Mind and metarepresentational competence (see Leslie 1987). There are good
reasons to think that these abilities and the degree to which they appear are unique to humans (see Penn,
Holyoak, and Povinelli 2008).
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4.6 Explanatory power
I started this paper by claiming that the integrative theory can explain some problematic
simple sentences that may appear to have substitution failure; and I have been claiming all
along that it can also account for substitution failure involving referential expressions other
than proper names (e.g., demonstratives). I want to conclude this paper by devoting this
section to substantiating these claims. Since the goal is to show how well the integrative
theory accounts for otherwise problematic cases, I will be considering many other allegedly
problematic sentences. This should be enough to show that we can make an inference to the
best explanation from the evidence on proper names, together with its linguistic side, into
the case of demonstratives. The result is an integrated account that is our best option when
it comes to understanding the psychology and linguistics of substitution failure.
4.6.1 Simple sentences
Let us first go back to Saul’s 1997 examples of simple sentences that, allegedly, carry
substitution failure.
(7a) Clark Kent came into the phone booth, and Superman came out.
(7b) Dan dresses like Superman.
(7c) Superman was more successful with women than Clark Kent.
I argued before that if we do want to admit there is substitution failure, we must also
accept that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are not being used coreferentially. The problem
arises when we recall that whoever utters these sentences may at the same time believe that
Superman is Clark Kent. How can we account for such a speaker using these names in
(7a)-(7c) with substitution failure?
The integrative theory suggests that we look at the context in which (7a)-(7c) are ac-
ceptable and see if there is enough information there to guide the interpretation. Saul
1997 doesn’t provide us with such a context, but we can safely assume that of the fictional
“Superman” comic-book story. To make a long story short, Clark Kent is a Krypton-born,
Kansas-raised, and highly decent man with superhuman abilities that he decides to use to
benefit humanity. But Clark has a problem: he wants to continue with his normal human
life as much as possible. So he decides to pretend to be someone else when using his
superpowers; thus, he creates a character which he will enact every time it is needed.17
17There are multiple “Superman” stories. Some take Superman to pretend to be Clark Kent when willing
to hide his superhuman powers. Whether it is Clark Kent or Superman who pretends is immaterial for our
purposes. So long as it is clear that this particular pretense is involved, everything will be fine.
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This character is called ‘Superman’ and wears blue lycra and red trunks, with a long red
cape and an ‘S’ shield on his chest. Whenever he stops pretending to be Superman, Clark
Kent is dressed like any normal person and carries a normal job as a reporter. It is with this
information in the background that (7a)-(7c) are uttered.
It seems clear that in all these cases the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are not
coreferential. There are, to my mind, several moves one can make here. It may be that
‘Superman’ only refers to object x when he pretends to be a superhero (most of the time
this happens when he wears blue and red with a cape) and that ‘Clark Kent’ refers to that
same object when he pretends to be a reporter. If we follow this line, we have to claim that
‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ refer to distinct temporal parts of the same object. Alternatively
we may want to claim that ‘Clark Kent’ refers to object x and that ‘Superman’ refers to a
fictional character created and exclusively personified by x. Or perhaps we want to claim
exactly the opposite. All of these offer the correct interpretation (7a)-(7c) while explaining
why there is substitution failure. The strange thing, as Saul 1997 points out, is to make sense
of this while at the same time admitting that (7d) is true.
(7d) Clark Kent is Superman.
There are two worries one might have about (7d). First, one might worry that it is
an acceptable thing to say in the same context in which (7a)-(7c) are successfully uttered.
Second, one might worry that it makes little sense for a speaker to utter (7a)-(7c) while
believing something like (7d). The integrative theory has an answer to both worries. On
the one hand, it is acceptable to utter something like (7d) in the same context of utterance
of (7a)-(7c) because by uttering (7d) the speaker will put an end to the pretense necessary
to make sense of (7a)-(7c). A successful utterance of (7d) presupposes, of course, that the
audience doesn’t know that the alleged distinctness between Clark Kent and Superman is
nothing but a pretense. Otherwise it would not be informative.
On the other hand, a speaker may honestly utter (7a)-(7c) to convey what she takes to
be non-trivial information while at the same time believing in something like (7d) because
she is asked to pretend, for the purposes of the conversation, that either one of the three
options above is the case—that Superman and Clark Kent are different temporal parts of the
same object, or that Superman is a fiction personified by Clark Kent, or vice versa. There is
certainly no problem with pretending that something is the case even though one pretty well
knows that it isn’t.
Before leaving the field of simple sentences, let me consider a more traditional example
owed to Quine 1961. According to this story, Giorgione is Barbarelli, however, (7e) is true
while (7f) is false.
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(7e) Giorgione was so called because of his size.
(7f) Barbarelli was so called because of his size.
This example has been discussed ad nauseam (see Predelli 2009 for a recent descussion).
I will not say anything new about it, but will simply point out how the context helps the
speaker use ‘Giorgione’ in a way that exhibits substitution failure. It seems obvious, and has
been pointed out by many (see Crimmins 1992), that the use of the predicate ‘SO CALLED’
makes anaphoric reference to a previously used name. The context is such that the most
reasonable way to bind this anaphor is to the name ‘Giorgione’. That this is so appears to be
verified by the conversation in (7g) which offers a more explicit way of conveying the same
information.
(7g) L: Did you hear Barbarelli was called ‘Giorgione’?
E: I didn’t know! How come?
L: He was so called because of his size.
It seems, then, that whoever utters (7e) or (7f) will be using the relevant name both
to convey its referent and to convey the name itself. There is substitution failure, if at
all, precisely because the name is so used. Even if they are coreferential, ‘Giorgione’ and
‘Barbarelli’ are phonemically distinct and this difference is exploited in (7e).
This account of (7e) fits well within the lines of the integrative account I am offering. It
involves a self-referential use of the relevant name that is purported to not be substitutable,
and the predicate ‘BEING SO CALLED BECAUSE OF HIS SIZE’ is very obviously mapped on
to the property of BEING CALLED ‘GIORGIONE’ BECAUSE OF ONE’S SIZE. Speakers are
best interpreted, both here and in the traditional cases (i.e., substitution failure within belief
reports), as using the names self-referentially. This is what the integrative theory predicts.
4.6.2 Demonstratives
Substitution failure does not only appear with the use of proper names. Speakers may also
use demonstratives in ways that exhibit substitution failure. Consider the following example
owed to Clapp (pers. comm.).
Suppose we are hiking with Pierre and we are lost. A disagreement breaks out
about where we are, and we begin arguing while pointing at landmarks and
positions on various maps. Pierre does not speak English, and you do not speak
French. So, in an attempt to make Pierre’s views clear to you, I utter:
(8a) Pierre thinks we are here but he doesn’t think we’re there.
My utterance might be true, even if the same location is referred to by my uses
of ‘here’ and ‘there’.
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How can we come up with a metalinguistic interpretation of (8a) and what would that
look like? Here is how the integrative theory illuminates this case. It should be clear, first,
that (8a) cannot be read de re. Suppose the position I point at while uttering (8a) is called
‘Point A’ on the relevant map (it is a simple-minded map). If (8a) could be read de re (8b)
should, at least, make sense, but it doesn’t.
(8b) Pierre thinks we are at Point A but he doesn’t think we’re at Point A.
So it must be that, in uttering (8a), I’m exploiting the fact that ‘here’ and ‘there’ are
phonetically distinct expressions that can nevertheless be used in this context to refer to the
same location. Another piece of evidence supporting this is the fact that ‘here’ and ‘there’,
as they are used in (8a), must be phonetically marked. For consider a non-marked use of the
same sentence, as in (8c), while you are demonstrably pointing at the same spot on the map.
(8c) Pierre thinks we are here but he doesn’t think we’re there.
Your belief report would be naturally understood as a joke. Now, the requirement that
the demonstratives used be phonetically marked is, perhaps, the clearest evidence that a
metalinguistic interpretation is required (see Horn 1989), as evidenced by cases like (8d).
(8d) He looks like Frankenst[áy]n not like Frankenst[ı́y]n.
That is not a to[ma:]to it’s a to[meI]to.
All these aspects of the use of (8a) in the mentioned context yield an answer to our first
question: a metalinguistic interpretation is triggered by the fact that a de re interpretation
would not even make sense and by the evident fact that the use of the demonstratives is
phonetically marked. So what would that metalinguistic interpretation look like? Here’s one
candidate:
(8e) Pierre thinks ‘here’ refers to our location but he doesn’t think ‘there’ refers to our
location.
There are a couple worries some might have with this interpretation. First of all, it seems
strange to say that a monolingual French speaker would have thoughts about the English
words ‘here’ and ‘there’. This can be explained by recalling the correspondence principle
(see page 88). What the ascriber is trying to do by uttering (8a) is not to be interpreted as
literally claiming that Pierre has thoughts about this or that English word, but rather that he
has thoughts about the corresponding referential expressions in Pierre’s language. Second,
it seems strange to say that ‘here’ or ‘there’ refer. Isn’t it more like it is uses of ‘here’ and
‘there’ that refer?
I think there’s little to be said about this worry. It seems to me that an adequate interpre-
tation will be one that fits the speaker’s goals in the conversation relative to the common
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ground. Ordinary speakers would not distinguish between ‘here’ and uses of ‘here’. That,
I think, is a well known fact. The distinction is, it seems to me, a theoretical one. So I
doubt that we have any reasons to think that saying that ‘here’ and ‘there’ refer (label, point,
denote, or whatever) will be strange for the participants in the conversation. True, it may
seem strange to philosophers of language and linguists, and it may very well be that this
conversation takes place among such individuals. In that case I think the claim that ‘here’
refers may very well seem strange. But, and this is the beauty of the integrative theory, in
such case we would have salient presuppositions and functions allowing us to get a different
interpretation, something like (8f).
(8f) Pierre thinks ‘here’ is used to refer to our location but he doesn’t think ‘there’ is used
to refers to our location.
How could we get such a theory-laden interpretation? Well, it’s quite simple. If the
participants are theorists that find it strange to claim that ‘here’ refers, it must be because
they strongly believe in some token/type distinction and that it’s only uses of referential
expressions that manage to refer. The integrative theory claims that the relevant meaning-
transfers will depend always on the context and the functions that are made salient by it.
The theoretical beliefs of the participants seem to be quite salient. So I do not see why it
cannot deliver a function mapping the predicate ‘BEING HERE’ onto the property of BEING
AT A LOCATION REFERED TO BY THIS USE OF ‘HERE’.
4.6.3 Anaphoric reports
Substitution failure can also appear within externally bound anaphoric constructions as in
(9a).18
(9a) Superman came in but Lois didn’t realize he was Clark Kent.
Unlike previous cases, the pronoun ‘he’ is anaphorically bound by the referential use of
‘Superman’ in the sentence context. So we seem to be forced to interpret ‘he’ as referring
to Superman. That is fine with me, so long as the context is sensitive to the use of the
name ‘Clark Kent’ such that BEING NAMED ‘CLARK KENT’ is a noteworthy property.
In such a case there will be a function mapping the property of BEING CLARK KENT (if
there is some such property) into the property of BEING NAMED ‘CLARK KENT’. If (9a)
genuinely exhibits substitution failure, then the context will provide the relevant properties
and functions.
18Eric Swanson mentioned this example in conversation. Similar examples appear already in Crimmins
1998.
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So, according to my view, (9a) is properly interpreted as (9b).
(9b) Superman came in but Lois didn’t realize that he was named ‘Clark Kent’.
This, to my mind, seems like a very reasonable thing to say in such a context. All is fine
with externally bound anaphoric belief report constructions. This same story accounts for
another related example as in (9c):
(9c) Superman came in but Lois didn’t realize he was Clark Kent, and in virtue of that
identical to Kal-El.
Suppose the context is the same as that of (9a). If so, then BEING NAMED ‘KAL-EL’ is
a noteworthy property in that context. Hence, there will be a function mapping the property
of BEING IDENTICAL TO KAL-EL (if there is some such property) into the property of
BEING NAMED ‘KAL-EL’. If (9c) genuinely exhibits substitution failure, then the context
will provide the relevant properties and functions. So, according to my view, (9c) is properly
interpreted as (9d):
(9d) Superman came in but Lois didn’t realize that he was named ‘Clark Kent’ and, in
virtue of that, that he was also named ‘Kal-El’.
It may seem odd to say that someone is named ‘X’ in virtue of being named ‘Y’. This
oddity is, on this view, contextually explained. If the context is such that, say, by law all
individuals named ‘Alexander’ must also be named ‘Jon’, then it will be acceptable to say
something like (9e):
(9e) He is named ‘Alexander’ and, in virtue of that, he is also named ‘Jon’.
When the proposition that all the relevant individuals named ‘X’ are named ‘Y’ is
presupposed in the context, it seems fine to utter ‘He is named ‘X’ and, in virtue of that, he is
also named ‘Y’ ’. Thus, the integrative theory takes (9c) to be acceptable in a context where
it is presupposed that there is one individual named ‘Clark Kent’ and that the individual
named ‘Clark Kent’ is the only one named ‘Kal-El’. In such a context, uttering either (9c) or
(9d) would be felicitous.
(9c) Superman came in but Lois didn’t realize he was Clark Kent, and in virtue of that
identical to Kal-El.
(9d) Superman came in but Lois didn’t realize that he was named ‘Clark Kent’ and, in
virtue of that, that he was also named ‘Kal-El’.
To contrast, consider a context that does not presuppose that the individual named ‘Clark
Kent’ is also named ‘Kal-El’ or that there is only one person named ‘Kal-El’. As far as we
know there might be several people named ‘Kal-El’ and we are looking for one of them. A
man comes in wearing a name tag that reads ‘Clark Kent’. In such a context, it would be
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infelicitous for a third party to utter (9f) or (9g).
(9f) Did you see him? He was Clark Kent, and in virtue of that identical to Kal-El.
(9f) Did you see him? He was named ‘Clark Kent’, and in virtue of that he was also named
‘Kal-El’.
We would be justified to ask: what do you mean “in virtue of that”?
4.6.4 Mistaken identities
Here’s another case owed to Crimmins 1998 (and apparently also to Steve Yablo). As we
very well know, speakers may be mistaken about certain identity statements. Andy, for
example, may very well not know that Dr. Zemph is Clare Quilty. Suppose then that Andy
takes these names to have different referents. How should we understand (10a) as it is used
by Andy?
(10a) Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph is smarter than Clare Quilty.
On the view I have argued for, what Andy does not know is that ‘Dr. Zemph’ and
‘Clare Quilty’ are two names of the same person. He certainly does not want to convey the
information that Professor Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph is smarter than himself or than
some merely possible individual. It is at least unclear how to make sense of Andy’s utterance.
On my view, the best way to understand (10a), after applying the proper meaning-transfer
operations, is to interpret it either as (10b) or as (10c).
(10b) Humbert believes that ‘Dr. Zemph’ names someone who is smarter than Clare Quilty.
(10c) Humbert believes that ‘Dr. Zemph’ names someone who is smarter than the person
named ‘Clare Quilty’.
I think both interpretations are good enough for the purposes at hand, and both are
suggested by the integrative theory.
4.6.5 Embedded reports
Attitude reports may (apparently) also be embedded within attitude reports. Here is an
example owed to Crimmins 1998.
(11a) Andy believes that Humbert doubts that Clare Quilty wrote Psychoanalysis.
How should we make sense of this? To find a plausible candidate for the content of
an utterance of (11a) we need a lot more contextual information. Such information will
help us understand whether the important information concerns Andy’s mental states or
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Humbert’s. Furthermore, without this information, we cannot know whether (11a) is subject
to substitution failure at any level of embedding. In any case, assuming there is substitution
failure at any of the embedded sentences, the mechanism of predicate meaning-transfer will
help us find a plausible candidate for the content of the assertion (or the ascribed mental
state). There is nothing precluding predicate transfer from targeting the most or the least
embedded sentence or any combination thereof. Just as the simple version of predicate
transfer applies to ordinary first-order attitude reports, the same account can be applied to
less ordinary second (or higher?) order attitude reports. Like predicates, predicate transfer
can be embedded.
4.6.6 Anaphoric and de se reports
Other problem cases include what has come to be known as de se ascriptions. Once more,
the examples come from Crimmins 1998.
(12a) Sometimes, when I see an important philosopher, I don’t realize that she is that
philosopher [or: that she is she].
(12b) That man doesn’t think that he is Lingens.
(12c) I think that he is Lingens.
(12d) Unlike you, I think that you are Lingens.
I have already shown how to deal with externally bound anaphoric belief-report construc-
tions. So called de se ascriptions are not too different. The suggestion before consisted in
taking the predicate ‘BEING X’, where ‘X’ is a referential term, as transferring its meaning
from the property of BEING X (if there is such property) on to the property of BEING NAMED
‘X’. In the present case all we need is for the predicate in question (e.g. ‘BEING THAT
PHILOSOPHER’) to transfer its meaning on to a suitably different property: i.e., that of
BEING NAMED AS X or, perhaps, REALLY BEING NAMED ‘X’. This strategy delivers the
following interpretations of (12a)-(12d).
(12e) Sometimes, when I see an important philosopher, I don’t realize that she is named as
that philosopher [or: that she is named as she is].
(12f) That man doesn’t think that he is really named ‘Lingens’.
(12g) I think that his real name is ‘Lingens’.
(12h) Unlike you, I think that your real name is ‘Lingens’.
If the contexts of utterance of (12a)-(12d) do in fact exhibit substitution failure, then
the names used will be salient and the property of having those particular names will very
likely be noteworthy. Suppose for example that you are going through passport control and
the officer wonders whether you are the infamous Nazi official Rudolf Lingens. On his
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view, you have a fake passport and a modified facial expression. You insist that you are,
say, Gottlob. He replies by uttering (12d): Unlike you, I think you are Lingens. In such a
case, I believe, (12h) offers a very plausible interpretation of the corresponding utterance (or
mental state). Similar remarks apply to (12e)-(12g).
4.6.7 Germans
Last, but not least, something must be said about the limits of the account. My theory
borrows heavily from Nunberg’s 1979 and 2004 account of predicate meaning-transfer. Now,
according to this theory, we can say things like (13a).
(13a) Edu’s dissertation, which weighs five pounds, has been refuted.
whereby we manage to say that an abstract thing, which has a physical instance that weighs
five pounds, has been refuted. According to Nunberg, we do this by mapping the predicate
‘WEIGHING FIVE POUNDS’ into the property of HAVING A CONCRETE INSTANCE THAT
WEIGHS FIVE POUNDS. It seems, then, that speakers can transfer meanings to almost any
property. In particular, my theory seems to predict that we can say things like (13b)19
(13b) Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph, which is a German name, is a central figure of
Psychoanalysis.
But, as Recanati has pointed out to me, (13b) is not really an acceptable thing to say. So, it
seems, my theory makes a wrong prediction, unless it has a good explanation of why we
cannot say things like (13b).
Fortunately, there is some such explanation. It is not true, as it may seem at first glance,
that any predicate can transfer its meaning to any alternative property; even predicate transfer
has its limits. Consider, for example, a conversation among contemporary artists. Nunberg
2004 notes that in such a context it is acceptable to say things like (13c) but not things like
(13d).
(13c) I’m in the Withney.
(13d) I’m in the second hall, first cradle to the left.
What is the difference between (13c) and (13d)? Why can we say one but not the other?
Nunberg has a simple explanation, which I find convincing: it is because the property of
HAVING YOUR WORK EXHIBITED AT THE Withney is a noteworthy property in the context,
while that of HAVING YOUR WORK EXHIBITED IN THE SECOND HALL is not. The same, I
think, goes on with (13b).
19It is important to note that this same result appears for “ham sandwich” cases. This suggests that this is a
more general problem and not a unique feature of my account.
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(13b) Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph, which is a German name, is a central figure of
Psychoanalysis.
We cannot say things like (13b) because, unlike the property of BEING NAMED ‘DR.
ZEMPH’, the property of HAVING A GERMANIC NAME is not a noteworthy property in
contexts with substitution failure. It’s not true, strictly speaking, that the integrative theory
predicts that we can felicitously utter (13b) simpliciter. What it really predicts is that in
contexts where the property of HAVING A GERMANIC NAME is noteworthy, it will be
felicitous to utter something like (13b). I think this is true. To illustrate, consider context c.
context c:
Andy and I are discussing the history of psychoanalysis. He claims that it
is mainly a product of French culture, while I think it has a strong German
influence. To determine who is correct we decide to look at the “big names” of
psychoanalysis and consider whether they are German or French. To defend
his point, Andy goes on to mention the names of some well known French
psychoanalysts: “Look, Lacan, Dolto, Roudinesco, Lagache, Favez-Boutonnier,
and Reverchon-Jouve—they are all French names.” Knowing how highly Andy
thinks of Professor Humbert’s knowledge of the history of psychoanalysis, I
reply by saying: “Yes, but Humbert believes that Dr. Zemph, which is a German
name, is a central figure of psychoanalysis.”
This, to my mind, is a perfectly acceptable use of (13b).
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Chapter 5
The Cognitive Theory of Empty Names
Ordinary use of empty names encompasses a variety of different phenomena, including
issues in semantics, mental content, fiction, pretense, and linguistic practice. In this paper I
offer a novel account of empty names, the cognitive theory, and show how it offers a more
satisfactory account of the phenomena than a recent account owed to Sainsbury 2005 and
2010. The paper includes a brief discussion of issues in metaphysics and psychological
explanation, and concludes with a metalinguistic account of negative existentials.
Introduction
My goal is to offer an account of empty names that does not take them to have descriptive
semantic content. Doing so will allow me to keep a homogenous semantics for referen-
tial uses of names (empty or otherwise) that is consistent with the empirical evidence (see
Garcı́a-Ramı́rez and Shatz forthcoming). In this sense, I take my view to be anti-descriptivist.
There are two different kinds of anti-descriptivist theories of empty names in the literature.
On the one hand, there are those (see McDowell 1977, 1984, and 1986, and Evans 1981,
and 1982) that claim that the actual reference of names is an essential part of content and,
hence, that failures of reference result in failures of contentful thinking. On this view, empty
names are not intelligible. I will not be following this line of thought. As I will show later
on, there are good reasons to think empty names may be used to express intelligible, full
blown thoughts.
On the other hand, there are those that agree that empty names are intelligible, but differ
with respect to the kinds of content they take empty names to contribute. Within this group,
there are theories of two different sorts: complete and incomplete contents. Braun 1993
and 2005, Reimer 2001a and 2001b, and Taylor 2000, seem to think that empty names are
used to express either “gappy propositions” or “propositions in waiting”. These views either
take the content to be pragmatically completed by descriptive information derived from
118
the context, or take speakers to always assert falsehoods by using empty names. I take the
relevant content associated with empty names to be complete, non-descriptive, and subject
to be true. So I will not be following this strategy.
Two kinds of complete contents have been associated with empty names: indefinite
propositions such as that something has property F (see Adams and Stecker 1994) and
singular propositions such as that A is F (see Salmon 1998, Soames 2002, and Thomasson
2003; see Sainsbury 2010 for objections). My account is, in a sense, reminiscent of the
latter view. I do think that, in the relevant contexts, empty names are used to express
complete contents that resemble singular propositions. Yet my view is importantly distinct.
On the opposing view, empty names are not empty: speakers manage to express singular
propositions by using them because the names do in fact have a referent. Thus, speakers
manage to express complete singular propositions by using empty names in virtue of the
semantics of the name.
I do not agree with the idea that empty names have referents. It requires that we accept
an unnecessary ontology of fictional and other abstract objects. On my view empty names
are empty and speakers manage to express complete contents in virtue of general cognitive
mechanisms of interpretation. Thus, on my view, we need more than just the semantics of
names to understand what goes on with the ordinary use of empty names. Part of the goal of
this paper is to describe such machinery.
In section 5.1 I present a survey of the phenomena involved in the ordinary use of empty
names. There I show how Sainsbury’s 2005 RWR-theory accounts for the phenomena, and
offer two objections against it. Section 5.2 presents the central claims of the cognitive theory
I wish to defend. I develop the theory by showing how it solves the puzzles in section 5.3.
Section 5.4 presents the advantages of the theory by showing how it can be used to address
further worries about fictional entities. I conclude in section 5.5 by offering an account of
the use of empty names in negative existential constructions.
5.1 A theory and the phenomena
Reimer 2001a identifies two problems related to the ordinary use of empty names. On
the one hand, speaker intuitions support the idea that statements using empty names are
meaningful and truth-evaluable. Reimer dubs this “the intuition problem”. On the other
hand, speakers’ behavior suggests that there is something which they affirmed, denied,
etc. while using empty names. As theorists, we are left with the task of describing some
proposition or other that is asserted, denied, etc. Reimer calls this “the proposition problem”.
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I believe there is more to this story. Speaker behavior points to many other problem-
atic tasks left for us to work out. Competent speakers do not only use empty names to
make simple declarative statements; they also use empty names to engage in games of
make-believe, and to make belief reports that describe behavior adequately, both within and
without games of make-believe.1 The use of empty names within games of make-believe
demands an account that is consistent with a more general theory of fictional discourse
and, as a consequence, of pretense. Adequate belief reports that make use of empty names
suggest that the proposition expressed by the embedded that clause has all the explanatory
virtues of a proposition that would be expressed by using a non-empty name. A satisfactory
account of empty names must not only solve the “intuition” and “proposition” problems, it
must do so in a way that is fitting for attitude ascriptions and fictional uses of empty names.
Sainsbury 2005 and 2010 presents a theory meant to solve these problems by defending
the following central claims:
RWR 1: All referential expressions, and particularly names (empty or not), are se-
mantically homogenous. They all have the same semantic behavior and determine
truth-conditions in the same way.
RWR 2: All names are associated with referential conditions of the form:
∀ x (‘N’R x ≡ x=N)
where XRY takes X to refer to Y.
RWR 3: ‘S is p’ is false if and only if either (i) ‘S’ lacks a referent; or (ii) ‘S’ ’s referent
lacks the property referred to by ‘p’.
Together RWR 1 and RWR 2 entail that all names, empty or not, have a meaning: i.e.,
the referential condition described by RWR 2. There can be, on this view, reference without
referents (hence the label ‘RWR’). Non-empty names will have a referent on top of this.
This allows us to understand the intelligibility of empty names. According to this view,
an assertion of ‘N is F’, where ‘N’ is an empty name and ‘F’ is a predicate, will express
something like:
∀x (‘N’R x ≡ x=N ∧ Fx).
This solves the proposition problem, mentioned by Reimer. The content of a sentence using
empty names is modeled by the quantified first order logic sentence above. According to
RWR 3 all affirmative sentences using empty names are false. So this solves the truth-value
1See section 5.5 on uses of empty names in negative existential claims.
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problem: all assertions using empty names are truth-evaluable. All affirmative ones are,
in fact, false. Sainsbury thinks this also delivers an account of how negative existential
assertions may express truths. For ‘S doesn’t exist’ just is the negation of ‘S exists’. If ‘S’ is
empty, then ‘S exists’ is false and, hence, its negation (i.e., ‘S doesn’t exist’) is true.
I have two objections against RWR, which I will present in the following sections. For
now let me just point out that RWR does not really treat empty and non-empty names in
a homogenous semantic way. On this view, non-empty names always (i.e., by necessity)
have a referent, while empty names never (i.e., by necessity) have one. And there is no
intermediate referring expression according to the theory. With this and RWR 3 it’s not
difficult to show that empty and non-empty names always get their truth-conditions through
different means. Sentences with non-empty names are always true/false depending on
whether the referent has/lacks the relevant property. Sentences with empty names are always
false because they lack a referent.
To illustrate suppose we hold fixed an ordinary interpretation of the predicates ‘is tall’
and ‘is short’. If so, then there is no single context in which ‘Mark Sainsbury is tall’ and
‘Mark Sainsbury is short’ can both have the same truth-value.2 And the same happens if we
use instead the name ‘Barack Obama’ or any other non-empty name. This, however, is not
true of empty names. According to RWR 3, all affirmative assertions using empty names
are false. If so, then there is at least one single context, namely, a non-fictional one, where
‘Hamlet is tall’ and ‘Hamlet is short’ both have the same truth-value (i.e., false).
This result seems odd, in and of itself. But the problem is not limited to its oddity. The
problem is that it’s not clear how we can accept it and still claim that there is no semantic
difference between empty and non-empty names, as Sainsbury 2005 wants to claim. RWR
does not offer a genuinely homogenous semantic way to treat empty and non-empty names.
5.1.1 Mental content
Sally believes that Santa is coming tonight. She leaves cookies and milk near the Christmas
tree and prepares herself to stay up all night. How should we describe Sally’s mental state?
Is it a typical belief-like propositional attitude? If so, what is the proposition expressed by
the embedded clause that Santa is coming tonight? As suggested above, according to RWR
the embedded sentence expresses something like:
2I am aware of the fact that ‘Mark is tall’ and ‘Mark is short’ can both be used to say something true
provided we change the standards of measurement. But there is no way to change the standards of measurement
without changing the context. So it’s still the case that ‘Mark is tall’ and ‘Mark is short’ cannot both be used
with the same truth-value in the same context.
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∀x (‘SANTA’R x ≡ x=SANTA ∧ Cx).
(where Cx: x is coming tonight)
This account helps illuminate the explanatory role of belief reports because it allows us
to distinguish among the content conveyed by using different empty names. Using ‘Hamlet’
instead of ‘Santa’ will help us convey different propositions. This is so in virtue of the
fact that the reference conditions are, as Sainsbury puts it, homophonic. They involve the
names that they define. Thus, if we can distinguish between ‘Hamlet’ and ‘Santa’ we can
distinguish between claims about Hamlet and claims about Santa, as well as between beliefs
about the former and beliefs about the latter.
The belief report ‘Sally believes that Santa is coming tonight’ is successful, on this view,
because it takes the subject to distinguish all the predicates she associates with whichever
object meets the condition of being identical with Santa from, say, objects that meet the
condition of being identical with Hamlet. Enjoying cookies and milk by the Christmas tree
is not a property that competent speakers associate with whichever object is Hamlet. It is,
apparently, one they associate with whichever object is Santa.
This gets us to my first objection against RWR. Like any account of the semantics of
names, this explanation comes with a cognitive cost: in order to understand names subjects
must also understand identity statements of the form ‘x=A’ or, alternatively, they must
understand how an object may have the property of BEING IDENTICAL WITH A. There is
substantial empirical data against this view (see Garcı́a-Ramı́rez and Shatz forthcoming). On
the one hand, there are good reasons to think that 6-month-olds do competently understand
their own names, even though they have a poor and general understanding of properties (i.e.,
they only understand general properties such as HAVING A CERTAIN SHAPE). On the other
hand, recent studies (see Perner, Rendl, and Garnham 2007) suggest that identity statements
are not understood until between the second and third year of life. Thus, by the time they are
18 months old, human infants already understand several different names, yet they lack an
understanding of identity. This strongly suggests, against Sainsbury’s account, that identity
conditions are not part of the semantics of proper names.
5.1.2 Fictional discourse
Santa is a jolly old man with a white beard who lives in the North Pole and wears red. This
is fiction. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as Santa. So the short story above
cannot be true. This naturally prompts the question: what is the difference between fictional
and non-fictional discourse? Why is this Santa story so different from saying, for example,
that Bush is a jolly old man with a white beard who lives in the North Pole and wears red?
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Whichever theory of empty names we may have, it better be consistent with a satisfactory
distinction between fictional and non-fictional discourse.
Walton (1990) presents a challenge for any such account.3 There are, at least, two
requirements: First, the account must be consistent with a more general distinction between
fiction and non-fiction—the distinction between works of art and artifacts, between sculp-
tures and chairs—and not just between fictional and non-fictional discourse. Second, it
must explain why it is that works of fiction, unlike works of non-fiction, warrant their own
assertions. It is because the fiction says so that one is warranted to assert that Santa wears
red. However, it is not because Darwin says so that one is warranted to assert that species
evolve. Here’s a better way to put it.
A particular work of fiction, in its context, establishes its fictional world and
generates the fictional truths belonging to it. [. . . ] Every piece of discourse or
thought which aspires to the truth has a reality independent of itself to answer
to [. . . ] The fictional world corresponding to a given work of fiction is not thus
independent of it. [Walton 1990, p. 101-102.]
As I presented it, RWR claims that, in virtue of semantics alone, all assertions using empty
names are false. Thus, the self-warranting aspect of fictional discourse is not accounted
for in virtue of the semantics alone. According to Sainsbury 2010, successful assertions of
‘Santa is coming’ carry a fiction operator and can be either paraphrased or replaced by asser-
tions of ‘According to the story, Santa is coming’. The account is sensitive to how fictional
discourse warrants its own assertions, since assertions of the latter form can, in virtue of
their semantics, be used to express something true. Appealing to fiction operators, however,
undermines Sainsbury’s account. For it fails to meet the first of Walton’s requirements: it
cannot be generalized to explain the difference between fiction and non-fiction, between
chair-shaped sculptures and chairs.
This is my second objection to RWR. Sainsbury’s is, very clearly, a linguistic strategy.
As such it should be rejected for the same reasons that Walton 1990 rejects other linguistic
accounts such as Searle’s 1975 (see also Schiffer 1996): i.e., because they make nonsense of
the general fiction / non-fiction distinction. Works of fiction go way beyond discourse. Most
of them are not assertions, let alone assertions whose truth value must be evaluated within a
story. Are paintings assertions? Do they tell us a story? Are Rothko’s blue-over-red works
of fiction telling us something according to which something else is true? The answer is
clearly negative. The fictional / non-fictional discourse distinction simply cannot be based
upon linguistic features (like having or lacking a fiction operator), for the same distinction
must be drawn in non-linguistic contexts. There is no way around this. Walton’s 1990 lesson
3See Walton 1990, especially Chapter 2 “Fiction and nonfiction”.
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seems as clear as truthful: we must resist the temptation to treat fictionality and fictional
truth as a species of truth (e.g., as truth with a fiction operator). If paintings and sculptures
are fictions, just like Santa stories, with nothing close to fiction operators, then it cannot be
that fiction operators distinguish fictional form non-fictional discourse.
If having fiction operators is not what makes fictional discourse fictional, what does? To
answer this question I believe we must take the self-warranting aspect of fictional discourse
seriously. Here I follow Walton 1990 up to some extent. I believe that what makes a piece
of discourse a fictional one is the fact that it prescribes its own interpretation. Whether a
given sentence S is to be interpreted as meaning that Φ is the case or that Ψ is the case is
something that is determined by the fictional story. Non-fictional assertions do not, in this
sense, prescribe their own interpretations. Fictional names do not have a semantic value
to contribute, for they do not have a referent. They are meaningful mainly in virtue of
the relevant fictional context where they appear. Empty names, in general, do not have a
semantic value to contribute. They are meaningful mainly in virtue of the relevant context
in which they appear.
It should be clear that by ‘context’ I do not mean anything linguistic (this is not a
linguistic strategy). The contexts I have in mind are more cognitively general, representa-
tional contexts, which may be understood as situations involving competent subjects and
objects taken as representations. Similarly, when I say that fictions prescribe their own
interpretations I do not mean to say that they prescribe their own semantic values. The term
‘interpretation’ here must be understood in a more general sense that includes several kinds:
linguistic, aesthetic, moral, etc. If the relevant piece of fiction is linguistic, then the context
will probably provide an interpretation of a linguistic kind.
Thus, on my view, the distinction between fictional and non-fictional discourse is non-
semantic: for something to count as fictional discourse a speaker must assume that its
correct interpretation is given by the fiction itself, and not merely by the semantic or lexical
conventions that prevail outside of the act of fiction making. There is no fictional discourse
outside of the fictional context (though it may very well be that the same string of symbols
is meaningfully used both inside and outside of fictional contexts). And the same goes on
with non-linguistic pieces of fiction.
To wrap up, what makes a piece of discourse something fictional is not the fact that it
lacks any meaning outside of the fictional context, which it allegedly gains once it appears
within the relevant context. Rather, what makes it fictional is the fact that, regardless of its
conventional meaning outside of the fictional context, the proper assignment of meaning and
truth-values to the piece of discourse is determined by the discourse itself once it appears in
a fictional context. This interpretation assignment is given by means of a general cognitive
124
process, rather than a language specific, semantic process.
It is an independent claim of mine that empty names do not convey a proffered semantic
(for more on the proffered /non-proffered distinction see Roberts 1998). This entails that
utterances involving empty names are not intelligible merely in virtue of their semantics. But
this should be no problem since my view takes them to be intelligible mainly in virtue of the
general cognitive mechanisms and contexts that make use of them. I say “mainly” because I
don’t want to endorse the problematic claim that facts about the natural language being used
play no role in this explanation. It seems plausible to think, for example, that certain facts
about English do explain why ‘Santa is coming tonight’ is a meaningful piece of fictional
discourse. What I claim is that such linguistic facts are not enough to deliver a satisfactory
explanation. We need more to properly understand what goes on with the ordinary use of
empty names. This extra element is, on my view, given by a general cognitive mechanism.
5.1.3 Pretense and imaginings
It is rather surprising that philosophical theories of empty names have simply ignored the
psychological research on pretense. The latter is directly concerned with what speakers do,
psychologically speaking, when engaged in fiction making. The data are evidently relevant.
Yet, to my mind at least, not a single account in the philosophical literature on empty names
has reflected upon this. This attitude is unfortunate not only because it is negligent but,
most importantly, because it has precluded philosophical theories from benefitting in a
rather substantial way. As I will show, a proper understanding of the cognitive mechanisms
underlying human pretense is a key element of any adequate theory of empty names.
Generally speaking, there are two competing accounts of pretense available in the lit-
erature: behaviorism (see Lillard 1993a and 2001, and Nichols and Stich 2000 and 2003)
and mentalism (see Leslie 1987, 1994, and 2000, and Friedman and Leslie 2007). Whether
you are a mentalist or a behaviorist about pretense you are bound to posit some mechanism
or other by means of which our cognitive apparatus “quarantines” the contents of pretense-
attitudes from the rest. The idea, owed to Leslie 1987 and followed by Nichols and Stich
2000 (see p. 120 ss.) is a recognition of a rather simple fact: subjects need not believe what
they pretend. When an adult pretends of a banana that it is a telephone she does so while
still believing that it is not a telephone. Behaviorists like Nichols and Stich 2000 account for
this by positing a separate “pretense box”. Mentalists, specially Leslie 1987, do this in terms
of a decoupling mechanism. Because it offers the most detailed account of the process, I
make use of Leslie’s decoupling account (more on section 5.2).
That’s not all there is to the quarantine of pretend-attitudes. Pretended behavior usually
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involves the use of props. When a child pretends of a banana that it is a telephone, that
particular banana is central to her pretense. However, she doesn’t pretend that the banana is
a telephone but rather that this is a telephone. Similarly, when she pretends of an empty
cup that it is full, she does not pretend that the empty cup is full but that that cup is full.
According to Leslie 1987, the referential, truth-conditional, and existential commitments
of the pretended representations are also quarantined. Thus, the goal of the decoupling
mechanism (see Leslie 1987 and 1994) is to divorce the representation from its content.
It is this feature of pretense that I want to underscore. When describing the attitudes
of speakers that use empty names, one must keep in mind that the mental states of these
speakers are guided by mental representations and not by the states of affairs that these
may or may not ordinarily represent. I believe this is a commonly ignored yet substantially
relevant feature of the ordinary use of empty names. If the psychological research on
pretense is correct, then what we need in order to explain the data is a proper understanding
of the representational mental states involved. What is the right kind of attitude associated
with the ordinary use of empty names?
5.2 The cognitive theory
Central theses
The cognitive theory of empty names is based on the following central theses:
Semantics: In virtue of semantics, all referential uses of names contribute their referent,
and only their referent, to the content of utterances in which they appear.
Pragmatics: All referential uses contribute a non-proffered piece of information: that
there is a referent of the name (some take this to be a presupposition).
Cognitivism: Referential uses of empty names are intelligible not merely in virtue of
semantics and / or pragmatics, but mainly in virtue of the general cognitive resources
they recruit (i.e., something like Leslie’s 1987 “decoupling mechanism”).
Representationism: Two object-directed attitudes, the content of which is cognitively
determined (as above), may be directed toward the same object even if the associated
representations have been (cognitively) assigned different referents.
I take the first thesis to be a familiar one, reminiscent of Millian views on proper names.
I do not, however, have any particular interest in defending everything that goes under that
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label (see Soames 2002 for a recent exposition). I do agree, however, that proper names are
rigid designators and singular terms. But I also take these to be semantic features of names.
My defense of this first thesis is mainly empirical: I take it to be the best explanation of the
relevant psychological and neurological data (see Garcı́a-Ramı́rez and Shatz forthcoming). I
take the second thesis to be uncontroversial. There is, to my mind, a lot of agreement on
this (see Heim 1982; Roberts, 1998 and 2004).
It is the third and fourth theses, cognitivism and representationism, that I take to be a
contribution of the theory I want to propose. I will defend them in the sections to come.
The details
The cognitive theory of empty names comes in two parts. First, it assumes a referentialist
semantics for names, according to which the only semantic contribution of a proper name is
its referent. In doing so it allows us to extend the same semantic treatment to all referential
uses of proper names, including empty ones. This is a great advantage and, to my mind, an
important contribution of my theory to the debate on empty names. A consequence of this
homogenous treatment is that assertions, belief reports, and fictional games that make use of
empty names are not intelligible in virtue of their semantics alone. So we need the second
part of the theory to explain how such uses are intelligible. Here I offer a psychological
account of the mechanism involved in uses of empty names in a way that is independent
of the semantics of the expressions used. Even though there is already a lot of empirical
research on pretense, the account I offer is still preliminary. More needs to be said about the
relation between pretense and the development of mental representational states. On this
fluid view, when using empty names speakers assert, believe, report, and desire the contents
of their imaginings, which are concerned with what I call “epistemically decoupled units”
or EDUs for short. As I will hint at in section 5.4 the benefit of EDUs goes beyond the theory
of empty names.
5.2.1 The decoupler
Leslie 1987 distinguishes among three kinds of mental representations: primary (e.g.,THAT
THE CUP IS EMPTY), the function of which is to adequately represent the subject’s environ-
ment according to the information received through perception; decoupled, which can be
viewed as mental analogues of quoted sentences (e.g., THAT “THE CUP IS EMPTY”), the
function of which is to divorce primary representations from their referential, truth, and
existential conditions; and metarepresentational, which are higher order representations
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(e.g., THAT SANDRA PRETENDS OF THAT CUP THAT IT IS EMPTY), the function of which is
to offer proper objects of propositional attitudes and to adequately represent psychological
states. It is important not to identify decoupled representations as the main product of the
decoupler. The latter is a cognitive mechanism that is meant to deal with three different
kinds of representations and its main goal is to yield a metarepresentation (on Leslie’s view
at least). Yet, it is part of the job of the mechanism to produce (as the result of a subprocess)
decoupled representations.
Figure 5.1 (taken from Leslie 1987) gives a first approximation. Solid arrows correspond
to input and output relations. Boxes correspond to independent mental representational
states. The striped arrow corresponds to a mental function from and into mental states. This
function is understood as the process of decoupling, which takes the primary representation
produced on the basis of the initial “world” input and turns it into a metarepresentation.
Figure 5.1 Primary and other representations
The decoupler is meant to be an independent mechanism, detached from general cogni-
tive processes, and available for use in distinct tasks (e.g., mind reading). Its malfunctioning
has been hypothesized to play a central role in autism, see Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith
1985.
Figure 5.2 offers a more detailed description of the mechanism itself. As before, solid
arrows correspond to input / output relations. This time, however, boxes correspond to
distinct mental processes. There are five such processes: two main ones (i.e., perception and
decoupling) and three subprocesses (i.e., expression raising, manipulating, and interpreting).
The mechanism of decoupling involves three distinct subprocesses. The first subprocess
consists in copying the primary representation by divorcing it from its semantic values. One
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Figure 5.2 The decoupling mechanism
way to understand this is by analogy with the quote or mention of a given sentence, whereby
both its meaning and truth-value are suspended.
The second subprocess consists of manipulating this decoupled representation by using
information from central memory. This information may include, for example, rules of
inference and general knowledge, as well as notions of attitudes. This relation with central
memory is essential to understand how imaginings and pretense develop beyond the initial
input. When children are told to pretend of an empty cup that it is full, they naturally
behave as if its contents have been spilled when their peers turn the cup upside down.
Perhaps of more general philosophical interest is the fact that this explains how decoupled
representations can still figure in inferential processes. That is to say, the mental analogues
of uninterpreted sentences can still play a role in the relevant inferential processes. The
subjects may go from ‘this cup is full’ to ‘there is water on this table’ if they see that the
relevant cup is turned upside down.
The third and last subprocess is that of interpretation, which consists in the assignment of
the relevant meanings and truth-values in order to deliver a proper object of an attitude (e.g.,
believing, desiring, hoping, etc.) to central cognitive systems. As you can see in figure 5.3,
the process of interpretation has access to central memory and, thus, to information gained
through perceptual processes. In this way, the process may arbitrarily assign perceived
objects as referents of the corresponding representation.
129
Figure 5.3 From upper left and clockwise: the three subprocesses of decoupling
5.2.2 Belief, pretense, and EDUs
According to Leslie 1987, the decoupler’s main goal is to deliver objects of thought. But
what exactly are these? Are they just traditional propositions? It is my belief that the
decoupler must produce representational objects that are, in important respects, distinct from
propositions. To see this we must take a closer look at “pretense” mental states and how
they relate to “belief” mental states.
Humans are able to have mental representational states of two broadly different kinds:
accurate and deviant. Beliefs, on the one hand, are of the former kind: they purport to
represent the environment in an accurate and faithful manner (e.g., my belief that there’s a
chair in front of me). Pretense states, on the other hand, are of the latter kind: they purport
to represent the environment in ways that the environment is not, and in some cases could
not be (e.g. children pretend that broom sticks are horses or that bananas are telephones).
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Yet, an important feature of human cognition is that there is no contamination of “deviant”
upon “accurate” mental states. Humans normally do not believe what they pretend. Pretense
states are taken to be quarantined by the decoupling mechanism above described.
There are important similarities among these two kinds of mental representational states.
They both represent the environment. They both, also, guide behavior equally efficiently.
To properly pretend that something is the case, one has to “play along” with the pretended
representation of the environment (see Nichols and Stich 2002). Accurate and deviant repre-
sentations are also similar in the way they form part of inferential processes. If one pretends
of an empty cup that it is full, one will also pretend that its contents are spilled if the cup
is turned upside down. Finally, belief and pretense (accurate and deviant representational
mental states) also follow a similar developmental path (see Shatz 1994 on the development
of language and ToMM from infancy to toddlerhood; see Bosco, Friedman, and Leslie 2006,
on the development of pretense).
This underscores the differences between accurate and deviant representational mental
states. Unlike belief, which is ordinarily caused by perception, pretense mental states are
not a product of human perceptual processes. Pretense mental states have their origin in
some or other representational assumption: e.g., that this broom stick is a horse. Belief and
pretense also have different goals: pretense mental states are not in the business of offering
faithful representations of the environment. And, finally, there is also a difference that can
be described in terms of general uniformity: beliefs tend to be consistent with each other,
pretense mental states can very well be explicitly inconsistent among each other.
Leslie 1987 has identified three different forms of pretense. “Imaginary object” pretense
happens when subjects pretend that there is an object where there is none (e.g., that there is
a teaspoon in front of you). “Fictional properties” pretense happens when subjects ascribe
fictional properties to material objects they use as props (e.g., that a plastic doll has a dirty
face). Lastly, “object substitution” pretense happens when subjects take an object to stand
for another (e.g., when a broom stick is taken to be a horse, or when an actor is taken to be a
character).
These forms of pretense require representational contents that seem to be at odds with
propositions. Pretense mental states can be about what is impossible; furthermore, they can
be about contradictions. To illustrate, consider the following passage from Borges’ “The
Book of Sand”.
He told me his book was called the Book of Sand because neither sand nor this
book has a beginning or an end. He suggested I tried to find the first page.
I took the cover in my left hand and opened the book, my thumb and forefinger
almost touching. It was impossible: several pages always lay between the cover
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and my hand. It was as though they grew from the very book.
“Now try to find the end”.
I failed there as well. “This can’t be” I stammered.
“It can’t be, yet it is” the Bible peddler said. “The number of pages in this
book is literally infinite. No page is the first page; no page is the last. I don’t
know why they are numbered in this arbitrary way, but perhaps it’s to get one
to understand that the terms of an infinite series can be numbered in any way
whatever.”
The passage is certainly comprehensible (and quite enjoyable). Yet, its understanding
requires, at least, that one is able to pretend that some contradictions are the case. Whatever
representational content the above passage conveys, it seems to be one that is not bound by
the limits of logical space. In so far as propositions are bound by logical space, we need
something else than just propositions to account for the pretended representational contents
conveyed by Borges’ work.
Consider now a theatrical representation. Peter and Paul observe two different perfor-
mances of Shakespeare’s “Hamlet” at the National Theater. Peter sees Daniel Day-Lewis
performing as Hamlet, Paul gets to see Ian Charleson. As part of their understanding of
the play, Peter and Paul are asked to pretend that φ : that Hamlet is courageous. It seems
uncontroversial to say that both, Peter and Paul, share a common representational mental
state directed towards φ . But things get complicated when we wonder what exactly φ is.
Both Peter and Paul are engaged in object substitution. Peter pretends that Day-Lewis
is Hamlet, Paul pretends that Charleson is. According to Peter, whether or not Hamlet is
courageous depends on whether Day-Lewis has a certain set of properties; according to Paul
it depends on whether Charleson has them. So one and the same representational content,
e.g., φ that Hamlet is courageous, has different truth-conditions or, if you prefer, different
satisfiers depending on the theatrical performance. It seems, then, that φ is not a proposition,
for propositions are defined by their truth-conditions.
We can find some common conditions of satisfaction. We can say that, independently
of the performance, whether φ is the case depends on whether the relevant prop has the
relevant properties. This would give us common truth (or satisfaction) conditions for Peter’s
and Paul’s pretending that φ , but it still delivers the result that the representational content
is not determined by the truth or satisfaction conditions. For it is clear that neither Peter
nor Paul pretend that ψ: that the relevant prop is courageous; φ and ψ are not the same
representation.
These rather brief remarks suggest that, whatever they are, the representational objects
to which pretense mental states may be directed are importantly distinct from propositions.
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Two instances of these representational objects may be considered to be of the same type, as
with Peter’s and Paul’s pretense that φ , even though the instances have different referential
(and hence truth) conditions. Peter’s pretense takes ‘Hamlet’ to refer to Daniel Day-Lewis,
Paul’s to Ian Charleson. For reasons that should be clear in what follows, I will call these
peculiar representational objects “epistemically decoupled units” or EDUs for short. In the
following sections I offer a preliminary account of them by comparing them to propositions.
Even though it is still in its initial stages, the account should be enough to show how it
solves the problems posed by empty names.
5.2.3 EDUs and empty names
Of the three subprocesses mentioned in section 5.2.1 I want to underscore the third one.
It is the goal of the interpretation subprocess to assign the reference, truth, and existential
conditions of the corresponding representation. As a result of this process, empty names get
assigned a relevant content. This relevance will be determined by the needs of the context.
If, say, Sandra and Carla pretend of a doll that it is the Queen of England, then the referential
term ‘The Queen of England’ in the representation ‘The Queen of England has a dirty face’
will refer to the doll, and the truth-value of the representation will depend on the fictitious
properties that Sandra and Carla assign to the doll in question (e.g., having a face).
In all cases, by assigning an interpretation, the process delivers a meaningful representa-
tion that can now be the object of some attitude or other (e.g., the content of some belief
or other). The resulting interpretation, however, is general cognitive, in that it requires the
use of general purpose resources that go beyond purely linguistic ones. In this sense, the
interpretation is not semantic. This illustrates the third central thesis of the cognitive theory:
Cognitivism: Referential uses of empty names are intelligible not merely in virtue of
semantics and / or pragmatics, but mainly in virtue of the general cognitive resources
they recruit.
The importance qua referents of the objects used as props in the corresponding games
will vary from case to case. The game may include the rule that this and only this doll is to
serve as a prop of the Queen of England. It may also be, as it seems to go with Santa these
days, that many different objects may serve as a prop. In cases like this one, no particular
object is required to be the referent of the relevant term. To illustrate, consider the following
case.
Obama and McCain dress up like Santa and show up at Central Park, one on Monday,
the other on Tuesday. Suppose further on that it’s the first time Sandra and Carla meet with
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Santa. Sandra goes on Monday, Carla on Tuesday. On Friday Sandra and Carla get together.
They start wondering whether Santa will bring the gifts they expect. They do not wonder
whether Obama or McCain will bring the gifts. The interpretation subprocess may very well
have assigned Obama to be the referent of ‘Santa’ in the decoupled representation ‘Santa
will bring the gifts’. But it may very well have assigned any other object as well (e.g., a
drawing, a plastic toy, or even a mental image).
The relevant object of the attitudes here is that which is common to both Sandra and
Carla. They both entertain a full blown representation, with contents and truth-values
assigned. But what is common to both is not the referent that each has assigned to their
representations. Rather, what is common to both is the decoupled representation as it ap-
pears when divorced from its referential conditions. In cases like this, where the explanatory
role is played by the (decoupled) representation and not by its assigned contents, I say that
the attitudes are concerned with epistemically decoupled units (EDUs). This illustrates the
fourth and last thesis of the theory:
Representationism: Two object-directed attitudes, the content of which is cognitively de-
termined, may be directed toward the same object even if the associated representations
have been (cognitively) assigned different referents.
To avoid confusion it will be important to tease apart two different kinds of contents
that appear in the above thesis: (i) the object of the attitude, and (ii) the content of the
representation. There is a sense in which they may both be called “content”, one mental, the
other truth-conditional. But we need to properly distinguish among these two “contents” if
we are to make sense of object-directed attitudes—intentional or representational mental
states—associated with empty names. It is important, then, to keep in mind that we are
dealing with two distinct things: the object of the attitude (i.e., a representation) and the
content of the representation (i.e., an interpretation). That said, what representationism
claims is that two subjects may have the same attitude (e.g., belief) towards the same object
(e.g., Santa is coming tonight) even if they assign different interpretations to that object (e.g.,
one assigns Obama to ‘Santa’, the other McCain). This is possible in virtue of the nature
of the context in which the empty name is interpreted and insofar as the representation and
interpretation in question are the result of something like the decoupling mechanism just
described.
It is important to note, then, that on this view the cognitive interpretation cannot be
simply generalized to apply to every single utterance. Whether or not the cognitive account
applies depends on whether the situation demands that the subject make use of the relevant
general cognitive resources. This, in turn, is always determined by the context (e.g., a
134
context of fiction making). These are the contexts where representationism applies. The
cognitive theory of empty names claims that empty-name contexts generally make such
cognitive demands.
To better understand the object-directed attitudes that I am talking about here, it will be
useful to contrast them against good old “propositional” attitudes.
5.2.4 EDUs and propositions
I said the attitudes associated with empty names are concerned with a relevant EDU. For
ease of explanation, I will call these “EDU-attitudes”. What is, you may ask, the object
toward which they are directed? It is a representation with referential, truth, and existential
conditions assigned: a mental analogue of an interpreted sentence. In this sense, they are
very similar to propositions. Perhaps one wishes to think of propositions as sets of possible
worlds. Then one can also think of EDUs as sets of possible worlds: i.e., those stipulated by
the interpretation assigned by the decoupling mechanism. Alternatively, one may wish to
think of propositions as structured objects that mimic the syntax of the sentences used to
express them, with a corresponding assignment of the referents of the terms used . Then one
can also think of EDUs as structured objects in exactly the same way. The corresponding
referents will, once more, be determined by the interpretation assigned by the decoupling
mechanism. This naturally prompts the question: Isn’t this just the same as a proposition?
The short answer is no. The long answer requires some detail.
Differences
First and foremost, representationism is true of EDU-attitudes and, hence, it is also true of
the objects to which they are directed: i.e., EDUs. According to this thesis, the referential
conditions assigned to the EDU are not essential to them: a reference change need not result
in a different EDU. If one wants to keep the notion of reference as a semantic one, then one
can take the cognitive interpretation to assign “props” instead of referents. The example of
Sandra and Carla’s first meeting with Santa illustrates this very clearly. Sandra and Carla
may associate different props with ‘Santa’ (e.g., Obama or McCain) and yet they may both
have the same attitude (e.g., a belief) towards the same object (e.g., the representation that
Santa is coming tonight) that results from the process of decoupling.
However, representationism is generally not true of the attitudes associated with non-
empty names and, hence, it is generally not true of the objects they are directed towards.4 If
4I use the hedge “generally not true” to be consistent with the central claim that whether or not a cognitive
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these objects are propositions, then the thesis in question is generally not true of propositions.
Second, EDUs must be determined by something like the decoupling mechanism. This
mechanism, in turn, is cognitive-general. This, however, is not true of propositions. Insofar
as they are the objects of attitudes, propositions may be determined by task-specific linguistic
mechanisms: e.g., by means of syntactic and semantic processing. Now, insofar as it is
semantically determined, the referential conditions of a proposition are essential to it. The
same is not true of EDUs. In virtue of this there are no two mental states that can be directed
toward the same proposition and yet vary with respect to their referential conditions.
Third, this yields at least one important difference between propositional and EDU-
attitudes: the interpretation of embedded clauses in mental state reports. According to
the cognitive theory, the same sentence undergoes different interpretations depending on
whether it denotes the content of an EDU or a propositional attitude—i.e., in the case of
EDUs the referential conditions of the associated representation will be satisfied by props and
may be open to referential substitution. What is important, though, is that this differential
treatment is not explained by claiming that proper names may have different referents, but
by pointing at the general cognitive mechanisms that produce the objects of such attitudes.5
Thus, propositions and EDUs differ in kind as representational objects. The former
have their referential, existential, and truth conditions essentially. The latter do not. One
way in which this difference appears is with respect to referential conditions. Propositions
necessarily take referents. If the proposition is associated with a non-empty name, whatever
unique object is the referent of that name it is so by necessity. EDUs may take props. If the
EDU is associated with an empty name, whatever object the cognitive mechanism assigns
as the value of the name, it is only as a prop and, hence, it is not so by necessity. Many
other objects would do equally well, so long as they are assigned to the empty name by the
relevant process of interpretation. The paradigm example is, once more, the Santa case with
alternative props (e.g., Obama and McCain).
If we follow Rayo (forthcoming b) in distinguishing between formulas that are satisfied
by possibilities and those that are satisfied by representations of possibilities, we can take
propositions to always satisfy the former kind of formulas, while EDUs are able to satisfy
the latter. Rayo (forthcoming b) makes this distinction by means of the dot notation (ẋ).
interpretation applies will depend on the context. Thus, even though I give no example here, the cognitive
theory is open to the possibility of there being some use of a non-empty name that demands the use of the
decoupling mechanism and that may be said to observe representationism. It is important to note, though,
than in such case the name in question would not be used to convey its semantic content.
5This view on belief reports using empty names is wholly independent from the phenomenon of substitu-
tion failure. Empty name use and substitution failure are two clearly different phenomena. Elsewhere (see
Garcı́a-Ramı́rez, forthcoming a) I defend a predicate-transfer view of substitution failure that can be easily
applied to the case of belief reports that exhibit both phenomena: substitution-failure while using empty names.
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Thus, on this view, nothing can be said to satisfy the undotted sentence below (since there
is no object that is identical with Santa), but there is an EDU that can be said to satisfy the
second, dotted sentence (e.g., one that assigns Obama as a prop for Santa).
∃(x)(Santa = x)∧C(x)
∃(x)(Santa = ẋ)∧C(ẋ)
The difference is simple: (ẋ) takes us from possible objects to representations of these
possible objects. There are no possible objects that are Santa. But there are lots of them
that can represent Santa. It goes without saying that Rayo’s account is importantly different
from the cognitive theory I defend. His solution to the problem of empty names consists
in taking semantics (in general) to quantify over representations of possibilities instead of
possibilities. His account is, thus, semantic, not cognitive.
Similarities
I hope to have said enough about the differences between EDU-attitudes and proposi-
tional attitudes. In order to fully characterize the former it is important to also note some
similarities.
There is, first, an important psychological similarity. Even though they differ in virtue
of being directed toward different kinds of objects, EDU and propositional attitudes are both
guided by objects they are directed toward. If I believe that Santa is coming—i.e., if my
belief state is directed to the relevant EDU— and I believe that Santa loves cookies, I will go
and leave cookies by the tree. If I believe that Obama is coming—i.e., if my belief state is
directed to the relevant proposition— and believe that Obama likes cookies, I will go and
leave some cookies by the counter. Thus, EDU and propositional attitudes cause behavior in
exactly the same way.
Second, there is an important epistemological similarity. Both EDU and propositional
attitudes may be said to be adequate depending on the actual world. If, for example, the
relevant attitude has a mind-to-world direction of fit, it will be adequate (or true) depending
on what goes on in the actual world and regardless of whether its content is a proposition
or an EDU (more on this later). This seems to be the case with belief states. Whether they
are directed to an EDU or a proposition may be irrelevant when it comes to judging their
epistemological adequacy. If I truly believe (as opposed to merely pretend) that Santa is
coming tonight, my belief will be said to be epistemically inadequate even if it does have an
object (i.e., an EDU) as its content.
As for attitudes that are clearly concerned with fictions, such as pretense, their conditions
of adequacy will vary depending on the context. Whether and how the adequacy of these
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attitudes depends on the actual world is determined by the fictional context itself. For
example, if we pretend of a particular doll that it is the Queen, pretending that the Queen
has a dirty face may be adequate depending on the properties the doll actually has.
What we have, then, is a two-fold distinction between kinds of mental states: in terms of
direction of fit and in terms of kind of representational content (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Kinds of Mental States
Mental States Direction of Fit Referential Attitude
Commitment
Beliefs, hypotheses, etc. Mind-to-World Fixed Propositional
Beliefs, hypotheses, etc. Mind-to-World Flexible EDU
Desires, intentions, etc. World-to-Mind Fixed Propositional
Desires, intentions, etc. World-to-Mind Flexible EDU
Individuation
There are two defining properties of EDUs: (i) their referential conditions are not held fixed
(i.e., their referential terms may substitute reference without changing the representation);
and (ii) they are the product of the decoupling mechanism.
Given the truth of representationism, EDUs do not have their referential conditions
essentially—they exhibit what Leslie 1987 calls “object substitution”. Two subjects may
have attitudes directed toward tokens of the same EDU even if they assign different props to
the same corresponding referential term. Sandra and Carla, for example, both believe that
Santa is coming tonight. They both have a belief state directed towards the same object: i.e.,
a token of the same EDU.
But EDUs are also essentially the product of the decoupling mechanism described in
section 5.2.1. As mental representations, the relevant tokens and types of EDUs should
be individuated as products of the relevant cognitive processes. (For a similar view that
individuates representational content according to the cognitive mechanism responsible for
its production see Leslie 2008.)6
Through the first subprocess of copying, the “expression raiser” (see page 128) will
deliver the same uninterpreted sentence (e.g., ‘Santa is coming tonight’) in both cases.
Hence, for two objects of thought to be tokens of the same EDU they must correspond to the
same uninterpreted sentence in the language of thought. Through the second subprocess
the “manipulator” assigns inferential relations to the copied representation. Hence, for two
objects to count as tokens of the same EDU they must have, at least, equivalent inferential
6On Leslie’s 2008 view, generics (i.e., representations of the form ‘K’s are F’s’) are essentially the product
a default mechanism of generalization.
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patterns (this may be determined by the context). Finally, through the third subprocess
the “interpreter” assigns reference, existence and truth conditions by assigning referents
and meanings to the representation delivered by the previous subprocesses. We know the
reference conditions are not essential. But the same is not true of the existence and truth
conditions. EDUs should also be individuated in terms of these.
We have, then, four criteria for EDU individuation: reference substitution, correspon-
dence to uninterpreted sentences, inferential pattern, and existential and truth conditions.
All of these are determined by the decoupling mechanism.
I think this machinery is capable of solving all the relevant problems having to do with
ordinary use of empty names. I will present the solutions in the following sections. Let
me conclude the present section with two disclaimers. First, the cognitive account I have
described is meant to work on a case by case basis. It cannot be systematically generalized
to apply to any use of any term whatever. This precludes the account from overgenerating.
Whether the cognitive mechanism is in use and how it assigns values to terms is mostly up
to the context. Second, the distinction between EDUs and propositions (and between their
corresponding attitudes) is theoretical. I do not take speakers to be aware of such distinction,
or to know that they ascribe different kinds of attitudes depending on whether they use
empty names or not.7
5.3 Problem solving
5.3.1 Homogeneous semantics
The label “empty names” comprises three distinguishable kinds: fictional / mythical names
(e.g., ‘Santa’, ‘Hamlet’, ‘Pegasus’), mistaken scientific hypotheses (e.g., ‘Vulcan’), and
(perhaps) hallucinations—though this might be more about empty demonstratives than
names. The cognitive theory gives them all the same semantic treatment: they all lack a
proffered semantic value. Yet, they all convey the presupposition that there is a unique
object to which they refer (see page 126). A proper understanding of their ordinary use
requires that they be assigned an interpretation by means of something like the decoupling
mechanism.
7The cognitive theory of empty names does not require that speakers know there is a distinction between
EDU and propositional attitudes, just like Leslie’s 1987 meta-representational account of pretense does not
require that subjects know there is a distinction between representations and meta-representations.
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5.3.2 Meaningfulness
This helps us solve Reimer’s 2001a “intuition problem”, according to which speakers may
think that the sentences they use are meaningful even though they use empty names. The
case of speaker and hearer is easy. They take the speech acts to be meaningful in virtue
of cognitively interpreting them to be so. To properly engage in referential uses of empty
names, according to the cognitive theory, speakers must make use of extra-linguistic, gen-
eral cognitive resources such as the decoupling mechanism. Speakers (and hearers) find
referential uses of empty names to be meaningful because they imagine these names to have
a referent. This also explains why speakers (and hearers) may find such utterances to be
truth-evaluable.
It may be, however, that third parties also find such speech acts meaningful. Someone
who is not aware of Shakespeare’s work may nevertheless find an assertion of ‘Hamlet
is courageous’ to be meaningful without knowing that ‘Hamlet’ is a fictional name. She
doesn’t know what the conversants are talking about, yet she finds the utterance meaningful.
Perhaps this third party cannot be said to make use of the decoupling mechanism. Perhaps
she finds the use of ‘Hamlet’ meaningful without having to exercise her imagination to
produce an interpretation. This is possible, I think, only if we take the third party to interpret
the utterance of ‘Hamlet is courageous’ as meaning something like “There is a unique
thing that is courageous” or like “The thing (person) the conversants are talking about is
courageous”. This is not explained by appealing to the decoupling mechanism, but only
because it is already explained by appealing to the presuppositions conveyed by the use of
‘Hamlet’: i.e., that there is a single object to which uses of ‘Hamlet’ refer. Third parties
may find uses of empty names meaningful, without having to come up with an associated
referent, in virtue of the presuppositions conveyed by all referential uses of names. All this
is part of the cognitive theory of names (see section 5.2, page 126).
5.3.3 Fictional discourse
The account is also compatible with the distinction between fictional and non-fictional
discourse defended in section 5.1.2. On this view, fictional uses of empty names are
self-granting in virtue of prescribing their own interpretation—the fictional context itself
determines how the relevant speech act is to be assigned reference, existence, and truth
conditions. Since this is a cognitive, and not a linguistic, distinction it can be suitably
generalized to account for the fiction / non-fiction distinction. So long as we take objects
of fiction to be representations (and I see no reason against doing so), they can be said to
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prescribe their own interpretations. On this count the cognitive theory fares better than
Sainsbury’s 2005 and 2010 RWR theory (see section 5.1.2).
5.3.4 Psychological adequacy
The cognitive theory is consistent with the available evidence on pretense and fictional
reasoning. It partly stems from such research. But, does it face similar empirical problems
as Sainsbury’s RWR theory? (See section 5.1.2.) According to the cognitive theory, empty
and non-empty names are semantically on a par: all they require is an understanding of
reference. There are reasons to think this understanding is prelinguistic (see Garcı́a-Ramı́rez
and Shatz forthcoming). As such, the theory is compatible with the evidence suggesting
that proper names are understood as early as 6 months of age and, hence, a long time before
there is an understanding of identity statements.
The theory does claim that empty names, in particular, demand more than just linguistic
resources. There are independent reasons to think that competent use of these resources
(i.e., something like the decoupling mechanism) doesn’t appear until some time between the
second and third year of age (see Friedman and Leslie 2007). The cognitive theory predicts,
then, that competent use of empty names will not appear until some time between the second
and third year of age, once the decoupling mechanism is in use. There is, to my mind, no
evidence against this prediction, but there is some evidence that speaks on its behalf. On
this view, competent use of empty names appears at about the same age that children begin
understanding and engaging in acts of pretense, and it is also about the same age when they
understand identity claims and false belief. All these notions seem important to understand
what speakers do with empty names.
5.3.5 Non-fictional empty names
I have been speaking mostly of fictional empty names, but the cognitive theory is good
enough to account for referential uses of both fictional and non-fictional empty names. On
this view, there is no difference in kind between fictional (pretense-like) uses of empty names
and, say, serious (scientific-like) uses of them. There are, of course, important contextual
differences between Le Verrier’s hypothesizing that Vulcan is a planet that is responsible
for changes in the orbit of Mercury, and an adult’s pretending that Santa is coming tonight.
Yet, according to the cognitive theory, there is no linguistic difference and they both require
the use of the same general cognitive mechanism.
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The important difference between fictional and serious uses of empty names seems to be,
then, attitudinal. In both cases, the theory takes the speaker to have a mental state directed
toward an EDU, but the way they are directed differs. When used fictionally, empty names
are associated with a fictional or pretense-like attitude. When used seriously, empty names
are associated with a more epistemically committed kind of attitude (e.g., a belief). As such,
empty names and hence, EDUs can be associated with mental representational states with a
mind-to-world direction of fit.
Consider, for example, ‘Vulcan’. Le Verrier postulated the existence of a planet in
order to explain the disturbances in the orbit of Mercury. He called this hypothetical planet
‘Vulcan’. It turned out that there was no such planet and so ‘Vulcan causes disturbances in
the orbit of Mercury’ turned out to have no truth-value determined solely by semantics. We
can, I believe, reconstrue Le Verrier’s thoughts as imaginings and describe his intentions
accordingly. It could go as follows: we can conceive that Vulcan causes disturbances in
the orbit of Mercury; to believe this simplifies our theory and hence, is acceptable until we
find evidence to the contrary. Le Verrier did believe the representation he imagined (i.e., an
EDU), so he had an attitude with a mind-to-world direction of fit. Further evidence showed
Le Verrier’s hypothesis to be mistaken. No matter how well he imagined it, his belief turned
out to be false.
It is important to note that not all beliefs directed towards EDUs are automatically un-
warranted. Whether they are depends on the world and hence, on the evidence. Le Verrier
also hypothesized that Neptune caused disturbances in the orbit of Uranus. He had no more
evidence of the existence of Neptune than he had of Vulcan’s; as with the latter, he was
imagining an EDU and accepting it (or believing it) for theoretical purposes. It turned out
that he was correct in believing such a representation.
Presumably what happens once the subject finds evidence is that the relevant represen-
tation (i.e., initially an EDU) gets assigned an actual referent. At this time the information
gained through perceptual means is processed by the central system (see figure 5.2). Now,
once the relevant term, say, ‘Neptune’, gets its reference fixed with the information gained
through perception, the resulting representation lacks both of the defining features of EDUs:
it is no longer a product of the decoupling mechanism and its referent is not flexible or
substitutable; it is what Leslie calls a “primary representation” (see page 127) or what I have
here called a “proposition” (see page 135).
This proposition shares an important causal history with its EDU ancestor, and they share
some of the individuating elements for representations: i.e., they correspond to the same
uninterpreted sentence in the language of thought, and have equivalent inferential patterns
and perhaps also existence and truth conditions. This allows us to say that Le Verrier kept
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having the “same” belief throughout.
5.3.6 Errors and hallucinations
The case of errors is easily explained as well. Consider the following example:
Andy is lost in the desert; he is dehydrated. After hours of looking for someone,
he hallucinates a dark spot by a lake, at a distance. He says to himself, “He is by
the lake”. The sentence ‘He is by the lake’ has no semantically assigned referent,
yet Andy does have a mental state with content: because of his hallucination he
comes to believe that he is by the lake.
What’s the value assigned to ‘he’ in that representation? I think there’s one good can-
didate: the dark spot that Andy hallucinates. Does that spot exist? I think it does: it’s
something in Andy’s mind. Remember, anything may be assigned as a referent by the
subprocess of interpretation. What doesn’t exist is a person to whom Andy falsely believes
he is referring. In this particular case, Andy’s hallucinatory state turns out to be a false
belief (for some independent reasons to understand hallucinations in terms of false belief
see Byrne 2009).
5.3.7 Belief reports
Appealing to EDU attitudes also accounts for the problems associated with mental content
(see section 5.1.1). EDU attitudes are directed towards complete, full-blown, objects of
thought: an EDU with reference, existence, and truth conditions. As a result, they are
fine-grained enough to be psychologically explanatory, qua content, and they are as close
as anything can be to a singular proposition without being such: they are representations
that, if they were not detachable from their referential conditions, would represent singular
propositions. But how exactly does this work for belief reports? Here are some examples:8
(1a) Sally believes that Santa is coming tonight.
(1b) Le Verrier believed that Vulcan was a planet.
(1c) I used to believe that Santa exists, but now I don’t.
(1d) She used to believe that Santa exists, but now she doesn’t.
These are all “serious” uses of empty names. Fortunately, the fact that they are serious
does not constitute a problem for my account. The cognitive theory is not a pretense theory.
It does not take speakers to be always pretending (or to always ascribe pretense states) when
8I am not considering belief reports that exhibit substitution failure. See footnote 5.
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they use empty names. This, I think, is a great advantage of the account. As a result, it can
assign interpretations regardless of whether speakers pretend or not. What the theory claims
is that assertions using empty names either assert or ascribe an EDU attitude with an EDU as
content. So the examples in (1) all ascribe EDU attitudes towards EDUs, according to my
account. These objects of thought are full-blown mental contents with reference, existence,
and truth conditions assigned. So there’s nothing problematic with them. (1a) and (1b)
ascribe the EDUs in (2a) and (2b) to Sally and Le Verrier correspondingly, while (1c) and
(1d) describe how a given subject changed her mind from having a belief like EDU-attitude
towards the EDU in (2c) to lacking it. If we want, we may use an analogue of Rayo’s dot
notation ẋ to signal that a given content of a mental state is an EDU.
(2a) that ˙Santa is coming tonight
(2b) that ˙Vulcan is a planet
(2c) that ˙Santa exists
It should be clear that these are unproblematic cases.9
5.4 Advantages
I like to see my theory as having a mix of strength and parsimony. As I have shown, it
illuminates the many problems associated with the ordinary use of empty names, and it
does so in a unique way. Unlike all other theories, this one is compatible with a satisfactory
account of the fiction / non-fiction divide as well as with the evidence from language and
cognitive development.
So much for the strength. A very attractive part of the theory, to my mind, is its simplicity
and frugality. It offers a homogenous semantics for all referential uses of names, and it
does not require us to believe in the existence of fictional or any other special entities. It
does appeal to something like Leslie’s 1987 decoupling mechanism and the kinds of mental
representations associated with it. But this resource is one that we can have for free: we
will need it anyway if we want to account for the psychological process of pretense, fiction
making, and reasoning about false belief.
The cognitive account is also useful for purposes that go beyond the case of empty
names. Here are some examples.




There is a sense in which, when using a name like ‘Santa’ or ‘Hamlet’, speakers are said
to be talking about the same thing. This apparently happens even without pretense, for
consider the Shakespeare scholar whose life is dedicated to the study of Hamlet. What is she
studying? Works of fiction, of course. But, what are these? Fictional entities? Some, like
Salmon 1998, are happy to say: Yes, these are fictional entities. The theory I have proposed
suggests, however, a negative answer: No, fictional works are not fictional entities, nor are
they about fictional entities.
Fictional works are representations. But there is no need to go from this to accepting the
existence of what they pretend to represent. What matters, if the theory is correct, is not
what they represent but the works themselves qua representations. So Shakespeare scholars
study representations and this is exactly the kind of thing that they talk about when they
are talking about Hamlet. The same happens, the theory suggests, with all other fictional
representations including fictional names. There is nothing behind ‘Santa’, ‘Pegasus’, or
‘Venus’; what speakers talk about when they use these names, that very same thing they
share information about, is the representation itself, the contents of their own imaginings or,
as I put it, some EDU or other. (I have already explained how two subjects may be said to
have mental states directed toward the same EDU; see page 138.)
The cognitive theory explains how speakers manage to be concerned with the same rep-
resentation (or mental representation) in terms of the content of the mental states. Another
way to do this is to focus on the causal-historical chains of linguistic practice. If scholar
A’s use of ‘Hamlet’ is causally related to scholar B’s use in the relevant way—they are both
about the same representation, tokens of which they have seen, read, or heard—then scholar
A and scholar B are talking about the same thing.10 So, I propose, following Walton 1990,
that we stop talking about fictional objects and start talking about representations (some of
which are mental). To get an idea on mental representations, see Stich and Warfield 1994,
and for representations in general, look at Walton 1990.
5.4.2 Problematic assertions
It has been objected against pretense accounts of empty names that they cannot explain
serious uses of empty names. To illustrate, consider (3a)-(3d) (owed to Sainsbury 2010 and
Eric Swanson in conversation):
10For a similar causal account of “similar content” see Everett’s notion of THIN-ABOUTNESS in Everett
2000. His general theory of empty names, however, is one I disavow.
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(3a) The Greeks worshipped Zeus.
(3b) Holmes is famous.
(3c) Anna Karenina is smarter than Emma Bovary.
(3d) Santa is a fictional character.
Since it is not a pretense theory, the cognitive theory has no problems dealing with these
examples. It claims that serious assertions of (3a)-(3d) convey EDUs, which may very well
be accepted or believed by whoever utters them. As I said before, the fact that they are EDU
attitudes does not make them less (mind-to-world) committed. Suppose for the moment that
worshipping is a matter of believing. Then on my view, someone who utters (3a) may very
well believe a higher order EDU that itself attributes a belief-like EDU attitude (or a set of
these) to ancient Greeks. As such, the attitude ascribed by uttering (3a) may or may not be
warranted depending on the evidence we have about the attitudes of ancient Greeks. Similar
treatments are available for assertions of (3b)-(3d).
5.4.3 Explaining intentional inexistence
According to Brentano 1874:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by . . . the intentional (or mental)
inexistence of an object, and . . . reference to a content, direction toward an
object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent
objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within
itself. [Brentano, 1874, p. 88-89]
This paragraph has been highly influential in the philosophical tradition. It presents
two theses that almost everyone agrees with, yet there seems to be no agreement on how to
cash them out (for more details see Jacob 2003). The first thesis defines mental states as
intentional states: all and only mental states are about something, they tend to something
distinct from themselves. The second thesis takes mental states to be able to be about things
that do not exist (i.e., intentional inexistence). This second thesis seems to be the most
problematic: it suggests that we need to believe in so called “intentional objects”, things
which mental states are about and yet do not exist. Some feel uncomfortable postulating
things that are but do not exist. If possible, we should avoid making such assumptions.
The cognitive theory explains how speakers can be said to have thoughts about Santa,
Hamlet, Vulcan, etc., by having thoughts about some or other EDU. Thus, Brentano’s second
thesis is satisfied: by having mental states directed toward objects that are produced by the
decoupling mechanism, a speaker may be said to have thoughts about something that does
not exist. There is no need to look for special entities that do not exist. All we need is a
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relevant interpreted representation the interpretation of which does not require anything but
existing objects: i.e., an EDU. These objects exist; they are mental representations. Thus,
Brentano’s second thesis is verified without endorsing any extra ontology. Furthermore,
EDUs are distinct from the mental states that are directed toward them. Thus, Brentano’s first
thesis is satisfied. The cognitive theory explains how we can have thoughts about things that
do not exist without there being non-existing things and while distinguishing the content of
the thought (i.e., an EDU) from the thought itself (e.g., a belief directed toward an EDU).
I think this account of intentional inexistence does better than its rivals. But I don’t
have the space to defend it here. For some independent evidence on behalf of this account
see Gómez 2008, who offers an evolutionary account of pretense by associating it with the
appearance intentional inexistence. For an alternative account see Kriegel 2007.
5.4.4 Metanormative theory
The cognitive theory explains how sentences using vacuous terms can be meaningfully used.
It is also explains how subjects can have mental states directed toward full blown contents
that may be conveyed by uses of those sentences and hence, how they can be guided by
entertaining the corresponding objects of thought. As such, it is a general theory, not only a
theory of empty names. It might prove to be useful when trying to understand the content of
statements and mental states associated with expressions which we may have independent
reasons to think are vacuous (perhaps because we have no evidence of the existence of their
referents or no need to postulate them).
Contemporary debates in metaethics have raised the question as to whether moral and
(perhaps) aesthetic terms are vacuous or not—and so, as to whether sentences such as
‘Killing babies is morally wrong’ have a semantically determined content. If we do have
independent reasons to think that such is the case (i.e., that moral and aesthetic terms fail to
have an actual referent, content, or truth condition), the cognitive theory may prove to be
useful in explaining why those sentences may be used in meaningful ways, how subjects may
have mental states with full blown proposition-like contents associated with such statements,




There are some uses of what appear to be empty names that I have not dealt with. These
are uses that seem to be referential, but are such that we are not justified in associating any
object with the name (not even as a prop). One is not justified, in these cases, in assigning
EDUs to the relevant speech acts. These are uses of empty names in negative existential
constructions of the form ‘X doesn’t exist’ where ‘X’ is an empty name. The dialogue in
(4a) gives a good example of this kind of use:
(4a) L: Lock your doors, Santa’s coming!
E: This is the stupidest thing I’ve seen in a while, but what would I expect from Spam
Land?
M: How can a kid be afraid of the big red guy?
N: This article is complete BS. How could anyone be afraid of Santa? Santa doesn’t
even exist.
(found online)
I think the cognitive theory can accommodate these cases. There are independent rea-
sons to think that negative existential assertions do not involve referential uses of empty
names. On my view, we are better off understanding negative existentials as involving
self-referential uses, i.e., where the name, say, ‘Santa’, is used to refer to itself. Thus, on
this view, the speaker conveys some metalinguistic information about the name used in the
negative existential sentence. Strictly speaking, this use of an empty name is not empty: it
refers to itself. Yet it is because ordinary referential uses of the same name are empty that
negative existential assertions are true. I will explain how this works in the remainder of the
paper.
5.5.1 Positive and negative uses
Let me begin with some useful taxonomy. There are, generally speaking, two kinds of uses
of empty names within negative existential constructions. On the one hand, there are cases
where the speaker does intend to use the name in a referential way. These are cases where
the speaker intends to convey, pragmatically or otherwise, the non-proffered information
associated with all names (see the theses on page 126): i.e., that there is a referent of the
name. I dub such uses of negative existential assertions “positive uses”. Here are some
examples (found online) of such uses:
(5a) Check node type doesn’t already exist when installing a module.
(5b) Free speech doesn’t always exist online.
148
(5c) The Higgs boson particle doesn’t already exist.
(5d) There are many things that don’t exist: Pegasus, Santa, Hamlet.
(5e) According to the authoress, diseases can be grouped into two categories: those which
come from the Gage world, and those internal to the group. . . Yet, this distinction
doesn’t sometimes exist and they turn to any possible cure in order to recover from the
disease.
Positive uses are not problematic for the cognitive theory. Since the speaker is presup-
posing that there is a referent, the hearer will be justified in interpreting her utterance by
assigning a relevant object as the referent of the term. If the name in question is empty, the
cognitive theory explains how the hearer can come up with a useful interpretation by means
of something like the decoupling mechanism. There is nothing odd in interpreting positive
uses, such as those in (5) above, by taking the relevant name (or, in general, an NP) to have a
referent. What requires some non-ordinary interpretation is the speaker’s use of the English
expression ‘exists’.11 Consider, for example, (5d). It seems clear that the speaker means
to say that there are some things that are mythical or fictional. Another important feature
of the positive uses is that they admit Positive Polarity Items (PPIs) (e.g., sometimes, not
always, etc.) as in (5a), (5b), and (5c).
On the other hand, there are cases of negative existential assertions where the speaker
does not intend to convey the information that there is a referent associated with her use
of the relevant name. In these cases, the speaker cannot be said to presuppose that the
name she uses has a referent. I dub these “negative uses” of negative existential assertions.
An example of such a use appears at the end of the dialogue in (4a). Given the speaker’s
intentions, the hearer does not seem to be justified in interpreting her utterance by assigning
any referent to the name. It would be odd to interpret N’s assertion in (4a)—i.e., Santa
doesn’t even exist—as referring to Santa and claiming of it that it doesn’t even exist. The
speaker seems to be rejecting the very idea that the relevant NP (e.g., ‘Santa’) has a referent.
An important feature of negative uses, like that in (4a), is that they seem to admit only
Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) (e.g., even, never).
Negative uses of negative existentials are not readily explained by the cognitive theory.
In so far as it seems incorrect to take the speaker to be referring to some object or other it
seems incorrect to take the cognitive theory (as I described it) to apply to this case. It is
negative uses, then, that are left to be explained.
To reach a proper explanation, we first need to be clear about the goals that speakers
have while using negative existentials in this manner. The speaker in (4a) can’t be properly
11In terms of conventional meaning the English expressions ‘exists’ and ‘there is’ are equivalent. Yet, there
are several ordinary uses where they are not. The sentence “There is nothing you can do about it” is clearly not
equivalent to “What you can do about it doesn’t exist”. For more on the ambiguity of the English expressions
‘there is’ and ‘exists’ see Fleming and Wolterstorff 1960.
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said to be presupposing that the relevant NP has a referent. Rather, it seems that what she
wants to do is close off all talk about Santa. Here are some other examples that support this
view (all found online).
(4b) Web 2.0? It doesn’t exist!
My problem is not with the characterization of the components of Web 2.0. It
is the implication inherent in the very livery, “Web 2.0,” that I just dont get.
How did we get here? First of all, Web 2.0 is a marketing slogan. The problem
I have with this “Web 2.0” slogan is that it is a contrivance, meant to imply
a unified movement or wave toward a better Web (. . . ) That is, until some
clever marketers wanting to charge a fortune for you to attend their conferences
dreamed this one up. Dreamed Web 2.0 up as a nice-off-the-tongue, easily
memorable descriptor for come to our conferences, learn about whats hot. Or
as Wikipedia puts it, “Skeptics argue that the term is essentially meaningless, or
that it means whatever its proponents decide that they want it to mean . . . ”
(4c) I say dark matter doesn’t exist.
In a study detailed in the Nov. 21 issue of the Monthly Notices of the Royal
Astronomical Society, [John Moffat and Joel Brownstein say] their Modified
Gravity (MOG) theory can explain the Bullet Cluster observation. MOG differs
from other modified gravity theories in its details, but is similar in that it predicts
that the force of gravity changes with distance. “MOG gravity is stronger if you
go out from the center of the galaxy than it is in Newtonian gravity,” Moffat
explained. “The stronger gravity mimics what dark matter does. With dark
matter, you take Einstein and Newtonian gravity and you shovel in more dark
matter. If there’s more matter, you get more gravity. Whereas for me, I say dark
matter doesn’t exist. It’s the gravity that’s changed.”
It seems that in (4b)-(4c) the speaker / author is negatively using the relevant referential
expression—she can be appropriately understood to accept that the NP in question does
not have a referent. It also seems that an adequate account of the goals of these assertions
includes the expectation that there be a relevant shift in the conversation. The speaker may
want to shift the conversation so that the relevant NP is no longer used or that the talk about
the alleged denotation of the relevant NP be closed off. More specifically, with (4b) we are
asked to stop talking about Web 2.0; and with (4c) certain astronomers ask that their peers
stop talking about dark matter and focus more on gravity. Since these are the ones left to be
explained, from now on I will use “negative existentials” to refer only to negative uses of
the existential construction.
With this in mind, I want to defend the following hypothetical claim: if we assume that
the relevant NP used in a negative existential is used self-referentially, we can avail ourselves
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a metalinguistic account of their use. To use a name, say ‘Santa’, self-referentially is to use
it not to refer to Santa, but to refer to the name ‘Santa’. Though semantically obvious, the
distinction is not obvious usage-wise. As Geurts 1998 puts it:
All things considered, language users don’t seriously try to make formal dis-
tinctions between linguistic expressions and their names. Instead they simply
use an expression to refer to itself, whenever the need arises. It follows from
this that ALL expressions of any language are equivocal in a way: besides their
ordinary meaning(s), they can also be used to designate themselves. [Geurts,
1998, p. 291.]
Let me now describe the metalinguistic interpretation I have in mind.
5.5.2 Metalinguistic interpretation
There are, to my mind, two different ways in which a negative existential may be used to
achieve its conversation-shifting goal. The most straightforward way to do it is by uttering a
negative existential that makes use of the relevant NP. On this view, a speaker can convey
the information expressed by (6a) by uttering (4a) in the relevant context.
(4a) Santa doesn’t even exist.
(6a) ‘Santa’ doesn’t even name something.
But one can also achieve the same goal by means of anaphoric reference as E does in (6b).
(6b) L: Nessie is carnivorous.
E: No, she isn’t. She doesn’t even exist.
On my view, these two uses of negative existentials may benefit from two different
mechanisms that allow the audience to recover the metalinguistic interpretation from the
conventional semantics of the sentence used. These are the mechanisms of meaning transfer
and presupposition accommodation. Briefly put, negative uses such as that in (6a) are
taken to involve selfreferential uses of their NPs, while those like (6b) are taken to deny a
metalinguistic presupposition of the utterance.
This metalinguistic view is not new, it has its ancestors in Stalnaker 1978, Walton 2000,
and apparently also Clapp 2008. Even though I agree with the spirit of these proposals, I
believe they have an inconvenience: none of them tells us how it is that hearers may recover
this non-literal (metalinguistic) interpretation from the literal semantics of the uttered sen-
tence. My main contribution to this tradition will be to point at the mechanisms by means of




Meaning-transfer was initially proposed and developed by Nunberg 1979 and 2004.12 The
mechanism is meant to explain how speakers may use expressions to convey information
that differs from their conventional content. For example, speakers may use (7a) to convey
something more like (7b).
(7a) I am parked out back.
(7b) I am the owner of a car that happens to be parked out back.
Nunberg 1979 and 2004 describes two conditions on predicate meaning-transfer: func-
tionality and noteworthiness. The former requires that the context include a salient function
mapping the predicate used onto the relevant (transferred) property by means of a function
mapping the ordinarily associated property onto the new one. The latter requires that the
transferred property be useful to classify its bearer for the purposes of the context. It seems
to me that every context in which a proper name is used includes a salient function mapping
the predicates associated with the referent of such name onto the property of naming the
object that has such property. For example, in a context where speakers say things like
‘Santa is red’, there will be a salient function mapping the predicate ‘being red’, which is
associated with the referent of ‘Santa’, onto the property of NAMING SOMETHING RED,
which is associated with the name ‘Santa’.
In the case of negative existentials, there will be a function mapping ‘exists’, which
may be said to be associated with the property of BEING SOMETHING, onto the property of
NAMING SOMETHING. It seems also that in such contexts it will be useful to classify the
relevant NPs (e.g., ‘Santa’) depending on whether they do or do not have a referent. Thus, it
will be useful to classify ‘Santa’ depending on whether it does or does not name something.
Thus, the property of NAMING SOMETHING will be a noteworthy one in the context where a
negative existential may be felicitously uttered. With these ingredients in hand, the mech-
anism can work in a simple manner: (i) the relevant name is used self-referentially; and
(ii) the non-negated predicate in the VP transfers its meaning into the property of NAMING
SOMETHING. That is how an utterance of ‘Santa doesn’t even exist’ can be interpreted as
(6a).
(6a) ‘Santa’ doesn’t even name something.
12Geurts 1998 describes both mechanisms in relation with the phenomena of irregular or metalinguistic
negations (see Horn 1989).
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Presupposition accommodation
Now, on this view, negative existentials involving anaphoric reference would benefit from
a different mechanism. The idea is that, just like there is anaphoric reference, there is
anaphoric presupposition accommodation by means of which a given assertion may ac-
commodate (or reject) a given presupposition of a previous assertion. In particular, denials
may be used to target and reject such presuppositions. Geurts 1998 defends a “binding
theory” of presupposition accommodation to explain how presupposition denial works.
What I am trying to illustrate is how such mechanism may help hearers interpret a negative
existential involving anaphoric reference in a metalinguistic manner. I am not claiming that
this mechanism is exactly the one described by Geurts 1998, but rather that there is some
mechanism or other of presupposition denial (see Horn 1989). Whatever that mechanism
may be should be enough for our purposes.
The “binding theory” of presupposition projection claims that anaphoric reference is
just a case of presupposition binding. Just like definite NPs can refer back to objects previ-
ously referred to in a given conversation, presupposition carrying expressions refer back to
presuppositions of expressions previously used in the discourse. The difference between
anaphoric pronouns and presupposition carrying expressions is that the latter may have a
richer semantic content. It is this richer content that allows them to be either bound or
accommodated. On this view, when interpreting the presuppositions of a given use of an
expression, speakers are guided by the following constraints in a step-wise manner:
A: Bind the presupposition to a suitable antecedent;
B: If not possible, then accommodate; and
C: If accommodation is necessary, do so globally if not locally.13
To illustrate how this mechanism works consider (6b)
(6b) L: Nessie is carnivorous.
E: No, she isn’t. She doesn’t even exist.14
In (6b) L uses ‘Nessie’ referentially. So L’s use carries a metalinguistic presupposition:
that ‘Nessie’ has a referent. This presupposition is inconsistent with E’s beliefs. How should
13To see how this mechanism works in detail and particularly with respect to the principles of Discourse
Representation Theory see Geurts 1998, p. 299-304.
14Compare with the following case of presupposition denial:
– L: Obama just quit smoking.
E: No, he didn’t. He never did smoke.
153
she accommodate such presupposition? The metalinguistic view I want to defend takes this
presupposition to be accommodated locally within the scope of the negation in E’s assertion
‘She doesn’t even exist’. Here is an example of the kind of reasoning suggested by the
metalinguistic view I defend.
E’s use of ‘she’ is anaphoric on L’s use of ‘Nessie’. It carries the reference and familiarity
presuppositions carried by L’s use of ‘Nessie’. How should one go on interpreting E? Well,
if we assume that L’s use of ‘Nessie’ does have a referent we can have a suitable antecedent
for ‘she’. But doing so would be very costly, for it would make E’s assertion inconsistent.
We would be taking E to assume there is some such referent of her use of ‘she’ and that that
thing does not exist. If we do not assume that L’s use of ‘Nessie’ has a referent then we do
not have a suitable antecedent that may bind the reference presupposition of E’s use of ‘she’.
So we are forced to accommodate this presupposition.
Now, we still have two options. We can try to accommodate the presupposition globally,
in this case, by whatever appears outside the scope of the negation. If we do so, we would
take E to presuppose that her use of ‘she’ in fact has a referent. But then we are again facing
the same problem: E’s assertion is inconsistent with this presupposition. Thus, we are forced
to accommodate locally, by taking the metalinguistic presupposition to fall under the scope
of the negation. If so we can reject the presupposition that E’s use of ‘she’ has a referent by
taking it to be negated. This delivers a consistent interpretation of E’s assertion: it is a denial
of L’s metalinguistic presupposition that ‘Nessie’ has a referent. Thus, we get once more
the desired metalinguistic interpretation that can help the speaker achieve her goal: close off
all conversations about Nessie. The resulting interpretation of (6b) is something like (6c).
(6c) L: Nessie is carnivorous.
E: No, she isn’t. ‘Nessie’ doesn’t even have a referent.
5.5.4 Problem solving
Let me now conclude these remarks by showing how well the metalinguistic interpretation
can solve the problems posed by negative existentials. These include the use of negative
existentials in neutral contexts, affirmative existentials, and existential suppositions.
Neutral contexts
There are two generally different contexts in which a negative existential may be used:
charged and neutral. Charged contexts may be said to include or exclude the proposition
that the relevant NP has a referent among the set of presuppositions. Neutral contexts are
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those that may be said to neither include or exclude such a presupposition. I said negative
existentials were informative because they convey the information that a given denoting
phrase doesn’t have a referent. This suggests that they are informative only in charged
contexts. However, the account works for both charged and neutral contexts.
Consider a neutral context. We have some evidence of the existence of a big mammal in
loch Ness, but the evidence is not good enough to believe there’s some such monster. So,
we don’t know whether or not it exists. In such a context we could utter either one of the
sentences in (8).
(8) The Loch Ness monster doesn’t exist!
The Loch Ness monster exists!
Asserting either one will be felicitous precisely because the context doesn’t make any
presuppositions about the reference of the denoting phrase. Asserting either one will also be
informative. The negative existential will convey that ‘the Loch . . . ’ doesn’t refer, while the
affirmative existential will assert that it does. So negative existentials may be felicitously
uttered in neutral contexts and in contexts that are committed to the existence of a referent
of the NP used.
Affirmative existentials
Now, an adequate theory of negative existentials must also explain how affirmative existen-
tials work. For it seems clear that negative existentials are closely related to them. As a
matter of fact, a proper account must show how it is that affirmative and negative existentials
constitute affirmation / denial pairs. It is a further virtue of the proposal I am defending
that it helps clarify this relation. Affirmative existentials may be felicitously uttered in both
neutral contextsand contexts that are committed to there being no referent of the relevant
NP. The latter are contexts in which the proposition that the relevant NP doesn’t refer is
being presupposed. The metalinguistic proposal has a very natural way of accounting for
affirmative existentials. Consider the conversation in (9)
(9) L: The Loch Ness monster prefers to sleep at the north end of the lake.
E: No, it doesn’t. In fact, the Loch Ness monster doesn’t exist.
L: You’re wrong. The Loch Ness monster exists. I’ve seen her myself.
Suppose that right after E’s assertion the context is negatively charged. So the context
is inconsistent with L’s beliefs. L can try to to fix the context directly by asserting the
affirmative existential. Such an assertion would involve a positive use of the relevant definite
NP, so it would carry reference presuppositions. These presuppositions are not yet satisfied
by the context, but that doesn’t preclude the assertion from being felicitous because, if it
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were accepted, the context would have been fixed. The affirmative existential asserts what it
presupposes, namely, that a given denoting phrase has a referent.15
This is a metalinguistic account of affirmative existentials that explains why affirmative
and negative existentials constitute affirmation / denial pairs. Affirmative existentials convey
the information that the relevant NP has a referent; negative existentials deny this.
Existential suppositions
I have not said, nor do I want to say, that all negative existential constructions work in exactly
the same way. Stalnaker 1978 provides some rather distinct uses of such constructions that
will help clarify my position. It seems as if negative existentials act differently in assertions
than they do in suppositions. Consider the following counterfactual owed to Kripke:
(10) If Aristotle hadn’t existed, the history of philosophy would have been very different
from the way it was.
Stalnaker 1978 notes that:
Clearly the proposition expressed in the antecedent of this conditional is not
the proposition that our use of the name Aristotle is not appropriately con-
nected with any individual. THAT proposition is compatible with Aristotle’s
existence. Furthermore, if Aristotle hadn’t existed, then our uses of his name
probably would not have existed either. The proper name seems to function in
the antecedent of the counterfactual more like the way it functions in ordinary
predicative statements. The proposition is determined as a function of the
PERSON Aristotle; it is true in possible worlds where HE does not exist, and
false in possible worlds where HE does exist. [1978, p. 93]
So it seems that negative existential suppositions are better understood as involving what
I dubbed “positive uses” of the existential construction (see section 5.5.1). In using them,
speakers seem to be conveying (or intending to convey) information about the denotation of
the relevant NP. If such suppositional uses involve an empty name, the cognitive theory has a
ready made explanation of their interpretation. All this is consistent with the metalinguistic
account of negative uses that I am defending.
Further issues
It seems to me that there are several other problematic features associated with negative uses
of existential constructions. An interesting issue has to do with the fact that it is not correct
15It is perhaps surprising to say that a given utterance asserts what it presupposes. But there is nothing
wrong with this. There are many other expressions the successful use of which takes the speaker to be asserting
what she presupposes. Felicitous utterances of ‘I am here’ and ‘I am speaking now’ are among them.
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to use ‘X doesn’t exist’ when ‘X’ is the name of a deceased individual. The interesting thing
here is that the assertion is incorrect even though it would be literally true and informative.
It is not correct, for example, to say things like “Churchill doesn’t exist” or “Ted Kennedy
doesn’t exist”. This suggests that the literal interpretation of negative existentials—that
which takes assertions of ‘X doesn’t exist’ to convey the literal negation of the claim that X
is an existent thing—is mistaken.16
This feature can be readily explained by the metalinguistic account: if assertions of
‘X doesn’t exist’ convey the information that the ‘X’ does not name something, then an
assertion of ‘Churchill doesn’t exist’ would convey the false information that ‘Churchill’
does not name something. And the same would happen if we were to use any name that is
used to refer to no-longer-living individuals within the construction ‘X doesn’t exist’.
I mentioned above that negative existentials accept NPIs but not PPIs. They have other
peculiarities as well. Negative uses, for example, cannot be accommodated prefixally. ‘Santa
doesn’t exist’ is not equivalent to ‘Santa is unexistent’ or ‘Santa is inexistent’. Positive uses,
however, allow such accommodation. Here are some examples (found online):
(11a) The field of industrial design is inexistent in Lebanon.
(11b) I live in a family where trust is inexistent and suspicion prevails.
Negative uses do not seem to follow the rule of obversion either. ‘Santa doesn’t exist’ is
not equivalent to ‘Santa is nonexistent’. Positive uses do seem to follow such rule, as in the
following examples (found online):
(11c) Service is nonexistent here.
(11d) John’s problems are nonexistent.
Negative uses are also not fully compositional. ‘Santa doesn’t exist’ is not equivalent to
‘Santa fails to exist’. Positive uses do allow the substitution of ‘doesn’t exist’ for ‘fails to
exist’. Examples:
(11e) A stable structure may fail to exist even if all the individuals have the same initial
endowments in private good [Weber, 1985, p. 178].
(11f) Expected utility fails to exist with constant relative risk aversion [Yoon, 2004, p. 219].
If this evidence is trustworthy, it offers support for the metalinguistic hypothesis, since
all these problematic features are, according to the experts (see Horn 1989 and Davis 2008),
characteristic of metalinguistic denials. It may also be that these features are not trustworthy
symptoms of their being metalinguistic denials. If so, they at least pose a challenge to
the opposing view that takes negative existentials to be ordinary negations with a literal
16The incorrectness of these uses of negative existentials is confirmed cross-linguistically, as it also appears
in Spanish and German. This suggests that it is not a peculiarity of some uses of negative existential assertions.
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interpretation.
It is unclear how such literal accounts (such as Sainsbury’s 2005 and 2010) can explain
why negative existentials exhibit all these features: i.e., accepting only NPIs, rejecting
prefixal accommodation, violating obversion, and not being fully compositional. Notice as
well that on this opposing view the incorrectness in using negative existentials with names
of deceased individuals turns out to be a mystery.17
5.6 Closing remarks
I have offered a new account according to which competence for empty names demands
the use of non-linguistic, general cognitive resources: i.e., something like Leslie’s 1987
decoupling mechanism (see section 5.2). On this view, the relevant content associated
with ordinary uses of empty names is what I call an EDU (see sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4).
I have shown how appealing to EDUs and their correlate EDU attitudes helps us solve
all the puzzles traditionally associated with empty names and a few more having to do
with psychological adequacy and the nature of fiction (see section 5.3), as well as some
longstanding philosophical puzzles (see section 5.4). I have also shown that this account
explains how empty names are interpreted in positive uses of existential constructions, both
denials and affirmations (see section 5.5.1). Furthermore, this cognitive theory is compatible
with a plausible metalinguistic account of negative uses of existential constructions (see
sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.4), which prove to be problematic for any account of empty names. I
believe all these are good reasons to accept the cognitive theory of empty names.
17For arguments against a third alternative account of negative existentials, according to which they are
interpreted as quantificational claims, see Walton 2003.
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Conclusions: Lessons from proper
names
What does a philosopher learn by looking at proper names from a cognitively oriented
standpoint?
Proper names are cognitively special. They constitute the very first words of an infant’s
lexicon, their comprehension demands very minimal cognitive resources, yet they are physi-
ologically and memory-wise expensive (see Garcı́a-Ramı́rez and Shatz, forthcoming). As
we argue in chapter 2, both features appear to have a common source: a lack of semantic
associations for proper names. Compared to other items in the lexicon, proper names have
very minimal, if any, content. All they seem to demand is an understanding of the reference
relation—i.e., that which holds between two objects one of which is taken to be a sign of
the other. This understanding appears to be the result of prelinguistic preparedness on the
side of the speaker. And it is plausible to think that it is part of a uniquely-human cognitive
endowment (see Penn, Holyoak and Povinelli 2008).
Given the plausible assumption that proper names are referential expressions, reference
itself turns out to be an abstract yet simple notion. It demands a comprehension of higher
order abstract relations. In particular, it requires, first, that the subject understands what it is
for an object to be a sign; and, second, that this object can be directly related to a second
object of which it is the sign. An understanding of abstract relations such as these appears to
be part of a uniquely human cognitive endowment that includes many other abstract notions:
e.g., from early on infants understand what it is for an object to be continuous in space and
time, as well as what it is for two or three objects to be numerically distinct. Yet, as abstract
as it may be, reference is simple: there are no mediating concepts or intensions between the
term (or its mental counterpart) and the referent. This yields an important result: human
beings do not appear to need mediating intensions to be able to think about objects.
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Proper names are also special thought-wise. We normally distinguish between physical
or material objects and representations. Cognitive psychologists urge us to distinguish
between representations and their interpretations, between, say, a proper name and its as-
signed referent. We need to make such distinction to understand how it is that humans, as a
matter of fact, engage in acts of fiction making (see Leslie 1987). At some point between
the second and third year of age human infants are able to follow and develop complex
games of make-believe that require an understanding of even more abstract notions such as
those of “prop” and “representation” (see Nichols and Stich 2000). Thus, signs and, with
them, names, are not only good to deliver objects of thought but may themselves constitute
relevant guides for thinking. Several different tasks are achieved thanks to this mechanism,
including an understanding of pretense, false belief, and plausibly also language processing
(see Shatz 2008).
Given a cognitive apparatus that is able to distinguish between a representation and its
semantic interpretation, it is not a surprise if that mechanism still distinguishes between
representations even when they have exactly the same semantic interpretation. Thus, it is
not a surprise that humans may distinguish between ‘Without Averroes there would be no
western culture’ and ‘Without Ibn Rushd there would be no western culture’. Furthermore,
it is not a surprise that competent speakers may form their opinions based on this distinction.
In chapter 3, I argue that making such distinctions and forming opinions on their basis
are intimately related phenomena. Without an understanding of the underlying cognitive
mechanisms, such mental phenomena become puzzles: “informativeness” and “substitution
failure”.
If one is merely concerned with assigning a semantic interpretation (e.g., reference,
content, truth-conditions) it will of course seem puzzling that a substitution of semantically
equivalent representations should make any difference. And it may seem natural to think
that one needs to add something else to the semantics. The picture of the human cognitive
apparatus offered in chapters 2 and 3 suggests that human cognition is far from being only
interested in the semantically assigned interpretation of the representations toward which
subjects may direct their thoughts.
In chapter 4, I argue that the key to solve these puzzles is to realize that the relevant
thoughts are concerned with the representations and not so much with their semantics.
Subjects may take different coreferential names to refer to different objects and, hence,
understand the predicates associated with each name as corresponding to different objects.
Speakers may realize this and exploit it in order to adequately describe the mental state of
such subjects. The clue, then, is not to make the semantics more complex but to find out
what is guiding the relevant thought, that is, to realize what the relevant thought is really
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about. I take this to be one of the advantages of the cognitively oriented methodology I have
followed throughout (see Leslie 2008 for a similar approach).
Finally, proper names are special as they are unique to our human way of living. Under-
standing names illuminates how we think about how our world is, but also how we imagine
how it could be and should be: i.e., how we create fictional stories as well as scientific
hypothesis. It seems natural to think that the cognitive mechanisms involved in human
pretense and fiction making would play a significant role in the way in which humans use
fictional names (see Shatz 2008). Cognitive psychologists have done a lot to improve our
understanding of such mechanisms.
There is evidence suggesting that humans make use of something like a decoupling
mechanism by means of which they copy, manipulate, and interpret mental representations
according to the demands of the situation. Some such mechanism has been shown to play a
central role in the comprehension and ascription of mental states, as well as in the compre-
hension and engagement with pretense and make-believe (see Leslie 1987, and Friedman
and Leslie 2007).
In chapter 5, I take seriously the idea that there is a common mechanism underlying acts
of pretense and the understanding of empty names. Thus, I offer a cognitive theory of the
ordinary use of empty names by appealing to the decoupling mechanism that psychologists
associate with pretense. The account is offered not in terms of the semantics of empty names,
which I take to be the same as that of non-empty names, but in terms of cognitive-general,
non-linguistic, abilities of interpretation and manipulation of representations. I develop the
account further by including a somewhat detailed description of the type of representation
that is produced by such psychological processes. Once we have such a “cognitive” content
in hand we can explain how humans manage to convey information, form opinions, and
construct complete and meaningful stories, as well as theories, by using empty names.
There appears to be more than just fiction and science to human existence. We also
live in a world replete with institutions and norms. The cognitive theory, I believe, can be
extended to contribute, at least partly, to a better understanding of how we have thoughts and
convey information about such things. As things stand now, there are good reasons to think
that moral cognitive development is essentially tied to the development of a theory of mind,
both of which seem to make use of the same decoupling mechanism deployed in acts of
fiction making (see Shatz 1994, Wellman 1990, Haidt 2008, and Wellman and Miller 2008).
It is not a surprise, on this view, that some autistic children with poor moral cognition tend
to do bad in false-belief tasks and fail to engage in acts of make-believe.
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We can learn a lot by looking at proper names from a cognitively oriented standpoint.
 – Et ces’t tout?
– Ça suffit!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